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Introduction

M

ore than seven years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
and the subsequent anthrax-laced mailings in October of that year,

and three years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast
region, America has grown complacent about public health emergency
preparedness.

In January 2009, President-elect Barack Obama will be

inaugurated as president. Periods of governmental transition, here and abroad,
are often seen as a time when new leaders are tested in international affairs,
especially during war-time. Many national security experts are concerned that the
United States could face another terrorist attack, which requires higher levels of
vigilance, including increased attention to possible bioterror threats.1 Presidentelect Obama has noted the importance of assuring a smooth transition. Asked
about his transition team’s priorities he told CBS’s 60 Minutes, “Number one, I
think it’s important to get a national security team in place because transition
periods are potentially times of vulnerability to a terrorist attack.”2
While significant progress has been made to
better protect the country from health emergencies, funding for essential programs has
been cut, putting these improvements in
jeopardy. Additionally, a number of critical
areas of preparedness still have significant
gaps, including surge capacity and biosurveillance systems, and these problems are less
likely to be addressed as funding decreases.
Federal funding for state and local preparedness is down more than 25 percent from FY
2005 levels. In addition, there is no longer
any supplemental funding for states and localities for pandemic influenza preparedness,
even though state and local public health departments are expected to play a key role in
the nation’s strategy for combating pandemic
influenza. State and local governments will
not be able to make up for the shortfalls in the
current economic climate. According to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 33
states are facing shortfalls to their 2009 state
budgets, and 16 states already project shortfalls to their 2010 budgets. At the current rate

of economic deterioration, and based on the
course of past recessions, the Center predicts
that 2010 state budget gaps will be about $100
billion.3 Trust for America’s Health (TFAH)
is deeply concerned about the potential impact of these budget cuts on states’ ability to
be prepared for emergencies.
Pandemic flu, emerging infectious diseases,
terrorism, and catastrophic natural disasters
remain serious threats to our national security.
Instead of cutting these programs, Presidentelect Obama, his administration, and the
111th Congress must prioritize public health
emergency preparedness and dedicate sustained and increased funding to ensure Americans are well protected.
Americans expect and rely on the government to protect them from terrorism and
natural disasters, since people have little
power to protect themselves from these
crises. In a recent survey conducted by
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and
Public Opinion Strategies for TFAH, 61 per3

cent of Americans say that preparing for
major disasters is a very important issue for
government to focus on.
It is also clear that Americans will blame the
government if preparedness is lacking during future emergencies. When Americans
learn more about the details of gaps in preparedness, they are very concerned and believe the government is failing to live up to
its responsibility. The fact that many U.S.
cities and communities still do not have the
supplies and plans necessary to deal with
these emergencies causes people a great deal
of concern. Eighty-two percent of Americans
say this fact makes them concerned about
the safety of the country, with 53 percent responding that it makes them very concerned.
TFAH has issued the Ready or Not? Protecting
the Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and
Bioterrorism report, which examines the
progress that has been made in improving
America’s ability to respond to public health
emergencies, since 2003. This report, the
sixth annual edition, finds that on some levels, significant progress has been made in the
nation’s preparedness. There are important

areas, however, where continued, concerted
action is needed. From assuring an adequate
stockpile of pandemic influenza countermeasures to having adequate laboratory capacity to respond to a chemical or
radiological event, federal and state policies
still fall short of their stated goals. In many
other areas, a lack of transparency makes it
hard for the American people and their
elected representatives to know whether
their government is protecting them. The
variation in preparedness among the states
means that where one lives still determines
how well one is protected. Until all states
measure up, the United States is not safe.
The report also helps identify ongoing areas
of vulnerability. Some of the key areas of concern TFAH has raised include the need to:
I Increase accountability;
I Strengthen leadership;
I Enhance surge capacity and the public
health workforce;
I Modernize technology and equipment; and
I Improve community engagement.

A MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM TAKES ON
ALL-HAZARDS
There has been increasing acknowledgement among America’s leaders and current and former public health officials
about the need to modernize the public
health system to respond to a range of
threats, including naturally occurring diseases and disasters, as well as bioterrorism.
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the
potential for a pandemic flu outbreak, increased attention to foodborne illnesses,
and growing concerns about emerging infectious diseases have contributed to a
broad recognition among policy makers of
the need for an all-hazards approach to
public health preparedness.
In December 2006, Congress took steps to
address many of these concerns when legis4

lators updated and reauthorized the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Act, which
is now known as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). In addition, the White House issued a number of
presidential directives with components
aimed at improving public health emergency
preparedness. The most recent was Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)
21, released in October 2007, which establishes a National Strategy for Public Health
and Medical Preparedness.
The next challenge is to ensure that the
measures contained in the legislation and
directives are carried out and translated
into improved public health preparedness,
thereby keeping communities throughout

the country safer and better protected.
This will require sufficient funding requests
from the president and subsequent approval by Congress to carry out federal preparedness activities. Another challenge is
to address federal funding levels for upgrading state and local public health preparedness, which have been decreasing
yearly since 2004. This decline, along with
the fluctuations and uncertainty of funding
for other federal preparedness grants, has
adversely affected progress.
The 2008 edition of Ready or Not? focuses on
evaluating America’s public health emergency preparedness in the context of these
measures passed by Congress and issued by
the Bush administration to try to improve allhazards preparedness.
TFAH issues this report in order to provide
an independent analysis to:

I Inform the public and policymakers about
progress and vulnerabilities in the nation’s
public health preparedness; and
I Foster greater accountability for the
spending of taxpayer dollars on emergency preparedness.
Congress and the public are entitled to know
how well the country is being protected from
health threats. Moreover, the public health
system and other government entities involved in protecting the public’s health must
be held accountable for how well they are
carrying out their responsibilities as defined
by legislation and administrative directives.
In addition, without information about the
status of progress and vulnerabilities, it is difficult to determine whether the resources
and funds devoted to preparedness are sufficient for adequately protecting the public
from health threats.

Ready or Not? 2008: Key Findings
Indicator
1. Mass Distribution -- Strategic
National Stockpile
2. Mass Distribution -- Antiviral
Stockpiling
3. Public Health Laboratories -Lab Pickup and Delivery Services
4. Public Health Laboratories -Pandemic Influenza Planning
5. Biosurveillance

6. Health Care Volunteer
Emergency Liability Protection
7. Entity Emergency Liability
Protection
8. Medical Reserve Corps Readiness
9. Food Safety -- Detection and
Diagnosis
10. Funding Commitment

Finding
All 50 states and D.C. have an adequate plan to
distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, and medical
supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
Sixteen states have purchased less than 50 percent
of their share of federally-subsidized antivirals.
Twenty-four states and D.C. lack the capacity to
deliver and receive lab specimens on a 24/7 basis.
Three state public health laboratories are not able
to meet the expectations of their state’s pandemic
influenza plans.
Six states do not have a disease surveillance system
that is compatible with CDC’s National Electronic
Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
Eight states have limited protection for health care
volunteers during times of emergency.
Twenty-six states lack statutes that extend some level
of immunity to groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services.
Sixteen states do not have State Medical Reserve
Corps Coordinators.
Twenty states and D.C. identified the pathogen
responsible for reported foodborne disease outbreaks
at a rate lower than the national average of 44 percent.
Eleven states and D.C. cut funding for public health
from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08.
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SOME KEY 2008 PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
I January 2008: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warns of potential botulism in
canned green beans and garbanzo beans. Although no illnesses had been reported, FDA instructs that all cans from the infected plant should be immediately and carefully thrown away.
I February 2008: In the largest beef recall in history, 143 million pounds of beef are deemed
“unfit for human consumption.” The recall occurred after the Humane Society of the
United States released an undercover video showing workers at the California meat company kicking sick cows and using fork lifts to force them to walk.
I February 2008: Vials of ricin are found in a motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada after a man
suffering from respiratory distress was transported to the hospital.
I February 2008: An outbreak of 11 measles cases is identified in San Diego, California. The
strain is identified from an unvaccinated young boy who had recently traveled to Switzerland.
I March 2008: FDA warns of Salmonella risk in cantaloupes imported from a Honduran
grower and packer. CDC received reports of 50 illnesses in 16 states and nine illnesses in
Canada linked to contaminated cantaloupes.
I March and June 2008: Heavy rains cause severe flooding in the Midwest. In March, 17 people
died as a result of the flooding, and by the end of June storms and flooding across six states
caused 24 deaths, 148 injuries and more than $1.5 billion in damages to Iowa alone.
I June 2008: In June, outbreaks of Salmonella are linked first to tomatoes and months later to
jalapeño and Serrano peppers. Since April 2008, CDC has identified 1,442 people who
were sickened by the outbreak in 43 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and Canada.
I June 2008: Lightning sparks thousands of California wildfires across northern California.
Over 2,700 individual fires were recorded causing mandatory evacuations and damaging
thousands of acres.
I September 2008: In early September, Hurricane Gustav makes landfall in Louisiana and
causes widespread destruction statewide, amounting to billions of dollars in damages.
I September 2008: Just weeks after Hurricane Gustav hit the United States, Hurricane Ike
hits Texas as a category 2 storm, causing extreme damage in Texas. Twenty-seven deaths
are attributed to the storm that forced hundreds of thousands of residents to evacuate.
I September 2008: Melamine-contaminated infant formula and related dairy products produced in
China were found in countries across the globe. U.S. food safety officials conduct a national assessment to determine if any of the contaminated product was imported illegally into the United
States.

ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
The U.S. public health system is responsible for protecting the American people from a range of
potential health threats. An all-hazards public health system is one that is able to respond to and
protect citizens from the full spectrum of possible public health emergencies, including bioterrorism
and naturally occurring health threats. An all-hazards system recognizes that preparing for one
threat can have benefits that will help prepare public health departments for all potential threats.
Under an all-hazards approach, the public health system prepares for and is able to respond to
unique concerns posed by different threats. For instance, threats may be:
I Isolated at our borders, or regionally, or be national or global in scope;
I Of limited duration or occur in repeated waves; and
I Preventable and treatable through vaccines and medications, or there may be no pharmaceutical
interventions available.
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EXAMPLES OF MAJOR EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS
Agroterrorism: The “...deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of
generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability.”4 Agroterrorism can be
considered a subcategory of “bioterrorism” and foodborne diseases.
Bioterrorism: The intentional or deliberate use of germs, biotoxins, or other biological agents
that cause disease or death in people, animals, or plants. Examples include anthrax, smallpox,
botulism, Salmonella, and E. coli.
Blast Injuries: Explosions, whether deliberate or accidental, can cause multi-system, life
threatening injuries among individuals and within crowds. Blunt and penetrating injuries to
multiple organ systems are likely when an explosion occurs. Also, unique injuries to the lungs
and central nervous system occur during explosions.
Chemical terrorism: The deliberate use of chemical agents, such as poisonous gases, arsenic,
or pesticides that have toxic effects on people, animals, or plants in order to cause illness or
death. Examples include ricin, sarin, and mustard gas.
Chemical incidents and accidents: The non-deliberate exposure of humans to harmful
chemical agents, with similar outcomes to chemical terrorism.
Foodborne diseases: Foodborne illness is caused by harmful bacteria, viruses, parasites or
chemicals that are found in food and beverages and enter the body through the gastrointestinal
tract. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates there are approximately 75 million pathogen-induced cases of foodborne diseases each year in the United
States, causing approximately 325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths. Examples include botulism, Salmonella, E.coli 0157:H7, shigella, and norovirus.
Natural disasters: Harm can be inflicted during and after natural disasters, which can lead to
contaminated water, shortages of food and water, loss of shelter, and the disruption of regular
health care. Examples include hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, mudslides, fires, and tsunamis.
Pandemic flu: A novel, potentially lethal strain of the influenza against which humans have no
natural immunity. According to estimates from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), a severe pandemic could result in 1.9 million deaths and 9.9 million hospitalizations in the United States.5
Radiological threats: Intentional or accidentally-caused exposure to radiological material. A
terrorist attack could involve the scattering of radioactive materials through the use of explosives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction of a nuclear facility, the introduction of radioactive material into a food or water supply, or the explosion of a nuclear device near a population center.
Vector-borne diseases: Diseases spread by vectors, such as insects. Examples include the
West Nile virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and malaria.
Waterborne diseases: Diseases spread by contaminated drinking water or recreational
water, such as typhoid fever and cholera. According to CDC, over 1,000 persons become ill
from contaminated drinking water and over 2,500 persons become ill from recreational water
disease outbreaks annually in the United States.6
Zoonotic/Animal-borne diseases: Animal diseases that can spread to humans and in some
cases, become contagious from human to human. Examples include Avian flu, West Nile virus,
and SARS. In 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) identified more than 200 diseases
occurring in humans that were known to be transmitted through animals.7 Experts believe that
the increased emergence of zoonotic diseases worldwide can be attributed to population displacement, urbanization and crowding, deforestation, and globalization of the food supply.
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WHAT DOES ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE?
THE GOALS OF 24/7 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE INCLUDE:
I Rapid detection of emergency disease threats, including those caused by bioterrorism.
I Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly diagnose an infectious disease outbreak or to
identify the biological or chemical agent used in an attack.
I Surge capacity for mass events, including adequate facilities, equipment, supplies, and
trained health professionals.
I Mass containment strategies, including pharmaceuticals needed for wide-scale vaccination,
antibiotic, or antidote administration and isolation and quarantining when necessary.
I Streamlined and effective communication channels so health workers can swiftly and accurately communicate with each other, other front line workers, and the public about 1) the
nature of an emergency or attack, 2) the risk of exposure and how to seek treatment when
needed, and 3) any actions they or their families should take to protect themselves.
I Communications must also be able to reach and take into consideration at-risk populations.
I Streamlined and effective evacuation of at-risk populations with special medical needs.
I An informed and involved public that can provide material and moral support to professional
responders, and can render aid when necessary to friends, family, neighbors, and associates.
What it will take to achieve basic levels of preparedness:
I Leadership, planning, and coordination: An established chain-of-command and well defined roles and responsibilities for seamless operation across different medical and logistical
functions and among federal, state, and local authorities during crisis situations, including police, public safety officials, and other first responders.
I An expert and fully-staffed workforce: Highly trained and adequate numbers of public
health professionals, including health care providers, epidemiologists, lab scientists, and
other experts, in addition to back-up workers for surge capacity conditions.
I Modernized technology: State-of-the-art laboratory equipment, information collection,
and health tracking systems.
I Pre-planned, safety-first rapid emergency response capabilities and precautions:
Tested plans and safety precautions to mitigate potential harm to communities, public health
professionals, and first responders.
I Immediate, streamlined communications capabilities: Coordinated, integrated communications among all parts of the public health system, all frontline responders, and with the public.
Must include back-up systems in the event of power loss or overloaded wireless channels.
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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH JURISDICTIONS
The federal role: Includes policymaking, funding programs, overseeing national disease prevention
efforts, collecting and disseminating health information, building capacity, and directly managing
some services.8 Some public health capabilities, such as the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), are
federal assets managed by federal agencies that are available to supplement a state’s and community’s response to a public health emergency that overwhelms or may overwhelm their capabilities. Public health functions are widely diffused across eight federal agencies and two offices.
State and local roles: Under U.S. law, state governments have primary responsibility for the
health of their citizens. Constitutional “police powers” give states the ability to enact laws and
issue regulations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. In most states, state laws charge local governments with responsibility for the health of
their citizens. State and local health departments and first responders are the front line in any
public health emergency.
Some of the ongoing problems resulting from this diffused structure include:
1. Lack of clear roles for the various state, local, and federal agencies.
2. Differing responsibilities and capacities among the some 3,000 local health departments.
3. Limited coordination among the levels of government, including determination of how federal assets would be deployed to states and localities, and across jurisdictions, such as sharing assets and resources among states.
4. No minimum standards, guidelines, or recommendations for capacity levels or services are
required of state and local health departments. This results in major differences in services
and competencies across state and local agencies.
5. Lack of funding flexibility and comprehensiveness due to a federal funding structure that is
largely based on categorical or program grants. These often restrictive grants also lack a system of accountability.
6. Ineffective and random capacity to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations, community groups, and the private sector.

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES
In 2003, HSPD-8 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to draft a national all-hazards
preparedness goal, and in 2007 DHS released the National Preparedness Guidelines. The
Guidelines include three important elements -- the National Planning Scenarios, the Universal
Task List and the Target Capabilities List.9 These three documents illustrate the magnitude of
the federal, state, and local preparedness efforts.
The National Planning Scenarios is a list of 15 potential threats including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.

National Planning Scenarios
Improvised Nuclear Device
Aerosol Anthrax
Pandemic Influenza
Plague
Blister Agent

Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Nerve Agent
Chlorine Tank Explosion
Major Earthquake
Major Hurricane

Radiological Dispersal Device
Improvised Explosive Device
Food Contamination
Cyber Attack
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The Target Capabilities List includes 37 specific capabilities that all sectors of society should
possess in order to respond to any disaster.

Target Capabilities List
Communications
Community Preparedness and Participation
Planning
Risk Management
Intelligence/Information Sharing
and Dissemination
CBRNE Detection
Information Gathering and Recognition
of Indicators and Warnings
Intelligence Analysis and Production
Counter-Terror Investigations and
Law Enforcement
Animal Health Emergency Support
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Emergency Operations Center Management
Emergency Public Information and Warning
Environmental Health
Explosive Device Response Operations
Fatality Management
Fire Incident Response Support
Isolation and Quarantine

Critical Infrastructure Protection
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
Laboratory Testing
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and
Related Services)
Mass Prophylaxis
Medical Supplies Management
and Distribution
Medical Surge
Onsite Incident Management
Emergency Public Safety and
Security Response
Responder Safety and Health
Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Search and Rescue (Land-Based)
Volunteer Management and Donations
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response
and Decontamination
Economic and Community Recovery
Restoration of Lifelines
Structural Damage Assessment

The Universal Task List (UTL) is a menu of over 1,600 tasks that assist efforts to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from the 15 scenarios listed above. The UTL is not a
static list and will continue to be edited and expanded as additional tasks are addressed and
considered. The UTL is organized using four levels that define the type of tasks performed -National Strategic Tasks, Planning, Coordination and Support Tasks, Incident Management
Tasks, and Incident Prevention and Response Tasks. Combining the UTL with the Target
Capabilities List provides officials at all levels of government with a framework to evaluate their
level of preparedness.10
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State-By-State Public
Health Preparedness
Indicators and Scores

“
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MEASURING PREPAREDNESS IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATE PROGRESS.
— U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

SECTION
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All Americans have the right to expect fundamental health protections during public
health emergencies, no matter where they live.

I Expansion of laboratory capacity
L The number of Bio-Safety Level-3 Labs
has grown from 69 to 139.

States and localities play the central role in protecting the public’s health, whether in response
to routine threats or emergencies, such as a
bioterrorist attack or a natural disaster. Under
the U.S. Constitution, each of the 50 states has
primary legal jurisdiction and responsibility for
the health of its citizens. Therefore, the chief
focus of this report is the capacity of the states
to protect citizens from public health threats and
emergencies -- and the federal government’s important role in developing that capacity. The
federal government also plays a crucial role by
providing leadership, scientific evidence, and
critical resources to assure that every jurisdiction
is adequately and equally prepared. (The federal role is discussed further in Section 2.)

L The number of labs participating in the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
for infectious diseases exceeds 150, with
at least one in each state.14

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the Bush administration and Congress
have made state and local preparedness a priority, directing CDC to funnel more than
$6.3 billion to state and local health departments. The large infusion of cash has led to
progress in a number of key areas:
I Development of emergency response plans
L Eighty percent of states have response
plans for anthrax, 98 percent for smallpox, 67 percent for botulism toxin, 69
percent for nuclear events, and 49 percent for nerve agents.12
I Distribution of medical countermeasures
L All states have developed strategies and
plans to receive and distribute SNS
medical supplies.13

I Workforce
L All state public health departments
have staff on call 24 hours a day, seven
days a week, 365 days a year to evaluate
urgent disease reports.15
I Emergency communications
L Public health departments in all 50 states
and D.C. have trained public health professionals about their roles and responsibilities during an emergency as outlined
by the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS); in 1999 only 14 states did so.16
While TFAH applauds this progress, much
work remains to be done. In addition, CDC
and other agencies must do a better job of
communicating progress and gaps to policy
makers and the general public. The American people deserve to know how prepared
their states and communities are for different types of health threats, particularly when
their taxpayer dollars are being spent to support preparedness efforts. Currently, the
American public is not equipped with
enough information to monitor and hold
public officials accountable for whether their
communities are adequately prepared.
11

EVERY STATE IS DIFFERENT, BUT THERE ARE BASIC EXPECTATIONS EVERY
STATE SHOULD MEET TO ENSURE PREPAREDNESS FOR ALL-HAZARDS
States differ in how they structure and deliver public health services. In some states, the public
health system is centralized, and the state has direct control and supervision over local health
agencies. In other states, local public health agencies developed separately from the state and
are run by counties, cities, or townships, and usually report to one or more elected officials.17
Each state has different strengths, weaknesses, and unique challenges that affect its ability to
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. This report assesses how states are
performing with respect to meeting their preparedness responsibilities.
To help assess public health emergency preparedness capabilities, each state received a score
based on 10 key indicators, which TFAH derived from current publicly available data. Low
state scores reflecting weaknesses and challenges are not intended to be punitive. Rather, this
report is intended to help identify where and how states can improve or overcome obstacles
to an all-hazards approach to public health preparedness. In addition, providing information
about which states have particular strengths allows others to know which states to turn to for
best practices and models to guide their own preparedness efforts.

STATE SCORES
Despite allocation of more than $6.3 billion
in federal public health preparedness funds
to states and localities over the past six years,
reliable, valid performance measures to evaluate emergency preparedness are still to be
fully developed. Currently, CDC is using new
capability-based performance measures for
the state and local grantees.18 As CDC and
the research community build a stronger research base on preparedness, CDC expects to
roll out new objectives. Until recently, what
little data that is collected on public health
preparedness generally was not made publicly
available. However, in February 2008, the
CDC released its first report on the Public
Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State. The report
included data on all 50 states and four major
U.S. cities: Chicago, D.C., Los Angeles, and
New York City. CDC’s release of information
about the progress states have made to improve public health emergency preparedness
was an important step forward for transparency and accountability.
To further the discussion about state preparedness, TFAH annually develops 10 indicators focused on key areas of preparedness
using the limited data currently available for
12

all 50 states and D.C. Each state receives one
point for achieving an indicator or zero points
if they do not achieve the indicator, thus zero
is the lowest possible overall score and 10 the
highest. Taken collectively, these indicators
offer a composite snapshot of preparedness
including strengths and vulnerabilities.
TFAH has repeatedly called for the government to develop national performance standards and to publicly release information on
a routine basis about states’ progress in meeting these standards. The indicators in this
report were selected based on:
I Reflection of a fundamental, systemic public health need;
I Consultation with key experts about areas
important to serving basic public health
emergency needs; and
I The availability of state level data that were
verified through independent means or in
consultation with states.
Scores focus on relative achievements in
areas of preparedness, and highlight areas
where increased prioritization and investment must be made to address problems.
TFAH is only able to assess states comparatively where there are data available for all 50

states and D.C. Many states have taken action in other areas of preparedness or may
be in the process of increasing certain capabilities not reflected in this report. In some

WA

cases, TFAH is reporting data that shows an
improvement upon the state scores CDC
published in February 2008, representing
progress over the past year.

ND

MT

MN

VT

SD

OR

ID

ME

WI

WY

NH
MA

NY

MI
IA
NE
IL

NV

UT

CO

KS

IN

PA

OH
WV

MO

KY

VA

CA
OK
AZ

NM

TN

CT

RI

NJ
DE
MD
DC

NC

AR
SC
MS

TX

AL

GA

LA

FL

AK
HI

Number of Indicators Color
5
6
7
8
9
10

SCORES BY STATE
10
(5 states)
Louisiana
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Virginia
Wisconsin

9
(8 states)

8
(9 states)

Arkansas*
Alabama
Indiana
Michigan
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont

Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Minnesota
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Washington

7
(14 states & D.C.)
California
Colorado
D.C.
Illinois
Kentucky
Missouri
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming

6
(8 states)
Alaska
Idaho
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
Mississippi
Nevada
Texas

5
(6 states)
Arizona
Connecticut
Florida
Maryland
Montana
Nebraska

* Note: Arkansas’s score has been revised. The state provided information confirming they have a Medical Reserve Corps
Coordinator after the original release of the report.
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STATE PREPAREDNESS SCORES

States

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas*
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
14

1
Has adequate
plans to
distribute
emergency
vaccines,
antidotes
and medical
supplies from
the SNS

2
3
Purchased State public
50 percent health lab has
or more of an intra-state
its share courier system
of federally- (non-mail) that
subsidized operates 24
antivirals hours per day
for specimen
pickup and
delivery
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4
5
State public Has a disease
health lab
tracking
can meet the system to
expectations collect and
of the state’s monitor
pandemic
data
influenza electronically
plan
via the
Internet











































































6
7
8
9
10
Has laws
Has laws
State has a State identified Increased or
that reduce that reduce
Medical
the pathogen maintained
or limit
or limit the
Reserve responsible for level of
the liability liability for Corps (MRC) reported
funding
exposure for businesses and Coordinator foodborne
for public 2008
health care non-profit
disease
health
Total
volunteers organizations
outbreaks at
services Score
who serve in that serve
a rate that met
from
a public
in a public
or exceeded the FY 2006-07
health
health
national average
to
emergency emergency
of 44 percent FY 2007-08
(combined data
2004-2006)







































































































































47+D.C. 44+D.C. 42+D.C. 24+D.C. 34+D.C.
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9
6
5
9
7
7
5
8
7
5
8
8
6
7
9
8
6
7
10
6
5
6
9
8
6
7
5
5
6
10
7
7
7
10
8
8
7
7
9
7
9
8
9
6
7
9
10
8
7
10
7

* Note: Arkansas’s score has been revised. The state provided information confirming they have a Medical Reserve Corps
Coordinator after the original release of the report.

Some indicators reflect states’ use of funds
received through bioterrorism and public
health cooperative agreements from the
CDC and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
at the HHS, other health capacity readiness
programs, and state public health funds for
health emergency preparedness. Other indicators, however, illustrate the breadth of
all-hazards public health preparedness and

examine state laws and state collaboration
with planning partners.
Data from these indicators were drawn from
a range of publicly available sources, including CDC, ASPR, a survey conducted by the
Association of Public Health Laboratories
(APHL), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), public announcements from states, and interviews
with government officials.

Indicators

What the Indicators Measure

1. Mass Distribution -- Strategic National Stockpile - Did the
state test its plan to distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes,
pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies from the SNS, and receive a
passing grade from CDC?
2. Mass Distribution -- Antiviral Stockpiling -- Did the state
purchase 50 percent or more of its federally-subsidized antivirals
drugs to stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic?

This indicator assesses a state’s emergency response plan to quickly
provide medications to communities during emergencies.

3. Public Health Laboratories -- Lab Pickup and Delivery
Services -- Does the state public health lab currently have an
intra-state courier system (non-mail) that operates 24 hours per
day for specimen pickup and delivery?
4. Public Health Laboratories -- Pandemic Influenza Planning -Does the state public health laboratory meet the expectations of the
state’s pandemic influenza plan?
5. Biosurveillance -- Does the state use a disease surveillance
system that is compatible with CDC’s national system, including
integrating data from multiple sources, using electronic lab results
(ELR) reporting, and using an Internet browser?
6. Health Care Volunteer Emergency Liability Protection -Does the state have laws that reduce or limit the liability exposure
for health care volunteers who serve in a public health emergency?

7. Entity Emergency Liability Protection -- Does the state have
laws that reduce or limit the liability for businesses and non-profit
organizations that serve in a public health emergency?

8. Medical Reserve Corps Readiness -- Does the state have a
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinator?
9. Food Safety -- Detection and Diagnosis -- Did the state
identify the pathogen responsible for reported foodborne disease
outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national average of
44 percent (combined data 2004-2006)?
10. Funding Commitment -- Did the state maintain or increase
funding for public health programs from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08?

The federal government has declared stockpiling antivirals to be a
shared responsibility between the federal government and the states.
This indicator assesses the state’s ability to provide antivirals to high-risk
populations during an influenza pandemic.
This indicator reflects whether states have the capacity to deliver and
receive laboratory specimens on a 24/7/365 basis.

This indicator demonstrates the ability of the states to ensure
surveillance and laboratory capability during each phase of a pandemic.
This indicator demonstrates information about which states track health
threats in a manner compatible with the standards of CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). This system makes it
possible to quickly identify and track outbreaks and share the information
in a consistent way across health agencies and states.
This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to call up a health care
volunteer workforce in the event of a public health emergency. The
lack of liability protection is a serious deterrent to many volunteers who
may want to offer their health care services but are fearful of doing so
without clear liability laws.
This indicator helps evaluate states’ abilities to work with the private
sector in the event of a public health emergency. The lack of liability
protection is a serious deterrent to many businesses and non-profits
that may want to offer their services but are fearful of doing so without
clear liability laws.
This indicator assesses the state MRC program on the presence of a
State MRC Coordinator, who is responsible for working with all MRC
units in the jurisdiction.
This indicator reflects the ability of states to identify the pathogen
responsible for foodborne disease outbreaks.

This indicator, adjusted for inflation, demonstrates states’ commitment
to funding public health programs, which support the infrastructure
needed to adequately respond to emergencies.
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TREND ANALYSIS OF SELECT READY OR NOT? KEY INDICATORS
In the six years that TFAH has evaluated states preparedness, there has been considerable improvement. Although TFAH does not use the same 10 key indicators each year, the report has
tracked the following six indicators over time: Strategic National Stockpile; Public Health Laboratories -- Bio-Threat Testing; Public Health Laboratories -- Workforce; Biosurveillance -NEDSS; State Pandemic Influenza Plans; and Seniors’ Seasonal Flu Vaccination Rates.
Does the state have an adequate
SNS plan?
51
50

41

Does the state have sufficient lab
capabilities to test for bio-threats?
50

40

40

30

37

39

2005

2006

44

30
15

20
10

16

20

7

10

6

0

0
2005

2006

2007

2003

2008

2004

2007

*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007 and 2008.
**Note: In 2007, CDC switched from a green-yellow-red
stoplight model of evaluating state SNS plans to a 100point scale, where 69 and above is deemed sufficient.

Does the state public health lab have
adequate staffing to provide 24/7 coverage
to analyze samples in an emergency?
50

49

47

42

40

Does the state use a disease
surveillance system that is
NEDSS-compliant?
50
40

30
20

30

21

20
10

10
0

2004

2005

2006

2007

0

45

38

39

2006

2007

27
18

2004

2005

2008

*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2007 and 2008.

Does the state have a pandemic
influenza plan?
51

50

50

40

40

30

30
20

38

2006

2007

20
10
0

2003

2004

2008

*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2008.
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51
40

30
13

10
0

Did the state increase or maintain
seniors’ flu vaccination rates?

2008

*Note: D.C. is included in the total for 2006, 2007,
and 2008.

PROGRESS IN REPORTING STATE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Since 2002, CDC has administered the PHEP cooperative agreement, which channels federal
dollars to state and local public health departments.
In February 2008, CDC released its first report on the progress states have made using these
dollars and the existing challenges. The report, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by
State, includes national data as well as state-specific snapshots for all 50 states and four directly
funded localities: Chicago, Los Angeles County, New York City, and D.C.
Areas where progress was noted include the following:
I The number of epidemiologists in public health departments working in emergency response has doubled from 115 in 2001 to 232 in 2006;
I The number of state and local public health laboratories able to detect biological agents has
increased from 83 in 2002 to 110 in 2007; and
I Seventy-three percent of states reviewed have satisfactorily documented their plans to receive, store, and distribute the SNS.
Among areas where challenges to emergency preparedness and response remain were the following:
I Sixteen states did not report any plans to electronically exchange health data with regional
health information organizations;
I Thirty-one state public health laboratories reported difficulty recruiting qualified laboratory
scientists; and
I No state public health laboratories can rapidly identify priority radioactive materials in clinical samples.
As CDC continues to work with state and local public health departments, the agency prioritized the following initiatives, which include:
I Increasing the use of electronic health data for preparedness and response by networking
surveillance systems and using real-time data;
I Expanding laboratory testing; and
I Improving legal preparedness for public health emergencies.
In September 2008, the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Partners Workgroup, composed
of members of ASTHO, APHL, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), and
the National Association of Country and City Health Officials (NACCHO) released its own survey
of the PHEP Cooperative Agreement. The report, Public Health Emergency Preparedness: Six Years
of Achievement, also highlights improvements and challenges, but fails to list any state-specific data.
Among the accomplishments listed, the report details the following:
I All states have developed all-hazards emergency response plans;
I Nearly two-thirds of state health agencies have implemented workforce planning programs
to recruit, train, and retain a skilled workforce;
I State health agencies participated in more than 700 exercises of all types in 2007, and an
even greater number of exercises occurred at the local level; and
I Nearly all states (96 percent) now have 24/7 communications systems linking hospitals, state
and local public health officials and law enforcement, up from 80 percent in 2002.
The ongoing challenges include the following:
I Many local health departments lack plans for mass patient care and fatality management;
I Forty-three percent of small local health departments and nine percent of medium-sized
ones have no staff dedicated to preparedness activities; and
I Epidemiologists, environmental health workers, and laboratorians are “very-to-moderately”
affected by overall health care workforce shortages.
The report calls for “...a steadfast commitment of federal leadership, guidance, technical assistance and resources” to continue to develop and strengthen state and local preparedness.
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Indicator 1: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)
FINDING: All 50 states and D.C. have adequate plans to receive and distribute emergency vaccines, antidotes, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies from the SNS based on CDC’s technical assistance review (TAR).

1 State had a TAR this year but the
preliminary scores were unavailable
as of November 19, 2008.
2 State SNS score is preliminary
and awaiting final review.
Source: CDC. States were
evaluated between December 11,
2006 and September 23, 2008.
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50 states and D.C. scored 69 or higher
on CDC’s SNS TAR evaluation tool,
indicating they have adequate plans in
place to receive and distribute medical
countermeasures from the SNS
(1 point).

0 states scored below 69 on CDC’s
SNS technical TAR evaluation tool,
indicating they do not have adequate
plans in place to receive and distribute
medical countermeasures from the SNS
(0 points).

State
Alabama1
Alaska1
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine1
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada2
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon2
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington2
West Virginia
Wisconsin1
Wyoming2

State

Last TAR Date
9/26/2007
12/11/2006
6/17/2008
3/18/2008
6/17/2008
5/25/2008
1/28/2008
3/28/2008
6/16/2008
1/15/2008
5/13/2008
7/10/2008
10/10/2007
5/21/2008
6/25/2008
5/14/2008
6/17/2008
5/28/2008
4/4/2008
10/28/2008
8/1/2008
3/25/2008
11/28/2008
12/17/2007
3/7/2008
11/27/2007
7/15/2008
8/27/2008
11/18/2008
1/24/2008
12/6/2007
7/16/2008
5/22/2008
2/12/2008
11/6/2007
1/23/2008
6/12/2008
8/6/2008
9/23/2008
7/29/2008
1/10/2008
7/17/2008
8/12/2008
9/19/2007
8/6/2008
3/14/2008
7/14/2008
7/30/2008
9/4/2008
12/19/2007
10/16/2008

SNS Score
92
80
83
93
100
94
84
96
94
95
73
74
90
96
96
93
93
86
94
90
93
91
95
84
95
96
91
81
84
86
98
71
97
93
77
90
97
85
82
93
87
87
89
97
85
93
100
94
83
86
80

Last TAR Date

SNS Score

The SNS is a national repository of antibiotics,
chemical antidotes, antiviral drugs, antitoxins,
life-support medications, intravenous (IV) administration equipment, airway maintenance
supplies, and medical and surgical items. The
SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply
state and local public health agencies in the
event of a national emergency anywhere and
at anytime within the United States or its territories. As a condition of federal public health
preparedness grants, states are required to develop a plan for the receipt and distribution of
SNS contents and then exercise the plan.19
According to CDC, “Preparedness to receive,
stage, store, and distribute SNS materiel is essential to saving lives at risk during a public
health emergency.”20 For example, in a 2007
study, researchers used a computer model to
illustrate the importance of rapidly receiving
and dispensing medical countermeasures in
the event of a bioterrorist anthrax attack. According to the study’s authors, “The number
of people infected who become seriously ill
can be reduced by 81 percent if mass prophylaxis is initiated two days after the release (of
the anthrax) and finished two days later. If
mass prophylaxis is initiated five days after the

release and finished 10 days later, the number
of casualties is reduced by only 39 percent.”21
CDC evaluates states’ SNS distribution preparedness plans based on a zero-to-100 point
scale. The agency’s TAR relies primarily on a
checklist tool for evaluating SNS plans and
supporting documents. The evaluation takes
place over the course of one day during an onsite CDC staff visit.22 There are 13 functions
on which states are evaluated.23 The scoring
system assesses planning and management of
the stockpile. It does not reflect the actual capacity of the state to deploy countermeasures
and other supplies from the SNS.
According to CDC, states must obtain a score
of 69 or higher on the SNS TAR by December
31, 2008. As of November 19, 2008, 50 states
and D.C. scored 69 or higher. When CDC
published its report on state preparedness in
February 2008, there were 13 states that failed
to score above 69. The 13 states that brought
their SNS TAR scores above 69 over the past
year are Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.

19

THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)
The SNS maintains a variety of critical pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies including antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin and
doxycycline, chemical nerve agent antidotes like atropine and
pralidoxime, antiviral drugs such as Tamiflu® and Relenza®,
pain management drugs such as morphine, vaccines for agents
like smallpox, as well as radiological countermeasures such as
Prussian blue and DTPA. In addition to pharmaceuticals, the
SNS contains supportive care supplies like endotracheal tubes
and IV supplies, burn and blast supplies such as sutures and
bandages, ventilators, personnel protective equipment such as
N-95 respirators and sterile gloves and other life-saving medical materiel. While this list is not comprehensive, it is representative of the items contained in the SNS.
The SNS is positioned in undisclosed locations throughout the
United States and is configured to provide a flexible response
strategy. Included in the formulary are a dozen 12-hour Push
Packages, which contain over 50 tons of pharmaceuticals and
medical materiel. These assets are pre-configured in deployable containers and strategically located to enable rapid delivery to the site of a national emergency within 12 hours of the
federal decision to deploy.
The majority of the SNS formulary is maintained in managed inventory. Like the 12-hour Push Packages, these assets are also
strategically located around the nation. They provide the ability
to configure and deliver significant quantities of pharmaceuticals
and medical materiel as an initial response if the nature of the
public health emergency is well defined, or as follow-on to a
“push package” delivery. Delivery of assets from managed inventory are planned to begin arriving within 24 to 36 hours after the
federal decision to deploy them. Quantities in the SNS change
based on national planning guidance and prioritization, modeling
scenarios, and standard inventory management procedures.
In April 2007, Gerald W. Parker, ASPR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science & Technology regarding the development of medical
countermeasures. According to Dr. Parker, some of the contents of the national stockpile include:24
I Enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or
every man, woman, and child in America;
I Over 41 million regimens of countermeasures against anthrax;
I Therapeutic anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic patients;
I Countermeasures to address radiation exposure including
over 460,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA; and
I 1.7 million doses of liquid potassium iodide (KI) in a formulation that is more suitable for young children for use in the
event of a release of radioiodines.
The SNS also has been increasing its supply of countermeasures
that could be used during an influenza pandemic. For example,
HHS has allocated a total of $1.1 billion for the purchase of antiviral medications, $660 million of which has been obligated as
20

of May 2007. Overall, as of November 2, 2007, the SNS contained the following pandemic flu countermeasures:25
I 40 million regimens of Oseltamivir capsules;
I 10 million regimens of Zanamivir;
I 105.8 million N95 respirators; and
I 51.7 million surgical masks.
SNS and Children
As of November 2008, there are over 3.8 million regimens of pediatric antiviral formulations in the SNS to treat a potential pandemic flu for the nation’s 73.6 million children.26 For planning
purposes, the federal government has assumed that antivirals
would be needed for at least 25 percent of the population. However, they have not set any target for stockpiling pediatric antivirals, even though children and adolescents are known to often be
disproportionately affected by contagious respiratory illnesses.
An Aging Stockpile
Several of the medical countermeasures in the SNS were purchased under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276).
Congress appropriated nearly $5.6 billion for the procurement
of medical countermeasures through FY 2013, of which not
more than $3.418 billion was to be obligated during FY 2004
through 2008. More than four years later, many of the vaccines and some of the drugs are beginning to expire. The
BioShield Act, however, does not allow for replenishing the
stockpile, nor does it factor in the storage, security, and maintenance costs associated with the SNS.
An October 2007 GAO report identified a major issue of concern with regard to anthrax vaccines in the SNS. According to
the report, beginning in 2008, several lots of BioThrax will begin
to expire. Annual replacement costs of the anthrax vaccine are
estimated at $100 million per year in lost stockpile. To remedy
the problem, HHS/ASPR and the Department of Defense
(DOD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding that enables
DOD to procure, under the Economy Act, anthrax vaccine from
the SNS. Moreover, all DOD anthrax vaccine was transferred to
the SNS in 2008 and a joint inventory was created. The SNS
maintains a rotating stock of vaccine that is appropriately distributed to military sites and civilian laboratories to minimize the
amount of product that must be discarded upon expiration.
Other Concerns
I The 460,000 combined doses of Calcium-DTPA (Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-DTPA are far short of
what would be needed to address radiation exposure from
a catastrophic nuclear event in any large U.S. city.
I The quantity of non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, such as N95 respirators and surgical masks,
falls far short of what may be needed. The U.S. stockpile
contains 105.8 million N95 respirators and 51.7 million surgical masks, while France, with a population one-fifth that of
the United States, has stockpiled 300 million N95s and one
billion surgical masks.27

DISTRIBUTING MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
The Bush administration has been very concerned about the possibility of a major bioterrorist attack. In the scenario presented
below, the White House estimates that a terrorist flying a small

airplane, such as a crop duster, could spray anthrax over a major
metropolitan area contaminating upwards of three million people
with the bacteria.

CATASTROPHIC BIOTERRORISM -- ANTHRAX ATTACKS
October 2001 Attacks: 1 gram of anthrax
mailed out via letter
Antibiotic Treatment
30,000
Illnesses
22
Deaths
5
Decontamination
3 buildings
Projected economic cost (direct costs)
>$1 billion

Future Attack: 1-2 kilograms sprayed by
a crop duster over a major U.S. city
Antibiotic Treatment
1.9 - 3.4 million
Illnesses
~450,000
Deaths
~380,000
Decontamination
City-wide
Projected economic cost (direct costs)
>$1.8 trillion

Source: White House Homeland Security Council28

In light of such dire estimates, the U.S. government has developed three strategies to distribute and dispense medical countermeasures -- push, pull, and preposition.
Push
One strategy involves direct distribution, which emergency planners
refer to as a “push” mechanism, because antibiotics or antivirals are
pushed to people. In October 2008, HHS announced an innovative
“push” approach to distribute medical countermeasures in the event
of an anthrax attack: public health officials will rely on U.S. Postal Service letter carriers who volunteer to deliver medicines directly to residences in their communities in a public health emergency.
To help protect these volunteers from contracting anthrax, HHS
will issue medical kits containing small quantities of antibiotics for
future use by postal workers and their families during an anthrax
emergency. “In an anthrax attack, time is of the essence in preventing illness and death by getting antibiotics to those who may
have been exposed,” HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt said. “By
providing advance protection to letter carriers who volunteer to
deliver antibiotics in an affected community, we can gain the
benefits of the unique capabilities of the Postal Service to get
much needed medicines to those who need it quickly.”29
HHS and the Postal Service have pilot tested this approach in
three U.S. cities -- Seattle, Philadelphia, and Boston. In Philadelphia, 50 letter carriers, each accompanied by a police officer,
reached 55,000 households in less than eight hours.30 Based on
the success of these early tests, the project will be rolled out in
Minneapolis and St. Paul in 2009. The Postal Service will recruit
700 letter carriers, enough to cover about one-quarter of all
households. The volunteers will be medically screened, fitted
with N95 respirators, and issued a supply of doxycycline for
their household. On October 3, 2008, FDA invoked the Emergency Use Authorization powers it has under the 2004 BioShield
Act and approved the pre-positioning of doxycycline emergency
kits for their use by eligible Postal Service employees and their
household members in the event of an anthrax attack.31
Although some U.S. cities are interested in the possibility of
partnering with the Postal Service, others have concerns. The

major barrier for some cities is the requirement that postal
workers be accompanied by an armed law enforcement officer when delivering the countermeasures. Although sympathetic to the postal workers concern about their own security,
city officials do not think they will be able to provide this type
of police protection after a major anthrax attack or other public health emergency, as law enforcement personnel will be
occupied with other first responder duties.
Pull
Many argue that partnering with private sector entities will be
crucial to the successful mass dispensing of medical countermeasures as local health departments are unlikely to have
enough staff on-hand to do the job. According to an Institute
of Medicine (IOM) workshop summary, “Any private establishment that can rapidly serve large numbers of customers represents a potential opportunity for a public-private
partnership.”32 (Please see Indicator 7: Entity Liability Protection for a discussion on the importance of legal protections for
private sector and non-profit entities.)
The private sector would be crucial partners in the second strategy that government officials have developed, which involves
point of dispensing, or PODs, also known as a “pull” mechanism
because people will be pulled to the antibiotics. The IOM workshop summary report listed several activities that could be carried out through public-private partnerships, including:
I Coordinating logistics, warehousing, and distribution of
countermeasures;
I Setting up PODs;
I Providing labor to staff PODs and perform other functions;
I Training and screening of volunteers;
I Preregistering individuals to screen for adverse health effects;
I Tracking and registering people who receive countermeasures;
I Providing education and communication for recipients of
countermeasures; and
I Providing security for PODs.
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Pre-position
While the “push” and the “pull” strategies have their strengths, some experts argue that
neither will be sufficient to provide countermeasures in the necessary time frame during a
disaster. These public health experts favor the pre-positioning of MedKits, small supplies of
countermeasures for use at home during an emergency when directed to by public health
authorities. Pre-positioning would give the public access to medical countermeasures in the
event of a public health emergency, while also buying time for public health authorities to ramp
up their distribution activities
Other public health officials, however, have raised doubts about the feasibility of pre-positioning.
They are concerned that households will not follow the directions and may use the antibiotics
or antivirals in the MedKits to treat a household member who becomes sick during a nonemergency. A CDC study conducted in collaboration with the Missouri Department of Health
and Senior Services examined how 4,076 households in St. Louis would react to the distribution
of a MedKit with a five-day supply of ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or both, and detailed
instructions. The survey found that 97 percent (3,946) of all study respondents returned the
MedKits upon completion of the study and 99 percent of the returned MedKits were intact.33
Of the 130 households (three percent) that did not return the MedKits, 125 of these could not
find their MedKits, and five refused to return them.
Although this one CDC study suggests that with clear instructions households will use MedKits
appropriately, there are still major concerns. Will the MedKits go only to the households of
first responders and health care workers or the entire population? Who will pay for the
MedKits? If households are expected to buy the MedKits, how will the government avoid
economic disparities in coverage? If families do put their own money towards the purchase of
MedKits, what happens if there is a bioterror attack several years down the road at which
point there may be questions about the shelf-life of the product? Finally, in the event of an
anthrax attack, exposed victims need to take 60-days worth of antibiotics, but the MedKits
contain a five-day supply. How will public health officials get the remaining treatment courses
to the victims and ensure that they complete their treatment regimen? According to a report
from the Center for Biosecurity, “If the many thorny issues surrounding this strategy can be
addressed adequately, MedKits may prove to be an innovative and useful tool.”34
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Indicator 2: MASS DISTRIBUTION -- STATE ANTIVIRAL PURCHASES
FINDING: Thirty-four states and D.C. have purchased 50 percent or more of their federallysubsidized antivirals to stockpile for use during a pandemic influenza.

34 states and D.C. have purchased
50 percent or more of their federallysubsidized antivirals drugs to stockpile
for use during an influenza pandemic
(1 point)

16 states have purchased LESS than
50 percent of their share of federallysubsidized antiviral drugs to stockpile
for use during an influenza pandemic
(0 points)

State

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California**
Delaware
D.C.
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois**
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York***
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

All Antivirals
Purchased by
Entity as of
09/30/2008
533,553
77,030
382,398
2,752,151
121,164
45,000
474,022
172,487
516,018
650,912
312,631
286,084
216,224
471,804
1,076,950
340,640
338,648
600,477
135,514
68,000
880,293
2,444,836
677,882
57,000
1,388,858
1,298,792
459,960
80,310
613,706
71,036
827,661
417,902
227,561
363,729
52,718

Percent of
Allocation
Purchased*
112.84%
113.17%
133.52%
102.43%
141.05%
76.86%
52.03%
131.56%
50.25%
100.00%
101.21%
100.00%
50.01%
100.00%
101.74%
64.07%
111.89%
100.00%
57.56%
50.26%
97.01%
121.20%
76.67%
85.71%
115.65%
100.00%
105.59%
100.00%
100.00%
109.24%
107.03%
64.92%
119.65%
63.28%
100.00%

Arizona
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Idaho
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah

All Antivirals
Purchased by
Entity as of
09/30/2008

Percent of
Allocation
Purchased*

67,717
215
22,829
66,000
8,567
0
210,727
50,662
8,174
71,952
77,409
54,015
26,523
11,900
1,023,141
52,033

11.56%
0.05%
6.24%
3.70%
5.97%
0%
36.41%
7.52%
8.48%
39.44%
39.25%
14.67%
7.09%
10.53%
44.09%
21.07%

Notes: *The percent reflects total
state antiviral purchases and may
include unsubsidized state purchases, which is why some states
exceed 100% of their federallysubsidized allocation. **The population count for California and
Illinois does not include residents
of Los Angeles County or Chicago,
respectively. These two localities,
along with D.C., received their
own allocation of federally-subsidized antivirals based on their
populations. ***New York State
antiviral purchases include those
made by New York City. Please
see Appendix B: Influenza Antiviral
Drug Purchases by States, Localities, and Territories for a complete
breakdown of antiviral purchases.
Source: ASPR, information updated as of September 30, 2008.
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The federal government’s current goal is to
stockpile 81 million treatment courses of antiviral drugs for use in the event of a pandemic
influenza. Current HHS policy dictates that
this goal is a shared responsibility between the
federal government and the states. HHS is
stockpiling 44 million antivirals and allocating
them to states based on population. Meanwhile, states are responsible for stockpiling an
additional 31 million treatment courses.
In order to encourage states to develop their
own antiviral stockpiles, HHS designated $170
million to subsidize the purchase of up to 31
million treatment courses of Tamiflu® and Relenza®. HHS will subsidize 25 percent of the
cost, and states will pay the other 75 percent.
According to HHS, as of September 30, 2008,
state and local jurisdictions have stockpiled
nearly 22 million treatment courses of antivirals, of which almost 21 million treatment
courses were purchased using the federal government subsidy. Twenty-three states have
purchased 100 percent or more of their federally-subsidized antivirals; 26 states and D.C.
have purchased 75 percent or more; 34 states
and D.C. have purchased 50 percent or more;
and 38 states and D.C. have purchased 25 percent or more.
The antivirals Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) and Relenza® (zanamivir) have been shown to reduce symptoms and help prevent the spread
of seasonal influenza by suppressing the
growth of the influenza virus. Antivirals differ from vaccines in that they target the virus,
while vaccines trigger an immune response in
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the body. Antivirals do not need to be formulated to match a specific strain of the influenza virus to be effective. As such, they can
be manufactured and stockpiled in advance
of a potential pandemic influenza outbreak.
States that have not purchased their entire allotment of federally-subsidized antivirals give
several reasons. First, according to the National Governors Association (NGA) many
have “...expressed concerns about the reliance
on antivirals given that their effectiveness in
treatment may be compromised by the development of resistance by the pathogen.”35
Some scientists believe that a combination antiviral treatment might reduce the likelihood
of resistance, but this would require a broader,
larger stockpiling program.
Other states have questioned the effectiveness
of antivirals, particularly “...if they are used
more than 48 hours after the onset of symptoms in an infected individual.”36 Additional
limitations include concerns about the drugs’
potential side effects and financial constraints.
Given the projected budget shortfalls, many
states are reluctant to spend resources on purchasing and stockpiling antivirals that have a
limited shelf-life. Though this shelf-life recently
expanded from five years to seven years, it is still
too short for many state health officials.
Although TFAH recognizes these concerns,
current national policy calls for the stockpiling of antivirals to be a shared federal-state
responsibility. The successful containment
of a pandemic is threatened by differences in
capacity among states.

PRIVATE SECTOR ANTIVIRAL STOCKPILING
Under current HHS guidelines, state and local jurisdictions’ stockpiles of antivirals are to be
used only for treatment of pandemic influenza, rather than as a prophylaxis. However, new
draft guidance on antiviral use during a pandemic recommends that private employers and
health care facilities consider purchasing antivirals for use as prophylaxis (the draft guidance is
not HHS policy). Such use would be undertaken in an attempt to slow the spread of the pandemic by providing them to healthy individuals who have been exposed and to key personnel,
such as health care workers, who will be exposed to the new virus.37
HHS draft guidance on employer antiviral stockpiling lists several reasons companies may want
to buy antivirals:38
I To provide prophylaxis treatment for health care workers and emergency responders;
I To protect workers who are needed to maintain essential community services;
I To provide early treatment for workers who fall ill; and
I To protect overseas employees and operations in areas where federal pandemic response
activities will not reach.
According to HHS Deputy Secretary Tevi Troy, “Preparation is a shared responsibility, and businesses and private industry can contribute greatly to community resiliency.”39 In fact, more
than 300 large U.S. businesses have already stockpiled the antiviral Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) to
protect their workers and maintain business operations, according to George Abercrombie,
Chief Executive Officer and President of Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., maker of the drug.40
Some public health experts, however, have raised concerns regarding the advisability of private
sector stockpiles. They note that while stockpiling of antivirals may be feasible for large corporations, there are many businesses that will not be able to afford this luxury. Stockpiling will also be
difficult for businesses that lack warehouse space and employ part-time or uninsured employees.
Other barriers to employers’ stockpiling include concerns related to antivirals’ shelf-life and the
fear that state or federal governments might seize the stockpiled drugs in the event of a pandemic.
The Center for Biosecurity voiced its concerns with the proposed guidance, noting that “It is
unrealistic to expect the private sector to create sufficient antiviral stockpiles or to unilaterally
accept this burden, and it is especially troubling that segments of critical infrastructure are covered under the private sector’s voluntary participation. If the private sector does not stockpile
sufficient supplies of antivirals, serious consequences, including higher than necessary absenteeism rates among health care providers during a pandemic, will likely result.”41

REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Meningitis Outbreak in Chicago, Illinois, April 2008.
By the end of April 2008, the city of Chicago had 10 cases of group C meningococcal invasive disease for the year -- compared with only 13 cases in all of 2007. The Chicago Department of
Public Health took a proactive approach and decided to launch a mass vaccination campaign focused on the at-risk population -- children aged 11 to 18. Due to a preparedness investment in
previous years, the city was able to vaccinate 7,213 children in two weeks. Not only was the city
able to curb a potential outbreak, but they were also able to test the mass dispensing and mass
vaccination plans they had developed with support from the PHEP cooperative agreements.
Cluster of Neurological Illnesses in Rhode Island, December 2006.
In December 2006 five school aged children in Rhode Island were found to have a severe neurological illness that was suspected to have been caused by Mycoplasma pneumoniae infection.
After learning of the cluster of ill children, the Rhode Island Department of Health contacted
the CDC for assistance and testing. The health department then distributed antibiotics to all
the students, staff, and family members from the affected school. Public health authorities also
closed down three nearby school districts as a precautionary measure. The investments the
Department of Health made in its Medical Emergency Distribution plan facilitated the quick
and efficient distribution of antibiotics to over 1,000 people.
Source: ASTHO42
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SEASONAL FLU VACCINATION RATES
Routine vaccinations have helped prevent countless illnesses
and deaths, and are extremely cost-effective, sparing the
health care system the expense of caring for those who might
otherwise become ill.
According to CDC, five to 20 percent of Americans contract
the seasonal flu, more than 200,000 people are hospitalized
from flu complications, and approximately 36,000 people die
from the flu each year.43 Certain people, such as the elderly, the
very young, and those with compromised immune systems are
more vulnerable to complications from seasonal flu.44 Complications of flu can include bacterial pneumonia, dehydration, and

worsening of chronic medical conditions, such as congestive
heart failure, asthma, or diabetes. CDC’s Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that individuals
at high-risk for complications and their caregivers receive seasonal flu vaccinations at the beginning of each flu season.
Over the past three years, states have made vaccinating one
key high risk group, adults aged 65 and older, a public health
priority. According to data from CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), in 2008 50 states and D.C.
either increased or maintained vaccination rates for seniors,
up from 39 states and D.C. in 2007.

50 states and D.C. increased or maintained rates for vaccinating adults aged 65 and older
for seasonal flu (comparing 2004-2006 to 2005-2007)
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

2004-2006
rates

2005-2007
rates

63.0%
62.5%
64.7%
67.5%
67.9%
76.3%
71.8%
68.5%
56.9%
60.7%
63.4%
73.9%
65.1%
62.6%
64.5%
73.1%
68.9%
64.2%
65.2%
70.6%
63.3%
71.1%
68.4%
76.7%
64.6%
67.7%

64.0%
62.7%
65.7%
68.1%
67.4%
75.5%
72.3%
70.0%
58.7%
60.7%
64.5%
75.5%
66.1%
63.5%
67.1%
73.3%
70.7%
67.3%
65.2%
72.3%
65.6%
73.6%
69.8%
77.2%
65.6%
67.8%

Difference between
2004-2006 and
2005-2007
1.0%
0.2%
1.0%
0.6%
-0.5%
-0.8%
0.5%
1.6%
1.8%
0.0%
1.1%
1.6%
1.1%
0.9%
2.6%
0.2%
1.8%
3.1%
0.0%
1.7%
2.4%
2.4%
1.3%
0.5%
1.0%
0.1%

STATE
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2004-2006
rates

2005-2007
rates

71.4%
73.9%
56.5%
71.0%
65.8%
69.3%
64.2%
67.3%
71.9%
66.8%
72.9%
70.4%
63.8%
71.6%
63.2%
75.8%
66.1%
65.0%
72.4%
68.6%
68.2%
68.8%
65.9%
72.7%
72.5%

71.7%
74.3%
57.7%
73.3%
66.8%
68.5%
65.7%
68.8%
71.3%
68.5%
73.3%
71.1
66.7%
73.9%
64.8%
75.9%
67.4%
64.9%
72.7%
71.3%
70.5%
70.2%
66.9%
72.6%
73.4%

Difference between
2004-2006 and
2005-2007
0.2%
0.3%
1.1%
2.4%
1.0%
-0.8%
1.6%
1.4%
-0.6%
1.7%
0.4%
0.7%
2.9%
2.3%
1.5%
0.2%
1.3%
-0.1%
0.4%
2.7%
2.3%
1.4%
1.0%
0.0%
0.9%

Note: States in red type had statistically significant (p<0.05) increases. No state had a statistically significant decrease.
Source: BRFSS. Data include three year comparisons. Please note that each state has a different sample size so the rates of increase and decrease are not
comparable across states -- each state has a different range to reach statistically significant changes. See Appendix C for the methodology.
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Indicator 3: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- LAB PICKUP AND DELIVERY SERVICES
FINDING: Twenty-four states and D.C. do not have the capacity to deliver and receive laboratory
specimens on a 24-hour, seven days a week basis as part of public health preparedness.
26 states report that their public
health laboratories have an intrastate courier system (non-mail) that
operates 24 hours a day for specimen
pickup and delivery (1 point).

24 states and D.C. report that their
public health laboratories do NOT have
an intra-state courier system (non-mail)
that operates 24 hours a day for
specimen pickup and delivery (0 points).

Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky

North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Maine
Massachusetts
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Rhode Island
Utah
Washington
West Virginia

Source: APHL 2008 Survey of State Public Health Laboratory Directors

Each state should have the capacity to deliver
and receive laboratory specimens on a 24hour, seven days a week basis as part of public
health preparedness. Such a service, whether
state-owned and operated or contracted to a
designated carrier, is essential to ensure the
timeliness of laboratory testing and subsequent treatment or decontamination.
According to APHL’s survey of state public
health laboratory directors, as of October
2008 only 26 state public health laboratories
report having this capacity. Twenty-four
states and D.C. do not have this capacity.

Cuts in federal and state budgets have significantly impacted the ability of states to
develop and maintain courier services; further budget cuts are expected due to the
current economic outlook. These cuts
threaten to undermine state laboratory preparedness as rapid recognition of an event
requires that samples coming from first responders, clinical or other laboratories be
delivered to public health laboratories without delay. Continuous sample referral and
timely ground transportation are the keys to
state readiness.
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PROGRESS IN LABORATORY PREPAREDNESS
Since the first Ready or Not? report in December 2003, state public health laboratories have
made enormous strides in emergency preparedness. An annual survey of state public health
laboratory directors by APHL for TFAH has revealed major gains in terms of laboratory capacity and workforce.
For instance, in 2003, only six states reported that they had sufficient Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL3) laboratory facilities. BSL-3 labs are equipped with technology and trained staff that allows
them to safely handle infectious agents that may cause serious or potentially life threatening
diseases as a result of exposure via inhalation. The number of states with sufficient BSL-3 capacity has grown steadily over the years to 16 in 2004, 37 in 2005, 39 in 2006, and 44 in 2007.
State public health laboratories have also bolstered their workforce of trained lab scientists. In
2004, only 21 states reported having sufficient, trained laboratory scientists to manage tests for
anthrax or plague in a suspected outbreak. The number of states with sufficient, trained laboratory scientists to manage tests for anthrax or plague in a suspected outbreak doubled to 41
states and D.C. in 2005, and grew again to 46 states and D.C. in 2006.
In 2008, CDC received FDA clearance of a new CDC-developed test for rapidly detecting
seasonal and novel influenza viruses. This test will be deployed at all public health laboratories
and other laboratories participating in influenza surveillance. The test has high sensitivity and
specificity and will be used to confirm the first cases of pandemic influenza in a community
with subsequent initiation of community interventions.
In the midst of all this progress, there are still some gaps. For instance, while 44 state public
health labs have Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS), only 24 have the ability
to create, send, and receive Public Health Information Network (PHIN) messaging.45 PHIN
messaging uses standard messages and vocabularies to ensure interoperability among public
health systems, as well as ensuring that public health systems can work with health care, environmental, homeland defense, and other external systems and networks.
State public health laboratories’ progress is due in part to the influx of money from CDC for
upgrading state and local public health laboratory capacity. In addition to the accomplishments
detailed above, state labs have used these funds to:
I Purchase new instrumentation, adopt new technologies, and develop electronic reporting;
I Recruit and retain laboratory personnel;
I Maintain outreach programs to hospital and clinical laboratories and first responders; and
I Assure a coordinated response effort with federal partners.
However, as a result of funding cuts, much of this progress is threatened. A 2008 APHL survey of
state public health laboratories found that labs are experiencing difficulties in the following areas:46
I Hiring and maintaining personnel;
I Reduced analytical capabilities;
I Fewer employee training courses offered; and
I Inability to purchase critical equipment and supplies.
Other challenges include logistical problems with getting samples to the labs, duplicative efforts
between federal and state agencies, and the lack of communication about these efforts. This is
especially important in an era of declining funding.
An increase in funding would allow state public health labs to focus on new priorities, including:
I Expanded chemical terrorism detection;
I Funding for reagents, the diagnostic materials that are required to analyze suspect samples
for biological agents; and
I Funding to improve public health laboratory capability to investigate or confirm radiation
sickness or genetic mutations.
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Indicator 4: PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES -- PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING
FINDING: Only three state public health laboratories report that they cannot meet the expectations of their state’s pandemic influenza plan.
47 states and D.C. report that their
public health laboratories meet the
expectations of the state’s pandemic
influenza plan (1 point).

3 states report that their public health
laboratories do NOT meet the
expectations of the state’s pandemic
influenza plan (0 points).

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky

California
Kansas
Ohio

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Source: APHL 2008 Survey of State Public Health Laboratory Directors

States submitted revised pandemic influenza
plans on July 9, 2008 based on the most recent HHS guidance. As a condition to receive PHEP cooperative agreement funding
from CDC in FY 2009, state pandemic plans
must meet certain national standards. Specific supporting activities from the state pandemic influenza operating plans were
identified to be used as part of the assessment in determining whether a particular jurisdiction’s PHEP funding may be subject to
a partial withholding in FY2009. These activities (chosen across six operating objectives) were selected because they 1) are

important for a pandemic influenza response, 2) are ones in which the states have
received some guidance or had an opportunity to prepare, and 3) could easily be evaluated by reviewers. One of the PHEP-related
supporting activities involved the evaluation
of a state’s ability to collect, handle, ship, test,
and report on influenza virus specimens.
According to APHL’s survey of state public
health laboratory directors, as of October 2008
public health laboratories in 47 states and D.C.
reported that their labs met the expectations
of their state’s pandemic influenza plan.
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LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK (LRN)
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is a network of state, local, and federal public
health, military, and international laboratories that provides public health, food, veterinary, and
environmental testing capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism and other public health emergencies. The LRN provides emergency assistance and support through the
pooling of resources and personnel based on cooperative agreements.
Over the past six years CDC has expanded the number of LRN labs from 91 in FY 2001 to 164
in FY 2007.47 CDC has also worked with LRN member labs to improve their ability to rapidly
and accurately identify biological threat agents, raising the passing rate from 83 percent in FY
2005 to 91 percent in FY 2007. Currently, more than 90 percent of LRN labs can perform
tests for bioterror agents such as anthrax, tularemia, and plague, and more than 9,000 clinical
lab workers have been trained to detect, diagnose, and report public health emergencies.48
LRN labs undergo proficiency testing on a regular basis. CDC evaluates the LRN labs based on
their performance in four to six challenges per year that use simulated clinical and environmental samples to mimic real events. If LRN labs fail a challenge, CDC and APHL provide technical
assistance to the labs and they are re-tested.

CHEMICAL LABORATORY CAPABILITY
According to CDC, there are over 80 chemical agents that can kill or seriously injure a person
that have been identified as likely terrorist agents.49 Many of these are common commercial
and industrial chemicals that can be easily weaponized.
To help address the critical gaps in chemical laboratory preparedness, CDC has expanded the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN), an integrated network of approximately 160 labs encompassing federal, state, local, veterinary, military, environmental, food testing, and international labs, to include a chemical network.50 The chemical LRN (LRN-c) is made up of 62
state, territorial and metropolitan public health laboratories. LRN-c labs undergo proficiency
testing and are put through three challenges per year per chemical testing method. According
to CDC, in FY 2007, the LRN-c labs had a 90 percent passing rate on exercises.
Of the 62 LRN-c labs, only 10 are characterized as Level I laboratories.51 These 10 Level I labs
have “biomonitoring” capabilities, meaning they are equipped to detect an expanded number
of chemical agents in human specimens (blood, saliva, urine), plus run analyses for mustard
agents, nerve agents, and other toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical warfare.
Of these 10, half are ‘new’ labs that need to be brought “to analytical parity with existing Level
I laboratories,” a process that is expected to take two more years.52 The five existing Level 1
labs are in California, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Virginia. The five new Level I
labs will be located in: Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.53
In the event of a chemical terrorist attack, labs will not only need to be able to test clinical
specimens, but also environmental samples, such as water, air, soil, or food, to determine the
source, route, and potential extent of contamination. Very few public health laboratories,
however, are able to test for chemical warfare agents in environmental samples. In 2006, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began developing the environmental arm of the LRN
(eLRN) which will include equipment standards, testing protocols, and training modules for
laboratory workers. Without adequate funding, however, it is unclear how many states will be
able to upgrade their public health labs.
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RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY PREPAREDNESS
Under the all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness, the United States must be ready
to respond to any number of public health catastrophes, including the detonation of a so-called
dirty bomb. A dirty bomb, or radiological dispersal device, releases radioactive material
through the use of a conventional explosive. Although the detonation of a dirty bomb is unlikely to cause massive casualties or physical destruction, it could expose thousands of individuals to small traces of radioactive materials, which can require medical treatment and leave the
exposed at higher risk of developing cancer.
The National Planning Scenarios put together by the Homeland Security Council for use in national, federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities includes a scenario
that features the detonation of a dirty bomb in a downtown business district of three U.S.
cities. Under National Planning Scenario #11, public health emergency responders will have
to screen, monitor, and decontaminate up to 300,000 victims (100,000 at each site).54 However, according to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee report, “...validated methods to test clinical specimens in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the 13 highest
priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario.”55 Additionally, for those
isotopes for which validated methods do exist, screening 100,000 victims in the wake of a dirty
bomb could take more than four years due to current gaps in laboratory preparedness, including lack of equipment, trained personnel, and facilities.56 Testing the environmental samples
after a dirty bomb attack could take up to six years given current laboratory capacity. A 20062007 APHL survey found that fewer than 25 percent of state public health laboratories can
screen or test clinical specimens for radiation.57
The weakness of current U.S. radiological laboratory capacity was seen in November 2007
when a former Russian KGB agent was poisoned with the radioisotope Polonium-210 in London. After the agent’s death, CDC identified 160 U.S. citizens who were potentially exposed
to the radioactive material while staying at the same hotel or eating in the same restaurants.
However, CDC was only able to find one U.S.-based laboratory capable and qualified to conduct the necessary clinical tests for potential exposure to Polonium-210.58
That there are major gaps in radiological laboratory preparedness is not new information. In
fact, a 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report highlighted the weaknesses in
current federal efforts.59 More recently, in January 2007, the White House issued HSPD-18 to
address “Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction.” HSPD-18 warned
of the threats posed by nuclear and radiological devices and called on the United States to improve its radiological clinical laboratory testing capabilities.60
Two federal agencies have funded and are establishing surge capacity in several state public
health laboratories to close the gap in radiological laboratory preparedness. The EPA has
funded three state public health laboratories for surge capacity to build a National Environmental Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network. Once built, the network would drastically decrease the environmental sampling shortfall by 80 percent.61 FDA has funded and
established five surge capacity state public health laboratories.62
CDC has detailed plans to establish a Radiological Laboratory Response Network (LRN-R) that
would include five state radioanalytical labs to expand the federal response. The LRN-R would
cost an estimated $20.6 million over the next five years, but if implemented, would reduce the
time to analyze the clinical samples from a dirty-bomb attack from four years to three weeks.63
The president’s FY 2009 budget request included $10 million that would be used expand the
urine radionuclide screen into five states through the creation of the LRN-R.64 The screen will
be able to test for 22 high priority radionuclides likely to be used in a terrorist attack.
Congress, however, failed to pass a FY 2009 budget, instead enacting a Continuing Resolution
holding funding at FY 2008 levels for six months, through March 2009.
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Indicator 5:

BIOSURVEILLANCE -- NEDSS COMPATIBILITY

FINDING: Six states do not use a disease surveillance system that is compatible with CDC’s
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
44 states and D.C. report that they
use a disease surveillance system that is
compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance System
(NEDSS) (1 point)

6 states report that they do NOT use a
disease surveillance system that is
compatible with CDC’s National
Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS) (0 points)

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Connecticut
Kansas
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nevada
Utah

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Source: CDC National Center for Public Health Informatics, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services.

“

IF WE WANT TO DO ANYTHING IN REAL TIME, IF WE WANT TO
ACTUALLY RESPOND TO AN OUTBREAK IN SOME WAY, WE’RE GOING TO HAVE TO
COMPRESS THE TIME FROM THE DATA MOVING FROM THE CLINICAL CARE SYSTEM TO THE
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENTS TO THE

CDC, PARTICULARLY WHEN

IT’S A DISEASE OF NATIONAL INTEREST OR IMPORTANCE SUCH AS PANDEMIC

”

INFLUENZA OR A SUSPECTED BIOTERRORISM RELATED CONDITION.

65

— DR. LESLIE LENERT, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS, CDC.

Delivering effective public health services depends on timely and reliable information.
Health departments cannot protect people
from existing or emerging health threats, such
as a pandemic flu, or a bioterrorist attack, without correct and pertinent information. The
lack of timely and comprehensive data can
delay the identification of and response to serious and mass emergency health problems. In
addition, federal, state, and local health departments and private health care providers
must all work together to effectively track information about and respond to health threats.
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The National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS) was developed to integrate
and standardize the tracking of specific infectious diseases. It promotes standards-based,
electronic reporting for more rapid, accurate,
and integrated information. In fact, a study
published in January 2008 found that automated electronic laboratory results (ELR)
identified nearly five times as many cases as traditional, paper-based reporting and identified
these cases nearly eight days earlier.66 The authors noted, that “Public health monitoring of
disease outbreaks, including reports of notifi-

able conditions from laboratories and health
care providers to public health authorities, is
fundamental to the prevention and control of
population-based disease.”67 NEDSS also has
the advantage of producing “...integrated surveillance systems, where the disease issues of
reportable conditions in public health are
tracked in an environment that allows you to
see that patients who have HIV also have hepatitis C and tuberculosis, and you can take integrated public health action.”68
The tracking of specific (i.e., notifiable) diseases does not, however, address the important need to detect health events of urgent
concern due to conditions not already called
out for surveillance. Additionally, detection
is often necessary before the specific cause
has been identified even when due to a reportable condition. Early detection of unusual patterns of disease and health
behaviors can provide critical lead-time for
unexpected events and unexpected occurrences of common conditions (like diarrheal
illness). Therefore, NEDSS is working
closely with CDC’s BioSense program to
identify best practices and explore ways to
use the same IT infrastructure for both surveillance systems. In 2008, the two programs
began testing the integration of their systems
for automated laboratory reporting to state
and local public health authorities. Further
integration of case-based surveillance systems, like NEDSS, with event-based detection
is needed at the state and local levels.
According to CDC, to be considered NEDSScompatible, states must have systems that
meet the following requirements:

1. Disease data entry directly through an Internet browser-based system, thereby creating a
database accessible by health investigators
and public health professionals.
2. Electronic Laboratory Results (ELR) reporting, which allows labs to report cases
to health departments.
3. Integration of multiple health information databases creating a single repository.
A fourth component, electronic messaging capabilities, allowing states to share information
efficiently with CDC and other health agencies, is being upgraded system-wide, and is,
therefore, not included among the criteria.
In order to determine FY 2009 grant allocations,
CDC’s Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services queried state health departments on the status of their Public Health
Information Networks. According to CDC’s
2008 Assessment of States NEDSS Status, 44 states
and D.C. are NEDSS-compatible, including
seven states that achieved NEDSS-compliancy
for the first time in 2008: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming. Six states are identified as non-compatible with NEDSS. The majority of the noncompatible states meet two of the three criteria.
These states are making steady progress towards
meeting the third requirement.
According to CDC, 2009 is the first year of
the new project period for the NEDSS cooperative agreement with the states. As part of
the NEDSS strategic planning process, which
is currently underway, CDC will develop new
criteria for NEDSS-compliance. TFAH will
use the new criteria in its 2009 report.

REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Respiratory Syncytial Virus Outbreak in Alaska, 2007.
In early 2007, hospitals in Alaska were pushed to their limit during a Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV) outbreak. By March, 53
infants and young children were diagnosed at a small, 10-bed
hospital in Barrow, Alaska. The surge of patients led to the hospital going through nine months of supplies in just six weeks.
The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services activated
its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to support the hospitals affected by the illness and developed and distributed fact

sheets around the state describing the symptoms and warning
signs of RSV. Such diligence paid off in September 2007 when
an outbreak of enterovirus occurred, as well as during the 2008
RSV season. When four infants were admitted in a single week
with an unknown illness the hospital staff immediately notified
the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. The rapid
disease monitoring and reporting prevented the health system
from encountering the overload it had seen the previous year.
Source: ASTHO69
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BIOSENSE
BioSense is CDC’s early-event detection system that collects
clinical information from hospitals, such as patients’ symptoms,
quantities and types of drug prescriptions, and the number of
emergency room visits, among other data. This so-called “system of systems” links data “from large hospital systems, dataaggregating systems, and state/county surveillance systems to
provide a unified national view.”70 This type of surveillance,
known as syndromic surveillance, relies on information available well before an official diagnosis or confirmed lab result.
Some public health officials believe this type of surveillance can
be crucial to alerting them to possible disease outbreaks or
bioterrorism, while others are skeptical about the merits of
syndromic surveillance in providing outbreak recognition.
According to CDC, as of November 2007, BioSense had more
than 1,900 hospitals and health care facilities around the country
transmitting data. This includes 423 hospitals transmitting realtime data, covering 38 states and 71 major metropolitan areas,
and 1,500 federal military and veterans’ outpatient facilities.71
BioSense officials told TFAH that another 200 hospitals joined
the program in 2008, as well as the Georgia State Public Health
Department and Quest Diagnostics.72
Over the past year, the BioSense program has undergone
major revisions based on serious concerns expressed by Congressional overseers and state and local health departments.
BioSense is moving away from the previous model of connecting hospitals directly to CDC, which bypassed state and local
health departments. According to one CDC official, “This
model is kaput.” Instead, the BioSense program is focusing on
creating a national system that builds on state and local health
departments surveillance systems.
The shift in mission has led to new priorities. Over the next
four years (2008-2012) the program plans a rapid expansion
that will integrate existing state and local real time surveillance
systems to maximize coverage. CDC plans to work with state
and local health departments and offer technical and financial
support for their real time systems in exchange for data.
CDC is also sponsoring the formation of regional collaboratives
for real time surveillance. The first grants for these regional
partnerships were awarded in October 2008. The four partnerships that received CDC funding cover the following geographic
regions: the National Capital Region (Maryland, Virginia, and
D.C.); Ohio and Pennsylvania; the St. Louis area; and a Southern
States collaborative (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
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Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee). The grantees will focus on
developing procedures to collect and share data; information infrastructure; and legal issues around data sharing agreements.
Another program goal is focused on data stewardship. Currently, states have independent systems that are not connected to one another, and in many cases, local health
departments are not connected to state systems. To build
trust among federal, state, and local partners, CDC is developing a federated database model that would ease the sharing
of data among partners. This technology would underpin the
regional collaboratives. Under the federated database model,
data is stored in different geographic locations around the
country. By storing data locally at state and local health departments, but providing access to CDC and other authorized
organizations to access and analyze the data, CDC says this
“eliminates the risk of a single point of failure thus creating a
robust, safe-fail framework.”73 BioSense program officials believe this model will entice the participation of those cities and
counties that had been reluctant to share data.
Finally, BioSense will work to improve case-detection capabilities, which will allow the surveillance system to capture data
more quickly from health care settings and move the information to public health departments at the federal, state, and local
levels. CDC also plans to offer incentives to hospitals and
health care providers to join the BioSense network by enhancing the system’s ability to share data from the public health departments with clinical care providers, and by allowing data
collected via BioSense to be used to support research activities.
The president’s FY 2009 budget request included $49.9 million for BioSense, an increase of $15.5 million over the previous fiscal year.74 The additional funds were to be used to:
I Enhance syndromic surveillance capabilities and develop
case-based surveillance ones;
I Support basic and applied research and evaluation;
I Implement connections with the new Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs) and Health Information Exchanges (HIEs); and
I Increase BioSense coverage in major metropolitan areas.
Congress, however, failed to pass a FY 2009 budget, instead
opting for a six-month Continuing Resolution at FY 2008 levels
through March 2009.

Indicator 6:

HEALTH CARE VOLUNTEER EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION

FINDING: Eight states have “low” protections for health care volunteers during times of emergency, meaning that those states have only Good Samaritan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense, but not necessarily immunity from liability.
42 states and D.C. have “high” or
“medium” protections for health care
volunteers during times of emergency
(1 point).
Alabama
Kentucky6
1
Arizona
Louisiana3
Arkansas
Maine2,3
2,3
California
Michigan2,4
6
Colorado Minnesota3,4
Connecticut1 Mississippi3,4
Delaware1,2 Missouri2,4
D.C.
Nebraska4,7
2,4
Georgia
Nevada
Hawaii2,3
New Hampshire2
Idaho
New Jersey
Illinois2,3,4,7 New Mexico6
Indiana6
New York
Iowa1,4,5
North Carolina2,5
2,4
Kansas
North Dakota

Oklahoma3
Oregon3
Pennsylvania3
Rhode Island2
South Carolina2
South Dakota4,7
Tennessee6
Utah6
Vermont3
Virginia2
Washington2
West Virginia2
Wisconsin2

8 states have “low” protections for
health care volunteers during times
of emergency (0 points).
Alaska
Florida2,4
Maryland3,4
Massachusetts4
Montana4
Ohio4
Texas4
Wyoming2,4

Notes:

4 Statute mandates that care provided be uncompensated.

States in bold font have “high” protections for health care
volunteers during an emergency.

5 State has not codified the UEVHPA but appears to have
covered all bases for full immunity for volunteers.

1 State not only pays for liability coverage, but also handles
some aspect of legal representation of emergency workers
if necessary.

6 State has adopted the UEVHPA.

2 Health practitioners explicitly named as a covered class.
3 Introduced UEVHPA legislation; not yet codified.

7 Based on 2007 TFAH review.
Source: Legal review conducted by the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services and
School of Medicine and Health Sciences.

“

REGARDLESS OF THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MALPRACTICE CLAIMS MAY OR MAY
NOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST VOLUNTEER PRACTITIONERS, AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF
ANY CLAIMS THAT MAY ARISE, THE RISK OF EXPOSURE TO LIABILITY GREATLY CONCERNS
PRACTITIONERS WHO ARE CONSIDERING VOLUNTEERING THEIR SERVICES, AND MAY CLEARLY
75
DETER SOME SKILLED PERSONNEL FROM VOLUNTEERING DURING EMERGENCIES.
— MICHEALLE CARPENTER, JAMES G. HODGE, AND RAYMOND P. PEPE,
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE

In the event of a catastrophic public health
emergency, such as a bioterrorist attack, pandemic influenza, or natural disaster, government officials will depend on volunteer health
professionals to treat the surge of patients coming forward to seek care. However, relying on
volunteer health professionals presents several

”

issues including: licensing; permissible scope
of practice; the relationship between volunteers, the relief organizations, and local health
care, emergency management, and licensing
agencies; the eligibility of volunteers for immunities from liability; and volunteer protection laws and workers’ compensation benefits.
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In a recent survey conducted by the American Public Health Association, almost 60 percent of clinicians reported that having
medical malpractice insurance coverage
would be important (24.3%) or essential
(35.4%) in their decision to travel out of
state to provide assistance during an emergency. At the same time, almost 70 percent
of respondents answered that immunity from
civil lawsuits would be an important (35.6%)
or essential (33.8%) factor in deciding
whether to volunteer in an emergency.76
While federal laws such as the 1996 Federal
Volunteer Protection Act (FVPA), the 2002
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the
2006 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act all provide some federal liability coverage, there is no uniform
federal law that acts as a shield to liability for
health care volunteers during declared public health emergencies.77 (Please see Section
2: Federal Preparedness for a further discussion on federal law.)
Good Samaritan laws, which exist in all 50
states and D.C., are narrow in scope and generally provide protection only for emergency
aid at the scene of an emergency. Health care
volunteers who provide non-emergency care
at a facility following the acute phase of an
emergency, for example, would likely not be
protected by a state’s Good Samaritan law.78
Furthermore, a Good Samaritan statute offers
only an affirmative defense in a liability action;
it is not a legal grant of immunity from suit.
In response to this gap in nature and scope
of legal liability protection extended to volunteers, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), along with a number of health
care professional organizations, developed
the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health
Practitioners Act (UEVHPA). The Act offers
model legislation to facilitate the deployment of health care volunteers during emergencies. The UEVHPA addresses a number
of important issues, such as registration, licensing and accreditation of qualified health
care volunteers for the purpose of swift and
effective deployment.79 The UEVHPA also
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extends civil liability protections to registered
health care volunteers similar to the immunity provided to state employees under the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), as well as provision for workers compensation.
Researchers examined the extent to which,
as of October 2008, states had either adopted
UEVHPA or had legislated its elements in
equivalent fashion. Researchers adopted the
following three-tier approach to the review:
1) States adopting the UEVHPA or enacting
its full equivalent, as measured by the
terms of state statutory law;
2) States whose laws offer some, but not all,
of the emergency volunteer protections
available under UEVHPA; and
3) States offering only minimal protections
in the form of Good Samaritan Statutes.
The “minimal protections” or “low” category
represents those states with only Good Samaritan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense,
but not necessarily immunity from liability.
The “some protections” or “medium” group
of states extend protections to volunteers during times of emergency, but may not explicitly
identify health practitioners, may require affiliation with a regional or local emergency
compact, or may not provide coverage to volunteers in the event of injury during rendering of services. Finally, the “UEVHPA” or
“high” protection states have adopted the
model statute or all of its elements.
Based on the research team’s findings,
TFAH awarded a full point to “high” and
“medium” protection states. Forty-two states
and D.C. have “high” or “medium” liability
protection for health care volunteers during
an emergency, while 8 states have “low” liability protection.
The number of states with “high” or
“medium” protection for health care volunteers in an emergency grew from 29 states and
D.C. in 2007, and TFAH expects state efforts
to increase.

There are also efforts underway in the states
to use their legal reforms to incentivize volunteerism. For example, in Arizona, state and
local government agencies joined the Arizona
Medical Association’s Disaster Preparedness
Task Force and collaboratively produced the
“Disaster Preparedness and Awareness Guide
for the Arizona Physician.”80 Colorado now
hosts an annual educational seminar focused
on legal issues in emergency management
through their Division of Emergency Management during which they address issues of volunteer liability among other topics.81 Texas
has focused on systematically registering and
credentialing volunteers through their Disaster Volunteer Registry.
In the two years since the NCCUSL adopted
the UEVHPA, six states have adopted the
UEVHPA model statue or all of its elements:
Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Utah. Another 12 states have
introduced UEVHPA legislation although it
has not been passed or signed into law: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.

The UEVPHA offers the most complete immunity protections for volunteer health practitioners.82 Because the model act includes a
prospective designation process, licensing requirements, worker’s compensation, and immunity from liability, the UEVHPA sets forth
an ideal set of conditions under which practitioners can render emergency care during
disasters. By alleviating immediate concerns
about personal safety and liability, the
UEVHPA establishes a legal climate in which
health care professionals are free to provide
emergency care in areas under emergency or
disaster declarations.
Whether or not a state has explicitly
adopted the UEVHPA, most states now provide some level of protection to disaster relief workers during emergencies. At the
same time, it is somewhat surprising that
nearly a decade after September 11th, all
states have not, at a minimum, incentivized
volunteerism among health professionals by
extending to such professionals the level of
immunity accorded a public official acting
in an official capacity.

REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Southern California Wildfires, November 2007.
In the fall of 2007, California saw the largest evacuation in state history due to a series of
wildfires that caused 10 deaths and 139 injuries. The California Department of Public Health
deployed 2,000 alternate care site beds that had been purchased by the state to improve the
emergency preparedness capabilities. The department also coordinated evacuations from 23
nursing homes, two acute care facilities and a psychiatric hospital. Because of the fast moving
and unpredictable nature of the wildfires, approximately 1,600 patients were moved from long
term care facilities and hospitals -- all of which was done safely and effectively. Throughout the
entire incident the California Department of Public Health provided important information to
local health agencies through the Health Alert Network.
Source: ASTHO83
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Indicator 7:

ENTITY EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION

FINDING: Twenty-four states and D.C. have statutes that extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing charitable, emergency, or disaster relief services, although
these laws varied greatly among states.
24 states and D.C. have statutes that
extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster
relief services (1 point).
Alabama1
Arkansas1,2,3
California1,2,3,4
Colorado4
Delaware1
D.C.7
Georgia1,3
Idaho1
Indiana2,4,5
Iowa1,3
Louisiana3,4
Michigan1,3,4,5

Nevada7
New Hampshire
New Jersey3,4
North Carolina1,3
Ohio1
Pennsylvania1,3
Rhode Island2,3,4
Texas1,3
Utah
Vermont
Virginia3
Washington6,7
Wisconsin

Notes:
1 Statute specifies that entity service must come at the
request of a political division or state agency.
2 Statute limits the role an entity may play in the emergency.
3 Statute requires entity to provide service without compensation.
4 Statute limits the kind of legal entity that may provide
emergency services.

Alaska
Arizona
Connecticut
Florida6
Hawaii
Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma6
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wyoming6

6 State provides liability protection to real property owners
who voluntarily offer their premises for disaster response
purposes.
7 A separate telephone survey of state health attorneys by
the UNC Institute of Public Health concluded these
states offer entity liability protection, however, a facial
read of the plain text of the statute suggests remaining
ambiguities regarding the extent to which the statute
confers unequivocal entity liability.

5 Statute only extends immunity to health care entities.

Source: Legal review conducted by the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services and
School of Medicine and Health Sciences.

Just as volunteer health professionals will be
called upon to provide treatment in a catastrophic public health emergency, so too will
private sector and non-profit organizations.
In fact, many state preparedness plans envision the role private companies will play in
distributing medical countermeasures in the
event of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack.
(Please see Indicator 1: Strategic National
Stockpile for a discussion of the role of the
private sector in the distribution and dispensing of medical countermeasures.)

the workshop summary report noted, “few
states furnish immunity from liability to corporations and other entities when they act as
Good Samaritans.”85 This is disconcerting as
businesses may not be able to maintain typical quality control standards in their efforts
to meet demand for resources. During declared states of emergency, legitimate concerns about liability thus could deter or delay
health care professionals and entities from
fully participating in relief efforts.

A 2008 IOM workshop examined the issues
surrounding the dispensing of medical countermeasures for public health emergencies,
including the need for liability protection for
private-sector volunteers and entities.84 As
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26 states do NOT have statutes that
extend some level of immunity to
groups and/or organizations providing
charitable, emergency, or disaster
relief services (0 points).

Researchers examined state law to identify
states that have enacted “volunteer entity” protections to incentivize emergency response by
public and private actors. In assessing state
law relevant to entity protections, the research
team drew from model language developed

by the Public/Private Legal Preparedness Initiative, a special undertaking of the North Carolina Institute for Public Health.86 Key
elements of this model law are as follows:
I The establishment of a specific coverage
trigger (e.g., a Gubernatorial declaration
of a state of emergency);
I Retroactive coverage that reaches preplanning and training activities; and
I An approach to protection that follows the
immunity model used for volunteers
rather than the more limited, “affirmative
defense” approach.
State statutes that extended to entities what
might be thought of as “property” immunity
-- that is, immunity with respect to injuries
involving real or other property owned or
controlled by an entity -- were not included.
Rather, in order to qualify for designation, a
state statute must have focused on protecting conduct undertaken by entities during
an emergency.

As of October 2008, 24 states and D.C. had extended some level of immunity to groups
and/or organizations providing charitable,
emergency, or disaster relief services. At the
same time, these statutes exhibit a wide degree
of variation. For example, 12 state laws specify
that the provision of services by a covered entity
must come at the official request of a state political division; four states limit the role that a
covered entity can play in the emergency (e.g.,
allowing only the provision of goods in response to a disaster); 12 state laws require that
the service provided be without compensation;
seven state laws limit the types of legal entities
that can provide services (i.e., immunizing specific professional groups, such as architectural
and engineering firms, rather than extending
immunities to all corporate entities); and two
states only extended legal protections to health
care entities. Though Florida, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming provide liability protection to real
property owners who voluntarily offer their
premises for disaster response purposes, they
did not qualify for the entity liability indicator.

STATE EMERGENCY LIABILITY PROTECTION INDICATORS
Faculty and staff at The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services
and School of Medicine and Health Sciences conducted the research and analysis for “Indicator 8:
Health Care Volunteer Emergency Liability Protection” and “Indicator 9: Entity Emergency Liability
Protection.” TFAH thanks:
Jennifer Lee, MD; Assistant Professor, Department of Emergency Medicine,
Orriel L. Richardson, MPH; JD anticipated 2011 (GW Law), Research Associate, Department
of Health Policy,
Ross Margulies, JD-MPH anticipated 2012, Research Assistant, Department of Health Policy, and
Sara Rosenbaum, JD; Chair and Hirsh Professor, Department of Health Policy.
The full-length write-up and the associated table of “State Liability Protections and Relevant
Statutes” are available online at http://healthyamericans.org/bioterrorism-and-public-healthpreparedness/.
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TOOLS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
In 2007-2008, CDC’s Public Health Law Program released a set
of tools for policy makers and practitioners to use in assessing and
strengthening their state’s or locality’s legal preparedness for allhazards public health emergencies. These include, among others,
the Forensic Epidemiology 3.0 and Public Health Emergency Law
3.0 training curricula, guides for developing MOUs for improved,
cross-sector investigation and response, suggested provisions for
mutual aid agreements, the National Action Agenda for Public
Health Legal Preparedness, and the Social Distancing Law Assessment Template. The National Action Agenda contains 100 ‘action options’ states, tribes, and localities can consider as they
work to improve their legal preparedness. (These and other
tools can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/phlp).

The Social Distancing Law Assessment Template grew out of a
CDC-ASTHO project in which 17 states assessed their legal
and operational sufficiency to implement quarantine, school
closure, and other non-pharmaceutical measures in an influenza pandemic. Fourteen states conducted multi-sector and
multi-jurisdiction exercises. Many of the participating states
concluded that their relevant laws were adequate but most
identified potential problems in implementing social distancing
measures effectively. These findings were reflected also in the
National Governors Association’s 2008 report on pandemic
planning that found that 22 states had experienced problems
with school continuity and that 13 had cited legal issues.87

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS
State public health departments are encouraged to carry out a
variety of drills and exercises, or to use real-world events, to
measure their ability to respond in an emergency. According
to a Congressional Research Service report “Exercises and
drills test the ability of jurisdictions to execute their plans, and
they detect planning gaps. Consequently, assessments of response capability rest not only on assessments of planning, but
also on assessments of exercise programs and integration of
findings into subsequent rounds of planning.”88
There are three key reasons to measure public health emergency preparedness by drilling, testing and exercising. First,
drills and exercises allow planners and policy makers to focus
on the most critical aspects of emergency planning, such as
mass countermeasure distribution or vaccination and mass casualty care. Second, drills and exercises performed and evaluated in a transparent manner hold officials accountable to the
public. Finally, well-designed exercises allow evaluators to
identify and address weaknesses in emergency plans.
CDC categorizes preparedness exercises into three groups:
tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale exercise.
Tabletop exercises involve discussing responses to emergency
scenarios and focus on training and problem solving. Functional
exercises test and evaluate capabilities and functions in responding to a simulated emergency, such as a disease outbreak. Fullscale exercises text and evaluate multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional
coordinated response to an actually deployment of resources
under crisis conditions as if a real incident had occurred.89
Under the 2006 PAHPA legislation, preparedness funding is
tied to state and local public health departments’ incorporation
of drills and exercises to test emergency preparedness. The
legislation also calls on HHS to develop evidence-based performance measures and criteria to evaluate state and local
health departments’ performance in these drills. Nearly two
years after the PAHPA legislation was signed into law, however,
neither CDC nor ASPR have put forth evidence-based guidelines regarding conduct of an emergency preparedness exercise in terms of what outcomes are expected from each drill.
As CDC and ASPR work to develop federal guidelines for public health emergency preparedness drills and exercises, there
are some existing federal programs that may offer guidance.
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The first model is the Homeland Security Exercises and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), “a capabilities and performancebased exercise program.”90 HSEEP provides Homeland Security
agencies and grantees with “...a common exercise policy and program guidance capable of constituting a national standard for all
exercises.”91 HSEEP uses consistent terminology so that exercise
planners from all federal agencies can communicate more easily.
In order to be compliant with HSEEP protocols, there are four
distinct performance requirements.92 They include:
1. Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop
and developing and maintaining a multiyear training and exercise plan;
2. Planning and conducting exercises in accordance with the
guidelines set forth by HSEEP;
3. Developing and submitting an after-action report; and
4. Tracking and implementing corrective actions identified in
the after-action report.
CDC has encouraged states to use HSEEP but has not
required it.
A second model is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), which has stringent emergency preparedness planning
procedures in place for NRC headquarters, regional offices,
and individual nuclear power plants. Before the NRC licenses a
nuclear power plant, NRC must have “reasonable assurance
that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological emergency.”93 NRC determines
whether or not the nuclear power plant has provided reasonable assurance by reviewing plant emergency planning procedures and training. According to NRC, “these reviews include
regular drills and exercises that assist licensees in identifying
areas for improvement.”94 Each plant owner is required to exercise its emergency plan with the NRC, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and offsite authorities at
least once every two years to ensure state and local officials remain proficient in implementing their emergency plans. Plants
also self-test their emergency plans regularly by conducting
drills. Perhaps, most importantly to assure accountability and
transparency, each plant’s performance in drills and exercises
can be accessed through the NRC Web site.95

CENTERS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND PREPAREDNESS
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE RESEARCH CENTERS
The Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) are a network of 30 academic-based preparedness education and training programs located in 27 accredited schools of public health
and three universities. The initial mission of the CPHPs was to link their academic expertise
with the needs of states for emergency responders and public health professionals trained in
public health emergency skills. However, under PAHPA, CPHPs were reorganized. Now, in
addition to focusing on the development, implementation, and dissemination of competencybased programs to train public health practitioners, they are required to focus on public health
systems and emergency preparedness research. The change in focus to include public health
systems research was deemed necessary because legislators found that there has been
“tremendous financial investment made to date for public health preparedness with no evidence-based measures for evaluating progress or preparedness.”96
Before establishing these new Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers (PERRCs),
CDC asked the IOM to produce a report on near-term research priorities for emergency
preparedness and response.97 IOM held a series of public meetings and workshops in December
2007 on the subject and then identified four priority areas for research into PHEP. They include:
enhancing the usefulness of PHEP training; improving timely emergency communications; creating
and maintaining sustainable response systems; and generating effective criteria and metrics. The
final research area is vital as currently “...it is difficult to measure objectively the progress that has
been made and the preparedness gaps.”98
In October 2008, CDC awarded $10.9 million to seven accredited schools of public health for
the establishment of the PERRCs. CDC awarded the five-year grants (2008-2013) to Emory
University; Harvard School of Public Health; Johns Hopkins University; University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis; University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
and University of Washington, Seattle.

Indicator 8:

MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS READINESS

FINDING: Seventeen states do not have State-level Medical Reserve Corps Coordinators.
34 states and D.C. have Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) Coordinators (1 point).

16 states do NOT have Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) Coordinators (0 points).

Alabama
Arkansas*
California
Colorado
Connecticut
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas

Alaska
Arizona
Delaware
Idaho
Iowa
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Nebraska
Nevada
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Texas
Vermont
Wyoming

Notes: D.C., Guam, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not required to have State MRC Coordinators, but
they do have unit coordinators.
*Arkansas’s score has been revised. The state provided information confirming they have a Medical Reserve Corps Coordinator after the original release of the report.
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps, www.medicalreservecorps.gov.
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The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a national
network of community-based groups which engage civilian volunteers to strengthen public
health, emergency response, and community
resilience. MRC volunteers include professionals from fields such as public health, medicine,
and nursing, as well as non-health professionals
who work on administration, logistics, communications, and other support tasks.
The MRC network is supported by the Office
of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve
Corps (OCVMRC), which is run out of the
Office of the U.S. Surgeon General in coordination with ASPR. As of October 28, 2008
there were 170,413 volunteers enrolled in 791
MRC units in 49 states, D.C., Guam, Palau,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
It is recognized that local governmental services may be quickly overtaxed in a major public health emergency, and that MRC
volunteers could help deliver essential medical care and other services. For example, in
HSPD-21, the White House emphasized the
need for state and local jurisdictions to have
a cadre of trained volunteers who can come
to the aid of their fellow community members. This presidential directive envisions a
country “where local civil leaders, citizens,
and families are educated regarding threats
and are empowered to mitigate their own
risk, where they are practiced in responding
to events, where they have social networks to
fall back upon, and where they have familiarity with local public health and medical
systems.”99 Groups such as MRC fulfill this vision and “will significantly attenuate the requirement for additional assistance.”100
In the 2007 Ready or Not? report, TFAH
looked at the number of MRC volunteers per
100,000 persons in each state. In the absence
of federal guidelines and evidence-based best
practices, TFAH set the threshold for the
2007 indicator at the 25th percentile, meaning 75 percent of states received a point for
having met or exceeded 14 Medical Reserve
Corps volunteers per 100,000 persons.
For the 2008 report, TFAH, in coordination
with the MRC Program Office, looked at a
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number of factors in assessing the MRC units
within a state, in addition to having volunteers.
I Is there a state-level MRC Coordinator?
All states have been encouraged to appoint an MRC State Coordinator to provide recommendations to OCVMRC about
new (and continued) MRC unit registrations, and to provide technical assistance
and support to the local MRC units within
a state. The appointment of an MRC State
Coordinator shows a level of commitment
from the state to the MRC. In some states,
the same individual serves a dual role as
the MRC State Coordinator as well as coordinator for the Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (ESAR-VHP).
As of October 28, 2008, 34 states had an MRC
Coordinator: Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North
Dakota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia
I Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 percent) in a state in compliance with the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) requirements? The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a consistent nationwide mechanism
for federal, state, tribal, and local governments, and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to effectively work
together to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from emergency incidents. The
federal government requires all volunteers
and emergency responders to be NIMS
compliant, and an understanding of NIMS
is one of the MRC Core Competencies.101
As of October 28, 2008, 16 states and D.C.
met this benchmark: Alaska, Colorado, D.C.,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington. Most

MRC units indicate that they are working towards NIMS compliance.
I Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 percent)
in a state integrated with state ESAR-VHP
systems? The MRC and ESAR-VHP are national initiatives of HHS to improve the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to
public health and medical emergencies.
While MRC units are made up of individuals
from local communities who support public
health activities year-round, and are trained
to respond in times of emergency, the ESARVHP system is primarily a means of registering and verifying the credentials of volunteer
health professionals in advance of an emergency. HHS recommends the two programs
integrate so as to strengthen the local-statefederal coordination of volunteers in the
event of a public health emergency.102
As of October 28, 2008, 16 states and D.C.
met this benchmark: Colorado, D.C., Florida,

Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia. Many MRC units indicate that they are
working towards integration with ESAR-VHP.
For the 2008 report, TFAH awarded states a
point based on the presence of an MRC State
Coordinator. Not only does this position enhance the collaboration among MRC units
across a state, but it is also a position that
demonstrates a state’s level of funding and
commitment to its MRC programs.
For the 2009 report, TFAH will also evaluate
states on the second two criteria: NIMS-compliance and ESAR-VHP integration. Although
states usually do not have direct control of the
MRC units operating within their borders,
state governments can affect community
resiliency and other MRC-related outcomes
through policy, funding, and coordination.

REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Major Flooding in Ohio, August 2007.
The Ohio Department of Health emergency response system was tested when flooding hit
nine counties in the summer of 2007. In Allen County, one of the affected counties, the local
health department used its recently updated communication equipment to share information
with local and state officials regarding the flood damage and needs within their community.
Public information staff, who had been trained with funds from a CDC cooperative agreement,
worked with the media to get information to the public regarding building clean-up, mold prevention, and the potential need of tetanus and other vaccines. Volunteers from the local MRC
unit set up a mass dispensing tetanus vaccine clinic, a plan which had been developed as part of
SNS preparations. The Ohio Department of Health’s Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance (RODS) System was used to detect an increase in complaints related to insect bites in
the flooded region, and personal protective measures after a flood were shared with the public
in order to reduce the risk of vector-borne illness outbreaks.
Source: ASTHO103
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Indicator 9:

FOOD SAFETY -- DETECTION AND DIAGNOSIS

FINDING: Twenty states and D.C. were unable to identify the pathogen responsible for reported
foodborne disease outbreaks at a rate that met or exceeded the national average of 44 percent
(combined data 2004-2006).
30 states were able to identify the
pathogen responsible for reported
foodborne disease outbreaks at a rate
that met or exceeded the national
average of 44 percent (combined data
2004-2006) (1 point).

20 states and D.C. were NOT able to
identify the pathogen responsible for
reported foodborne disease outbreaks
at a rate that met or exceeded the
national average of 44 percent
(combined data 2004-2006) (0 points).

State

State

Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Percent of Confirmed Outbreaks
(combined data 2004-2006)
83%
88%
63%
83%
94%
61%
100%
58%
55%
77%
100%
50%
48%
75%
66%
57%
44%
71%
63%
66%
100%
68%
50%
65%
67%
75%
89%
100%
95%
54%

Alabama
Arizona
California
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
New York
Texas
Washington

Percent of Confirmed Outbreaks
(combined data 2004-2006)
2%
40%
30%
25%
22%
17%
38%
32%
42%
24%
0%
33%
42%
28%
33%
12%
33%
30%
43%
30%
28%

Source: CDC’s Summary Statistics for Foodborne Outbreaks, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Available online at
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data.htm
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Approximately 76 million Americans -- one
in four -- are sickened by foodborne disease
each year. Many of these cases go unreported although there are an estimated
325,000 individuals who are hospitalized annually due to foodborne illness and 5,000
who die each year.104
CDC defines a foodborne disease outbreak
as the occurrence of two or more cases of a
similar illness resulting from the ingestion of
a common food. State, local, and territorial
health departments report foodborne disease outbreaks to CDC each year via the electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting
System (eFORS). CDC’s goal is for 75 percent of outbreaks to have a preliminary report in eFORS within 60 days of the date the
first individual became ill.105
Between 2004 and 2006, the last year for
which CDC data was available at the time of
publication, state public health departments
reported a total of 3,548 foodborne disease
outbreaks that sickened 74,077 individuals.
Of the 3,548 reported outbreaks, state public

health departments were only able to confirm the etiology, or causative pathogen, in
1,552 cases, or 44 percent of outbreaks.
Monitoring the public’s food supply is a realworld example of public health preparedness
as it requires the same skills and technologies
needed to detect and mitigate bioterrorism
and infectious disease outbreaks: a strong surveillance system and adequate lab capacity.
According to Michael Taylor, former Deputy
Commissioner for Policy at FDA and former
Administrator at USDA’s FSIS, “ensuring the
safety of the food supply is centrally important to the public’s health and underpins the
success of the nation’s trillion dollar food and
agriculture industries.”106
The 30 states that earned a point on this indicator were successful at identifying the bacteria, virus, parasite, or chemical that caused
the outbreak at rate that met or exceeded
the national average of confirmed foodborne disease outbreaks of 44 percent (combined data 2004-2006).

REAL-LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Salmonella Outbreak in Southern Colorado, March 2008.
Salmonella was first reported in Alamosa, Colorado on March 6, 2008, and by mid-March the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment was able to pinpoint the source of
the outbreak to the water supply. The department then activated its public information hotline, and issued a mutual aid request to water experts as well as requesting donations of bottled water for the affected area. With CDC cooperative agreement funds, the state health
agency placed epidemiologists in each of the state’s nine all-hazards regions. These epidemiologists conducted case interviews and phone surveys and tracked cases and hospitalizations.
The greatest challenge the state faced was keeping the public informed of the outbreak, specifically when it was safe to use the water. The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and the local Joint Information Center issued news releases, kept web sites up to
date, and produced and handed out informational fliers. Also, with federal cooperative agreement funding, the department was able to contract with the Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug
center to run the Colorado Health Emergency Line for the Public, which proved to be very
helpful -- answering 2,544 calls.
Source: ASTHO107
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STATES’ ROLE IN FOOD SAFETY
State health departments are on the front lines of food safety. A May 2008 report by the Food
Safety Research Consortium (FSRC), a multidisciplinary collaboration among eight research institutions to improve the U.S. food safety system, identified the following as the primary roles
of state food safety agencies:108
I Lead responsibility, in collaboration with local health departments and sometimes CDC, of
many major outbreak investigations.
I Frontline responsibility for ongoing foodborne illness surveillance, working both independently and in collaboration with CDC and localities on FoodNet, PulseNet, OutbreakNet,
and other surveillance initiatives.
I Responsiblity for the great majority of all food-related laboratory testing, including testing
for pathogens in clinical isolates and chemical and microbial contaminants in food.
I Carrying out more than 80 percent of all non-retail food establishment inspections, other
than in meat and poultry establishments, including the majority of “FDA inspections” conducted by state agencies under contract with FDA.
I Overseeing farm inspections of animal health and other conditions related to food safety, including primary jurisdiction for enforcement of federal pesticide use restrictions, which relate directly to the possibility of unsafe residues in food.
I Informing and educating consumers and commercial participants in the food safety system.
Apart from CDC’s Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases grants to
state public health departments, which includes the program goal of reporting 75 percent of
foodborne disease outbreaks to eFORS within 60 days of the first case, quantitative standards
to measure state food safety surveillance are lacking. To address this gap, the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) is developing a series of performance indicators to measure effective foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak response at the state
and local level.
On the regulatory side of food safety, in lieu of official required national standards, FDA has
pushed two voluntary efforts to create more uniform standards and practices as well as enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s food safety system: FDA’s Food Code
and a Voluntary National Retail Food Regulatory Program. Both programs seek to provide
local, state, and federal regulatory officials with science-based measures of performance that
will lead to more effective and uniform regulation of the food service and food retail sectors by
state and local food safety programs.

THE FOODBORNE DISEASES ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) is an active surveillance system,
which means that FoodNet staff routinely contact all clinical laboratories in the 10 FoodNet sites
to collect information on every confirmed case under surveillance of nine foodborne diseases.
The nine pathogens are Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Listeria, Salmonella, Shiga
toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157, Shigella, Vibrio, and Yersinia. FoodNet is a collaborative
project of CDC, 10 states* with a population of 45.5 million persons, or 15 percent of the U.S.
population, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the FDA. There are four main FoodNet objectives:109
1. Determine the burden of foodborne illness in the United States.
2. Monitor trends in the burden of specific foodborne illness over time.
3. Attribute the burden of foodborne illness to specific foods and settings.
4. Develop and assess interventions to reduce the burden of foodborne illness.
Note: * The 10 states that are part of FoodNet are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee.
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MANDATORY REPORTING ON FOODBORNE DISEASES
In the late spring/early summer of 2008, a nationwide Salmonella outbreak sickened more than
1,442 individuals in 43 states and D.C. At least 286 persons were hospitalized, and the infection might have contributed to two deaths.110 Food safety officials initially warned consumers
to stay away from fresh tomatoes, although this warning was later rescinded as scientists focused instead on raw jalapeño and Serrano peppers. Some epidemiologists and laboratorians
have attributed the delay in identification to gaps in mandatory reporting requirements.
Identifying foodborne disease outbreaks requires regular submission of clinical isolates and specimens to state public health labs. However, according to APHL, hospital and clinical laboratories
are sometimes reluctant to send isolates of foodborne pathogens to a state public health laboratory due to cost and time issues. A May 2008 survey of APHL members revealed that only 26
states have laws or rules on the books requiring nongovernmental (e.g. clinical, hospital-based)
laboratories within the state to send clinical isolates or specimens associated with reportable
foodborne diseases to the state public health laboratory. According to APHL, “Failure by these
nongovernmental laboratories to submit isolates, specimens and samples could delay timely identification of an outbreak, prolonging exposure to the contaminated product and leading to increased incidence of disease.”111
Among the 26 states that do mandate the collection of clinical specimens to state public health labs,
25 states require the submission of E.Coli specimens or isolates, 23 states require Salmonella, 22
states require Shigella, 21 states require Listeria monocytogenes, and 20 states require Vibrio samples.

ENHANCING THE ROLES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM
Much of the food safety debate has been over the reforms needed at FDA and USDA in order
to streamline the nation’s food safety system. While a federal restructuring is necessary, a successful food safety system that focuses on preventing foodborne disease must also include coordination and collaboration with food safety regulators and health officials at the state and
local level. In order to strengthen the roles of state and local agencies, in both their community-based food safety efforts and as integral parts of the nation’s food safety system, the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is funding a series of meetings among state and local officials, their federal counterparts, and food industry and consumer groups.
The project brings together members of the Association of Food and Drug Officials (AFDO),
ASTHO, and NACCHO. Participants will focus on five goals:
1. Formulate and express a modern vision of the role of state and local government in an integrated, prevention-oriented food safety system;
2. Identify gaps or constraints in current law, policy and practice at the federal, state and local
levels that inhibit fulfillment of that vision;
3. Recommend changes in law, policy, and practice that are needed to enhance the effectiveness of state and local agencies in addressing food safety problems at the local, state, and national level;
4. Identify specific opportunities to improve collaboration among state, local, and federal agencies; and
5. Describe current funding patterns and resource needs at the state and local level.
A report is due out in early 2009.
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Indicator 10: PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING COMMITMENT -- STATE PUBLIC
HEALTH BUDGETS
FINDING: Eleven states and D.C. cut funding for public health from FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08.
39 states increased or maintained level
funding for public health services from
FY 2006-07 to FY 2007-08 (1 point)

11 states and D.C. DECREASED funding for public health services from FY
2006-07 to FY 2007-08 (0 points)

State and percent increase (adjusted
for inflation)

State and percent decrease (adjusted
for inflation)

Alabama (7.2%)
Alaska (0.8%)2
Arizona (13.4%)
California (8.7%)8
Delaware (4.8%)2
Florida (3.3%)2
Georgia (7.5%)6,8
Hawaii (7.2%)2
Illinois (3.7%)
Indiana (50.9%)
Iowa (9.2%)
Kansas (9.6%)
Kentucky (1.5%)
Louisiana (20.0%)
Maine (9.3%)2
Massachusetts (3.1%)4
Michigan (2.8%)4
Minnesota (14.9%)2
Mississippi (3.3%)2,8
Missouri (2.9%)5,8

Arkansas (-0.2%)
Colorado (-0.2%)
Connecticut (-0.2)2
D.C. (-2.8%)
Idaho (-2.2%)
Maryland (-9.5%)2
Nebraska (-3.5%)4
Nevada (-6.9%)
New Jersey (-4.3%)
Oklahoma (-4.1%)1,8
Pennsylvania (-0.8%)2
West Virginia (-0.7%)

Montana (47.4%)
New Hampshire (6.0%)
New Mexico (6.2%)
New York (12.3%)
North Carolina (8.8%)2
North Dakota (52.7%)7
Ohio (9.0%)4
Oregon (29.7%)
Rhode Island (4.9%)
South Carolina (1.8%)
South Dakota (21.7%)
Tennessee (10.5%)
Texas (8.6%)8
Utah (9.2%)8
Vermont (1.8%)3
Virginia (5.5%)4
Washington (20.4%)4
Wisconsin (9.0%)4
Wyoming (3.9%)

NOTES: Biennium budgets are bolded.
1 May contain some social service programs, but not Medicaid or CHIP.
2 General funds only.

7 North Dakota’s budget data for the 2007-2009 biennium
taken from appropriations legislation.

3 Includes federal funds.

8 Excludes one-time funding for anti-virals.

4 Budget data taken from appropriations legislation.

Source: Research by TFAH of publicly available state
budget documents and interviews with health and budget
officials in the states.

5 Missouri’s percent change based on FY 2006-07 and FY
2007-08 actual expenditures.

This indicator, adjusted for inflation, illustrates a state’s commitment to funding public
health programs that support the infrastructure -- including workforce -- needed to adequately respond to emergencies.
Every state allocates and reports its budget in
different ways. States also vary widely in the
budget details they provide. This makes
comparisons across states difficult. For this
analysis, TFAH examined state budgets and
appropriations bills for the agency, department, or division in charge of public health
services for FY 2007-2008, using a definition
as consistent as possible across the two years,
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6 Georgia’s budget data for FY 2006-07 taken from appropriations legislation.

based on how each state reports data. TFAH
defined “public health services” broadly, including most state-level health funding.
Based on this analysis, 11 states and D.C. experienced cuts in their public health budgets.
With the present economic downturn, states
are encountering great economic distress and
many states have tried to close shortfalls by increasing taxes and/or cutting spending. Currently, 33 states are facing shortfalls to their
2009 state budgets, and 16 states already project shortfalls to their 2010 budgets. At the
current rate of economic deterioration, and
based on the course of past recessions, the

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities predicts that 2010 state budget gaps will be about
$100 billion.112 TFAH is deeply concerned
about the potential of state budget cuts and
the effect they will have a state’s ability to be
prepared for emergencies over the next years.
Several states that received points for this indicator may not have actually increased their
spending on public health programs. The
ways some states report their budgets, for instance, by including federal funding in the
totals or including public health dollars
within health care spending totals, makes it
difficult to determine “public health” as a
separate item.
Few states allocate funds directly for bioterrorism and public health preparedness as
part of their public health budgets. Instead,
most rely on federal funds to support these
activities. The infrastructure of other public
health programs, however, also supports
their underlying preparedness capabilities.

The PAHPA legislation states, however, that
beginning with FY 2009, public health and
hospital preparedness grant awardees must
contribute non-federal funds to support the
cooperative agreements. States are required
to match five percent of the total federal
funding for FY 2009, and 10 percent of the
total amount thereafter.113 Non-federal funds
may come from state public funding or private donations and may be in cash or in-kind.
Those states with stagnant or decreasing state
public health budgets may be challenged to
identify funds required for the state match.
While this indicator examines whether states’
budgets increased or decreased, it does not
assess if the funding is adequate to cover public health needs in the states. This also does
not take into account ongoing hospital needs
and funding.
(For additional information on the methodology of the budget analysis, please see Appendix
C: Data and Methodology for State Indicators.)

REAL LIFE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
Killer Tornado in Kansas, May 2007.
An EF5 tornado tore through the town of Greensburg, Kansas on May 4, 2007, leaving 11 dead
and $268 million in damages. In the months following the storm, the Kansas Department of
Health and Environment led the effort to protect the health and safety of residents. The Kansas
Center for Public Health and Preparedness helped to secure medical supplies; the Kansas National
Guard deployed its mobile hospital facility to assure that medical care was accessible; the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment reissued 355 birth and marriage certificates; the Food
Safety division inspected food vendors and oversaw the destruction of perishable food and over
the counter drugs; and the Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention distributed vaccines and
helped with administering and registering vaccines. The health agency had been trained in the
NIMS ICS and was able to respond to the emergency in a more integrated and informed manner
than it would have been capable of in the past.
The all-encompassing response by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment illustrates
the importance of a well-funded state public health department, which is why TFAH evaluates
states on their ability to increase, or at a minimum, maintain state public health funding.
Source: ASTHO114
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UNDER PAHPA STATES MUST MATCH FEDERAL DOLLARS
The 2006 PAHPA legislation included a requirement that states receiving CDC PHEP cooperative agreement funding must match those federal dollars with nonfederal contributions beginning in FY 2009 (CDC PHEP budget period August 10, 2009 -- August 9, 2010). The concept
of requiring states to match federal dollars is not new. HRSA’s Maternal and Child Health
Block Grant includes a required state match, as do other federal programs.
The PHEP grantees will be required to provide nonfederal contributions (match) “directly or
through donations from public or private entities and may be in cash or in-kind, fairly evaluated,
including plant, equipment, or services.”115 For FY 2009 states will be required to match at least
five percent of the PHEP grant, or $1 for each $20 of federal funds. However, for any subsequent fiscal year, states will be required to match no less than 10 percent of such costs, or $1 for
each $10 of federal PHEP funds. States must thoroughly document their in-kind match to the
level that it can pass a U.S. government audit. If they cannot document their five percent match,
then their PHEP grant award will be reduced to the level where they can document a match.
In addition, PAHPA includes language on the maintenance of funding which suggests that while
states are required to put hard dollars in their public health budget for emergency preparedness and response, if the states are not contributing hard dollars, there is no penalty. The disparity between the severe penalty for the match and the absence of any penalty for the
maintenance of funding requirement has led to serious concerns among state health officials.

SELECT 2009 STATE PREPAREDNESS INDICATORS
Based on feedback from state health departments and federal public health officials, TFAH will,
for the first time, give states and the public a preview of select indicators that will be measured
in the 2009 Ready or Not? report. By doing so, TFAH expects to incentivize local, state, and
federal health officials and policy makers to take action to bolster preparedness in key areas.
The indicators presented on pages 51-53 give readers an overview of current preparedness
efforts in the following areas: Medical Reserve Corps readiness and food safety. They are not
included in the 2008 overall state preparedness scores, but will be used in the 2009 report.
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Future Indicator 1:

COMMUNITY RESILIENCY -- MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS

For the 2009 report, TFAH will assess the
MRC units within each state on three factors,
in addition to having volunteers.
I Is there a state-level MRC Coordinator?
I Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 percent) in a state in compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
requirements?

Although states usually do not have direct
control of the MRC units operating within
their borders, state governments can affect
community resiliency and other MRC-related outcomes through policy, funding, and
coordination.
The results, as of October 2008, are listed
below.

I Are the majority of MRC units (≥ 50 percent) in a state integrated with state ESARVHP systems?
6 states and D.C. have: 1) Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinators,
2) a majority of MRC units in
compliance with NIMS, and 3) a
majority of MRC units integrated with
state ESAR-VHP systems (1 point).

44 states do NOT have: 1) Medical
Reserve Corps (MRC) Coordinators,
2) a majority of MRC units in compliance
with NIMS, and 3) a majority of MRC
units integrated with state ESAR-VHP
systems (0 points).

Colorado
D.C.*
Florida
Kentucky
North Carolina
North Dakota
Utah

Alaska
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi

Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming

*Note: D.C., Guam, Palau, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are not required to have State MRC Coordinators, but do
have unit coordinators.
Source: Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps
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Future Indicator 2:

FOOD SAFETY -- IMPLEMENTATION OF FOOD
SAFETY PROGRAMS

For the 2009 report, TFAH will assess states
on their implementation of the Voluntary
National Retail Food Regulatory Program.
The FDA -- in collaboration with federal, state,
and local regulatory agencies; the academic
industry; trade associations; and consumers -has also established a Voluntary National Retail Food Regulatory Program. The program’s goal is to reduce or eliminate the
occurrence of illnesses and deaths from food
produced or handled at the retail level.116
The program seeks to provide local, state,
and federal regulatory officials with sciencebased measures of performance by state and
local food regulatory programs that will lead
to more effective and uniform regulation of
the food industry.
Participation in the program is voluntary. To
be part of the program, the jurisdiction must
carry out an initial self-assessment of its retail
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food safety program within 12 months of enrollment in the program, conduct self-assessments every 36 months after that, and submit
to verification audits by outside parties.
As of July 2008, 40 states had at least one statewide agency enrolled in the program. Of
these 40 states, 33 had completed the initial
self-assessment of their program. The self-assessment is used to identify each program’s
strengths and weaknesses. Programs are assessed in nine areas. If a state meets any of the
nine standards, it reports that self-assessment
result to FDA. Thirty-two states met at least
one of the nine standards based on their selfassessment. Thirteen states had that achievement verified by an external evaluator.
States that have their self-assessments verified
by an external evaluator will earn a point on
this indicator.

Status of States Enrolled in Voluntary National Retail Regulatory Program
State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona*
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

State Agency Self-Assessment
Enrolled
Completed

Achieved at least
1 of 9 Standards
Based on
Self-Assessment

Achievement
Verified by
External
Evaluator













































































































































Source: Data as of July 2008 as reported by FDA’s Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition.117
















Note: *No state-wide agency is enrolled
in the program. However, 11 of 15
counties in Arizona are enrolled. Of the
11 counties, five have had their achievements verified by an outside auditor.

53

VOLUNTARY NATIONAL RETAIL FOOD REGULATORY PROGRAM
The nine standards enshrined in the program seek to provide local, state and federal regulatory
officials with sound, science-based measures that will lead to a more uniform regulation of the
food industry.
The Standards address the following program areas:
1. Regulatory Foundation
2. Trained Regulatory Staff
3. Inspection Program Based on HACCP Principles
4. Uniform Inspection Program
5. Foodborne Illness and Food Security Preparedness and Response
6. Compliance and Enforcement
7. Industry and Community Relations
8. Program Support and Resources
9. Program Assessment
The Program’s high standards are not static but ever changing as new problems and new solutions come to light. A built-in framework allows for continuous improvement based on scientifically-sound performance measures.
States and local jurisdictions that choose to participate in the voluntary program must follow a
continuous improvement model. First, the jurisdiction carries out an initial self-assessment of its
retail food safety program within 12 months of enrollment in the Program, and every 36 months
thereafter. The self-assessment is used to determine whether or not the jurisdiction meets the
NRFRP’s standards. After the self-assessment, the jurisdiction must conduct a verification audit
within 36 months of the initial self-assessment. The verification audits are to be performed by
an outside party and these results are used to confirm the accuracy of the self-assessment.
Once the verification audit is finished, the jurisdiction begins the whole cycle anew by completing another self-assessment. This allows the jurisdiction a chance to meet more of the nine
standards, while accounting for changes and updates in food safety regulations.
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Federal Preparedness

I

n this section of the report, TFAH examines federal preparedness
activities.

December 2008 marks the two-year anniversary
of the signing of PAHPA and the one-year anniversary of HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. Both the PAHPA legislation
and the Presidential Directive represent significant advances in the nation’s preparedness as
they set out key deliverables and benchmarks
for government agencies.
While much
progress has been made in meeting these deliverables, TFAH finds that the federal government continues to lag in several key areas:
I Congress has failed to deliver a sustained financial commitment towards preparedness
-- especially at the state and local level -where many of the essential preparedness
and response activities occur.
I The federal government has failed to align
its own policies with the recommendations

2

SECTION

and guidance it set forth for individual
and household preparedness.
I The current federal emergency preparedness structure is complex and overlapping;
the Obama administration will need to untangle this.
Issues addressed in this section include:
1. Funding for pandemic and all-hazards preparedness;
2. The state of federal preparedness;
3. Implementation of the PAHPA of 2006; and
4. Additional federal issues, including the
lack of an emergency health benefit and
deficiencies in sick leave policies, liability
protection for federal health care workers,
and the shelf-life extension program for
medications and vaccines.

1. Funding for Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Over the past six years, the federal government
has invested more than $6.3 billion in state and
local preparedness, and provided an additional
$600 million for state and local pandemic preparedness. Federal funding, however, has been
inconsistent and has declined over the past sev-

eral years. A report from the Center for Studying Health System Change noted that “federal
funding is fragmented ...coming from several
sources with varied requirements, making it difficult for communities to pursue a comprehensive strategy.”118

CDC’s Upgrading State and Local Capacity* and ASPR’s Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP) Funding FY 2003 -- FY 2008
$1,200,000,000

U.S. Dollars

$1,000,000,000
$800,000,000
$600,000,000
$400,000,000
$200,000,000
State and Local

$0

FY 2003

FY 2004

*Note: Upgrading State and Local
Capacity includes funds for: PHEP
Cooperative Agreements, Centers
for Public Health Preparedness,
Advanced Practice Centers, and all
other state and local capacity. HPP
line represents actual grant awards
to states and does not include nongrant program funds used to support HPP evaluation activities or
federal administration costs.
Source: 1) Upgrading State and
Local Capacity funding from
CDC’s FY 2009 Budget Justification document.119 2) Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) funding
from HHS’s FY 2009 Budget Justification document.120
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FY 2005 FY 2006
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FY 2008
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A. UPGRADING STATE AND LOCAL CAPACITY
public health agencies to carry out the following activities:122

State and local preparedness funds have remained relatively stagnant since FY 2003.
Congress failed to pass the FY 2009 budget,
instead opting for a six-month continuing
resolution until March 2009, so funding will
remain at the FY 2008 level unless Congress
strengthens the program in March.

I Recruitment and training of a highly
skilled, professional workforce;

According to ASTHO, steep cuts in the preparedness grants “will seriously hinder the
ability of state and local health agencies to
plan and carry out future activities.”121 Cutting the budget will affect the ability of state

I Enhancement of surge capacity for mass
casualties; and

I Improvement in state response plans;
I Expansion of laboratory capacity for biological, chemical, and radiological agents
of terrorism;

I Improvements in disease detection and
surveillance technologies and programs.

B. HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (HPP)
Inconsistent and decreasing funding also has
plagued the HPP grants. For instance, in FY
2007, ASPR competitively awarded $18.1 million to Health care Facilities Partnerships “for
the purpose of improving surge capacity and
enhancing community and hospital preparedness for public health emergencies in
defined geographic areas.”123 Another $25
million was awarded to Health Care Facilities
Emergency Care Partnerships to help integrate emergency care systems into overall preparedness strategies and plans.124 Both
programs were zeroed out in the FY 2009
budget. Although Congress failed to pass the
FY 2009 budget and instead, passed a six-

month Continuing Resolution that funds programs at FY 2008 levels through March, it is
unclear if these programs will receive funding.
According to a 2008 GAO report, state health
officials have expressed concern that “federal
funding for ASPR’s HPP decreased while program requirements increased, making it difficult for states to plan for maintenance of
emergency preparedness systems, meet new requirements, and replace expired supplies.”125
State officials have argued that a three-year
funding cycle would allow for long-term planning and more realistic work plans.126 ASPR officials are said to be aware of these concerns and
considering a change beginning in FY 2009.

C. UPGRADING CDC CAPACITY

$80,000,000

In FY 2008, Congress appropriated $120 million to CDC’s Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency
Response to upgrade CDC capacity in the
area of public health emergency preparedness initiatives. This funding supported a variety of programs including:

$60,000,000

I Laboratory Response Network (LRN),

Upgrading CDC Capacity Funding Levels FY 2004 -- FY 2008
$160,000,000
$140,000,000
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U.S. Dollars

$100,000,000

I Radiological Laboratory Response
Network (LRN-R);

$40,000,000
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FY 2008

Source: CDC’s FY 2009 Budget Justification document.128

56

I Select Agents Program;
I Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS);127

I CDC Director’s Emergency Operations
Center (DEOC); and
I Monitoring and evaluation of COTPERfunded programs, including the state and
local grants.
As with other CDC programs, funding has
declined significantly over the past five years,

yet PAHPA and HSPD-21 require programs
to meet higher benchmarks and deliverables.
Policy directives without the adequate funding to support them are rhetoric and do not
show a serious commitment on the part of
the administration and Congress towards
emergency preparedness and response.

D. BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BARDA)
The president’s FY 2009 budget proposal included $250 million for BARDA, an increase
of $148 million over FY 2008. An August 1,
2008 White House amendment to the FY 2009
budget proposed to increase BARDA funding
by about $500 million. The additional funds
would have been used to support the advancement of medical countermeasures for
12 biological threat agents, volatile nerve
agents, and radiological and nuclear threats.
In addition to these funds for advanced research and development, $25 million was included to support the advanced development
of next generation ventilators to help patients

in acute respiratory distress in a pandemic or
other public health emergency. The request
also included $22 million to manage Project
BioShield, slightly more than FY 2008.
Given the passage of the continuing resolution that funded programs at FY 2008 levels
through March 2009, it is unclear if BARDA
will be able to meet its development goals.

BARDA Funding FY 2007 - 2009
FY 2007 actual
FY 2008 enacted

$103,921, 000
$101,544,000

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services129

E. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
Congress passed a continuing resolution that
funded programs at FY 2008 levels through
March 2009. In FY 2008, Congress funded
$322 million for ongoing pandemic preparedness activities at CDC, FDA, NIH, and
the Office of the Secretary of HHS.
In September 2008, CDC announced it had
awarded $24 million to fund 55 programs in
29 state and local public health departments
that could serve as innovative approaches
for influenza pandemic preparedness.130
The $24 million for the new projects is part
of the $600 million allocated toward state
and local pandemic influenza preparedness
back in FY 2006.

The $600 million for state and local pandemic
preparedness was supplemental funding that
has been exhausted, although states will continue to work on pandemic influenza planning
through the all-hazards PHEP cooperative
agreement. However, CDC estimates that $20
million of the $600 million went to hire qualified personnel for specific pandemic planning
positions. When this money is exhausted,
these employees will be let go. Meanwhile, at
the same time the federal government has cut
all state pandemic influenza preparedness
funding, the PAHPA legislation links the quality of state pandemic plans to their eligibility
for future PHEP grants.
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2. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
In the three years since the White House issued
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,
much progress has been made to ready the nation for a future pandemic influenza outbreak.
The federal government has:131
I Stockpiled pre-pandemic vaccines and
antivirals;
I Created a domestic vaccine production capacity commensurate with the expected
requirements of a pandemic;
I Sponsored advanced development projects toward the next generation of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics; and
I Provided financial and technical assistance
to states to help them, among other
things, create complementary stockpiles of
antiviral drugs and develop and test various mitigation strategies.
Pandemic preparedness, to date, has focused
on the low-hanging fruit. Now that the easier
to solve problems have been addressed, HHS
Secretary Michael Leavitt notes that, “We have
entered a new phase in our preparations. The

milestones are farther apart but no less significant. We are now tackling some challenging
issues that can only be resolved with the collaboration of the full range of stakeholders -state and local officials, public health and
medical professionals, religious leaders and
ethicists, the business community, organized
labor, non-governmental organizations, and
individuals from all walks of life.”132
Among these challenging issues are four
areas of crucial importance to pandemic preparedness:
I Real-time disease detection and clinical
surveillance;
I Mass casualty care / Surge capacity;
I Swift distribution of medical countermeasures; and
I Legal and feasibility issues associated with
community mitigation strategies.
If unaddressed, these could significantly limit
the effectiveness of the national pandemic
response.

FEDERAL - STATE PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS COLLABORATION
The National Pandemic Implementation Plan includes 324 action items; 17 of these call for
states and local governments to lead national
and sub-national efforts; 64 of these require
state involvement. The 2006 PAHPA legislation
requires states to develop pandemic influenza
plans that meet national standards.133 HHS collected the first round of state plans in April
2007; however, an initial review of these plans
by HHS and other federal agencies found the
plans to be lacking. According to a separate
GAO report published in September 2008, the
HHS-led review of state pandemic influenza response plans found “many major gaps” in state
pandemic planning in 16 out of 22 priority
areas.134 The GAO report faulted HHS and
other federal agencies, noting that “while the
federal government has provided some support to states in their planning efforts, states
and localities have had little involvement in national planning for an influenza pandemic....even though the National Pandemic
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Implementation Plan relies on these stakeholders
efforts.”135
In between the initial submission of state
pandemic plans and the publication of the
GAO report, HHS revised its set of pandemic
planning criteria to remedy gaps in state
plans and address state and local officials’
concerns. In July 2008, states re-submitted
their revised plans to HHS. These plans are
currently under review.
The quality of state pandemic plans takes on
additional significance beginning in FY 2009
(CDC PHEP budget period August 10, 2009
-- August 9, 2010), as the PAHPA legislation
mandates that CDC link the quality of state
plans to public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) funding. To evaluate the quality of state plans, experts from HHS, CDC
and the states developed grading criteria.
State plans must demonstrate the state’s ability to accomplish the following objectives:136

I Ensure public health continuity of operations during each phase of a pandemic;

I Ensure mass vaccination capability during
each phase of a pandemic; and

I Ensure surveillance and laboratory capability during each phase of a pandemic;

I Ensure communication capability during
each phase of a pandemic.

I Implement community mitigation interventions;

HHS has indicated that they will release the
results of the state pandemic influenza operational plan review in December 2008, although the transition of administrations may
result in changes to how or when the results
are released.137

I Acquire and distribute medical countermeasures;

3. The State of Federal Preparedness: What the Obama Administration
Needs to Know
Although there have been many achievements over the past seven years, including
the development of medical countermeasures for use in a pandemic flu or bioterrorist attack, the creation and implementation
of a National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,
and the creation of volunteer medical and

public health emergency response teams,
among others, there are many crucial areas
where much remains to be done. In addition, the current system has many redundancies that need to be addressed and
streamlined. This should be a top priority of
the Obama administration.

A. DEFINING PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Obama administration must address
how public health emergency preparedness
and response can be better organized. Many
experts have called for more clarity around
the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies involved in public health emergency preparedness -- both among cabinet agencies -HHS, DHS, VA, and DOD -- and for offices
within HHS -- ASPR, CDC, and HRSA.
HHS is the lead cabinet agency for determining policy and planning for health emergen-

cies. There is broad consensus among experts
that HHS should remain as the lead agency.
However, other cabinet agencies have different types of expertise that are needed during
emergencies, for example, the VA can manage large health systems, and the VA and
DOD can effectively and rapidly move people,
equipment, and supplies. The Obama administration should ensure that these agencies are well-integrated in the nation’s public
health emergency response system.

B. BIOSURVEILLANCE COORDINATION
A 2008 GAO report highlighted the importance of a robust national biosurveillance system. In testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives, the lead author of the GAO
report noted that “Infectious diseases have
the potential to develop into widespread outbreaks and could have significant consequences, such as causing hundreds of
thousands of casualties, disrupting transportation and weakening our economy, damaging public morale and confidence, and
threatening our national security.”138 While

these infectious disease outbreaks could
occur naturally, the United States faces the
possibility that terrorists will use biological
agents as weapons of mass destruction.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the administration and Congress have emphasized the
need to improve biosurveillance. While HHS
is considered the lead agency for public health
response -- including human biosurveillance -some critical health functions operate out of
the DHS Office of Health, which has devel59

oped three major initiatives to provide early detection and warning of biological threats: the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC), the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS), and BioWatch.
Meanwhile, CDC, consistent with HSPD-21, has
set up the Biosurveillance Coordination Unit
(BCU). The BCU is leading the development
of the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human
Health and its implementation in collaboration
with public and private stakeholders. The development of this strategy is necessary to leverage current nationwide capabilities and target
new investments where the greatest improvement can occur. The specific goal of this effort
is to generate timely and comprehensive information that is accessible to decision-makers in
government, business, and the public in a usable and appropriate context; thereby, saving
lives through improved recognition of and response to urgent health threats. BCU released
an updated draft on October 31, 2008.
HSPD-21 also requires the establishment of a
federal advisory committee, including representatives from state and local government
public health authorities and appropriate private sector health care entities, in order to ensure that the federal government is enhancing
state and local government public health surveillance capability. The National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS), which
is comprised of prominent public and private
biosurveillance stakeholders and contributors,
was developed to meet this mandate. The
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NBAS will provide independent advice on biosurveillance for human health which will be incorporated into the National Biosurveillance
Strategy for Human Health.
In addition to systems at DHS and CDC,
there are biosurveillance systems at many
other federal agencies, including USDA,
FDA, EPA, VA, DOD, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
The mission of DHS’s NBIC is to bring all
these disparate biosurveillance feeds together by developing, operating, and maintaining an integrated network. This network,
the NBIS, will be used to detect a biological
event that presents a risk to the United States
or its infrastructure or key assets.
Given the confusion surrounding the existing
national biosurveillance structure, Congress
has commissioned two reports on the subject.
First, IOM and the National Research Council are evaluating national biosurveillance systems to detect biological threats in order to
determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the existing programs in detecting
and responding to biological attacks. This report is scheduled to be released in the late
spring/early summer of 2009. Second, GAO
is studying the integration of U.S. biosurveillance systems as mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). This report
is due out in the spring of 2009.
The Obama administration should review the
recommendations in these two major reports as
well as the recommendations from the NBAS.

NATIONAL BIOSURVEILLANCE INTEGRATION CENTER (NBIC)
DHS was required to establish a fully operational NBIC by September 30, 2008 as part of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). NBIC’s mission,
as spelled out by the 9/11 Commission Act is to:
I Rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern;
I Integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental
monitoring systems; and
I Disseminate alerts to member agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments.
NBIC is developing a so-called “system of systems”, the NBIS, that will pull together and integrate
surveillance data from all federal agencies, including CDC. The NBIC, it is important to note, has
no routine information exchange with the states. Considering that state and local governments
are the first to respond to public health emergencies, that appears to be a major gap.
Although there is some indication that NBIC intends to move into primary data collection,
public health experts worry that this could lead to duplication. Especially in an era of declining
resources, they argue that it would be better for NBIC to focus on the integration of data.
According to a 2008 GAO report, there have been numerous difficulties in bringing the NBIC online, including: defining what capabilities the center will provide once fully operational; formalizing
interagency cooperation agreements; and, installing a new information technology (IT) system.
NBIC continues to negotiate agreements with member agencies on the data they are to provide for the IT system. There is an inter-agency working group and MOUs have been finalized
with six of the 11 agencies that NBIC officials deemed important to center operations. DHS
has signed MOUs with DOD, USDA, HHS, the Department of Interior, State, and Transportation. NBIC has MOUs pending with five other agencies: the Department of Commerce, the
EPA, Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Service, and the VA.139
In FY 2008, DHS received $8 million to establish the NBIC and has requested an additional
$4.2 million in reprogrammed funds.140
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BIOWATCH
BioWatch is DHS’s environmental monitoring system, which is designed to serve as an early
warning system in the event of the release of biological agents by monitoring and testing air
samples. BioWatch sensors were first deployed in 2003 and there are currently some 500 sensors located in some 30 U.S. cities.141
The goals of BioWatch are to:
I Deliver early warning of a biological attack by identifying the biological toxin to minimize casualties;
I Assist in providing evidence on the source, nature, and extent of an attack to aid law enforcement and public health officials; and
I Determine where the biological attack occurred and what populations were exposed.
The latest generation of BioWatch detectors is in development. These sensors will be fully
automated and monitor five biological agents. Samples are collected on a 24/7/365 basis.
Critics of BioWatch point to its high cost -- the annual maintenance and operating budget is
$77 million -- and have suggested that the money would be better spent on enhancing hospitalbased rapid diagnostic capabilities. BioWatch has also suffered from sensors picking up
bioagents occurring naturally in the environment that were not related to any sort of terrorist
attack. In fact, most of BioWatch detections have been environmental detection events of
indigenous organisms, while a few were related to lab cross contamination.
State public health laboratories have also faced significant problems related to the BioWatch
program. There are 24 state public health laboratories that host the BioWatch program and
provide dedicated office and lab space for the BioWatch program free of charge.142 In July 2008
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, Dr. Frances Pouch Downes, President of APHL, outlined her association’s major concerns with the BioWatch program.143 These included:
I The lack of a contractual relationship between DHS and public health laboratories;
I Uncompensated laboratory costs;
I Unclear rules for the management and oversight of BioWatch contract employees by state
public health lab employees;
I Gaps in performance data necessary for state and local labs to assess BioWatch responses,
or possible false positives; and
I Security clearance concerns.
To address these concerns, APHL recommends that DHS fund BioWatch program partners through
a cooperative agreement so that contractors become employees of state and local jurisdictions and
more easily integrated into the public health labs. APHL also calls on CDC to direct more funding
from the public health emergency preparedness program grants to labs with BioWatch programs.
Given the controversy surrounding BioWatch, several organizations are preparing reports on its
effectiveness and place within the broader U.S. biosurveillance system. First, at the request of
Congress, the IOM and the National Research Council are evaluating national biosurveillance systems to detect biological threats in order to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the BioWatch system and the U.S. hospital and public health system in detecting and responding
to biological attacks. The final report will be released in the late spring/early summer of 2009.
A second group, the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS), which was created
under HSPD-21, is also evaluating Biowatch and other biosurveillance systems to develop a series
of recommendations for the Obama administration. That report is due in February/March 2009.
Finally, GAO is working on its own report on the integration of U.S. biosurveillance systems as
mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). This report is due out in the
spring of 2009.
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CDC BIOSURVEILLANCE INITIATIVES
In the past year, CDC has worked with federal, state, and
local stakeholders to organize current biosurveillance capability for human health and identify priorities to achieve the capability we need as a nation to detect acute health emergencies
early and respond effectively. Two important entities have
been stood up to meet the HSPD-21 mandate: the Biosurveillance Coordination Unit (BCU) and the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS).
The Biosurveillance Coordination Unit (BCU)
The BCU is responsible for developing the strategy and implementation plan for an integrated biosurveillance system to
safeguard human health. In early June 2008, the BCU developed a draft National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health
that was sent to the CDC Director and over 425 stakeholders. Based on feedback from this initial review, BCU released
an updated draft on October 31, 2008. As was done with the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, BCU will lead the
drafting of an implementation plan for the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health, which will describe specific
tasks and responsibilities of different agencies and programs at
the federal, state, and local level.
In addition, the BCU has developed a conceptual framework
of how CDC plans to integrate all human biosurveillance
activities at the agency.

for the development of the next generation biosurveillance capability. After carrying out an initial survey of national and international biosurveillance programs, the NBAS will provide a series of
priority recommendations to the federal government through the
ACD. NBAS recommendations will also be addressed through future versions of the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human
Health.
The NBAS has set up eight task forces to address key priorities:
I Integrating Clinical and Public Health Reporting;
I Animal, Food, and Vectors;
I Genomic Epidemiology and Digital Technologies;
I Environmental Monitoring;
I Diagnostics and Laboratory Information Exchange;
I Global Disease Detection and Collaboration;
I Biosurveillance Workforce of the Future; and
I Cross-Sector Collaborations for Biosurveillance Strategies.
The subcommittee’s first set of recommendations is due out
in March 2009. The NBAS will also produce an annual assessment on the state of biosurveillance.

The newest element in the
conceptual framework, is CDC’s
BioPHusion program, which will
integrate information from across
CDC experts and programs, as
well external sources to produce
timely and actionable reports.
Multiple information products will
be produced for various audiences, from state and local public
health practitioners to the NBIS.
The National Biosurveillance
Advisory Subcommittee
(NBAS)
The NBAS, which is a subcommittee to CDC’s Advisory Committee
to the Director (ACD), held its first
meeting in August 2008. The
NBAS includes representatives
from state and local public health
departments and private sector
health care entities. Its mission is
to serve as independent advisors
Source: CDC Biosurveillance Coordination Unit
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C. ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERMEASURES
In June 2007, HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt
published a Draft BARDA Strategic Plan for
Countermeasure Research, Development and Procurement to guide and facilitate the research,
development, innovation, and procurement
of medical countermeasures and build upon

established national strategies and directives.
There are still, however, major challenges
facing BARDA, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. Several
of these challenges are detailed below.

Funding
The major obstacle facing BARDA is sufficient
annual funding for advanced development of
medical countermeasures (MCM). According
to an analysis by the Center for Biosecurity,
while BARDA’s current level of funding has allowed ASPR to set up the infrastructure necessary to support advanced research and
development of MCM, it has been insufficient
to support the successful development of a
whole range of MCM. The Center for Biosecurity estimates that BARDA needs $817 million
in FY 2009 alone “to support one year of advanced development for the candidate medical
countermeasures against biological threats that

are currently in development.”144 However, to
achieve the goals identified by the Public
Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures
Enterprise (PHEMCE), whose mission is to
identify high threat areas and the appropriate
MCMs, BARDA would need a staggering $3.39
billion in FY2009 alone to have a 90 percent
chance of ultimately developing successful
MCMs for each biodefense requirement set
forth in HHS’s PHEMCE Implementation Plan.
This funding would have to be sustained for
many years, given the risks and costs associated
with MCM development.

Completion of pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile
A key element for U.S. pandemic preparedness
is the establishment of a pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile that provides protection against possible pandemic virus threats,
including the avian influenza virus H5N1.
BARDA is working with manufacturers to facil-

itate research and development on adjuvants
for use with the pre-pandemic vaccine, while
also trying to build a vaccine manufacturing infrastructure capable of producing and distributing the vaccine at pandemic onset.

The inherent risk of medical countermeasures development
According to ASPR, “analyses of the pharmaceutical industry cost models show the development of vaccines, drugs and other
biological products is $500 to $700 million
per product over eight to 12 years, with a low
probability of success (12 to 15 percent by

the end of Phase II clinical studies).”145
BARDA must find ways to mitigate and control risk, including shared cost responsibilities for early and advanced development and
focused advanced development of products
with highest benefit-to-risk profiles.

Product line sustainability
Once a company delivers its initial stockpile
to the U.S. government, it is in the best interest of the federal government to maintain
the infrastructure required to provide additional product upon expiration and/or surge
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capacity in the event of an outbreak. This requires federal investment not only in the development of the product, but also in the
sustainability of its investment.

Prioritization of MCM development
Considering the diverse and dynamic nature
of public health threats, and the expense and
time required to develop MCM, strategies
must prioritize investment and optimize our
ability to protect the nation. Numerous
CBRN threats have been identified, and any
number of emerging infectious diseases may

endanger public health in the future. It is
important to address the most significant
threats while at the same time retaining sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in
priorities due to events, given the time and
investment required to develop medical
countermeasures for these threats.

D. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Over the past seven years, the White House and
Congress have convened a series of federal advisory committees. In most cases, the committee members include representatives from
government, business, academia, community
organizations, and professional associations.
Many of the members serve on multiple federal
preparedness groups. These committees or
boards are tasked with providing advice and
counsel to federal government agencies on
matters related to public health emergency preparedness. The reports and documents these
committees produce are often non-binding. In
addition, it does not appear that these committees regularly or routinely communicate with
each other. As such, there is much duplication
of effort. Although TFAH believes it is very use-

ful for federal agencies to hear from such civilian advisory boards, the Obama administration
should conduct a thorough review of the existing federal advisory committees and their work.
The administration should pay close attention
to the reports and recommendations developed by these bodies and, when appropriate,
implement the recommendations to improve
public health emergency preparedness. If
there are duplicative committees, the administration should evaluate their usefulness.
A summary of the federal public health preparedness advisory committees that TFAH was
able to identify can be found in Appendix D:
Federal Preparedness Advisory Groups, Panels, and Committees.

E. MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
Currently, the federal government has a threetiered level of medical and public health emergency response teams. Level I responders are
full-time federal employees, including members of the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps (Commissioned Corps), the
VA, and DOD. The Level I responders are the
equivalent of the full-time professional military
and handle national disasters and emergencies. Level II responders are part-time or intermittent federal employees, such as
members of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Level II responders are the
equivalent of the military reserves and are activated when there is a national disaster or
emergency. Level III responders are community-based volunteer health care professionals
and non-health care professionals, such as
members of the MRC, Community Emergency

Response Teams (CERT), and ESAR-VHP.
Level III responders are the equivalent of the
state national guard. They are the first responders when an emergency strikes in their
communities, although in a federally-declared
disaster or emergency, they can be mobilized
to respond at the national level.
The administration should review the national
strategy to respond to catastrophic public
health emergencies and address any issues that
may impede a successful deployment of this
three-tiered structure, including issues pertaining to liability protection, licensing and accreditation, and workers’ compensation. In
addition, the administration should examine
the legal issues relating to when and how DOD
and VA can engage in the response, and issues
pertaining to cross-agency reimbursement.
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4. The Implementation of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA)
The 2006 PAHPA legislation further
strengthened the nation’s preparedness and
response planning. The legislation included
a series of benchmarks for federal agencies
to meet over the five-year span of the Act.
Seven of these deliverables were due no later
than 180 days after the enactment of PAHPA,
or by the end of June 2007. Another set of
four deliverables were due no later than December 2007, or 12 months after enactment.
Three more deliverables are due between
October 1, 2008 and January 2009. Funding,
however, was not provided for the implementation of the PAHPA benchmarks. In
spite of this, as of November 2008, eight of
the 14 benchmarks have been met, which is
commendable, given staffing and funding
constraints at the federal level.

However, some of the unmet or partially
completed deliverables are crucial to the nation’s preparedness, including:
I Development of new, outcome-oriented
performance measures;
I Enhanced real-time disease detection and
surveillance;
I Review of the medical and public health
emergency response; and
I Advanced research and development of
countermeasures.
Congress should hold regular oversight hearings to monitor the progress and implementation of PAHPA.
For more details, see Appendix E: Key Deliverables and Due Dates under PAHPA.

5. Additional Federal Issues
A. EMERGENCY HEALTH BENEFIT
In the event of a public health crisis such as
a bioterrorist attack, natural disaster, or pandemic flu, the expected demand on the U.S.
health care system would be extraordinary.
The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan projects
that a pandemic could result in 45 million
additional outpatient visits, with 865,0009,900,000 individuals requiring hospitalization, depending on the severity of the
pandemic. Such a major disaster would cross
state lines and quickly overwhelm health
care systems. A public health crisis of less
magnitude, for example, a major hurricane
or terrorist attack, could also severely test the
U.S. health care system. According to a 2008
report from the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), “recent incidents -- the September 11th and anthrax attacks of 2001,
and several Gulf Coast hurricanes in 2005 -have shown the limitations of existing funding mechanisms in support of public health
and medical incident responses.”146
With more than 15 percent of Americans
lacking health insurance coverage, the financial impact on the country’s public health
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and health care systems could be disastrous if
hospitals, community health centers, and primary care facilities treat large numbers of
uninsured.147 Likewise, if uninsured or underinsured patients hesitate to seek treatment
because of fears of out-of-pocket costs, treating and containing the further spread of a
pandemic would be nearly impossible.
To save lives, contain any pandemic to the
degree possible, and ensure a functioning
health care system throughout and after such
a catastrophic emergency, the federal government should act now to create a framework for emergency health coverage and
reimbursement.
A public health emergency benefit would
have to address two separate concerns for
providers and patients. It would have to
guarantee providers some level of compensation for the services they provide during a
pandemic, while encouraging individuals to
come forward for diagnosis or treatment.
In fact, such legislation was introduced in the
110th Congress by Senator Richard Durbin

(D-IL) and Representative Lois Capps (D-CA).
The bill, the Public Health Emergency Response Act (PHERA), would establish a temporary emergency health benefit for
uninsured individuals and individuals whose
health insurance coverage is not actuarially
equivalent to benchmark coverage. The benefit could only be triggered if the secretary of
HHS declared that a public health emergency
existed under section 319 of the Public Health
Service Act and chose to activate the benefit.
The benefit would last for up to 90 days; the
HHS secretary could extend it once for another 90 days. The funding mechanism in the
legislation is the Public Health Emergency
Fund; the bill would clarify that using the Fund
for uncompensated care is permissible. The
legislation authorizes $7 million each year for

the administration of this fund and for a public education campaign about the program,
and Congress would need to appropriate
money to the Fund only after the HHS secretary activated the benefit. It would also ensure
that coverage would be provided for individuals displaced by a public health emergency and
would clarify the scope of coverage.
It is best to create these mechanisms prior to
an emergency, rather than in the heat of the
moment when any delay would be counted
in lives lost. In addition, prior planning may
enable the government to be more cost-effective in using scarce resources. Planning
ahead for a catastrophic public health emergency is the best way to avoid needless loss of
life or wasted resources.

B. EMERGENCY SICK LEAVE
Controlling the spread of a pandemic flu will
depend on keeping infected persons away from
the uninfected as much as possible. Doing so
includes getting the infected and their families
to stay home from work. CDC guidance issued
in February 2007 includes the recommendation that sick people stay home from work for
seven to 10 days and that family or household
members of those sick remain at home for
seven days.148 This stay-at-home policy will limit
the contact of sick people, and their potentially
infected families, with others when they are contagious. These recommendations raise a troubling issue, however, because 48 percent of
private-sector workers in the United States lack
paid sick leave benefits and 94 million Americans do not have a single paid sick day they can
use to care for a sick child.149
TFAH encourages Congress to require paid
sick leave to ensure economic stability and
minimize health risks during a pandemic or
infectious disease outbreak. Although existing law, the Family and Medical Leave Act, allows employees to take unpaid sick time due
to a serious illness, the law exempts 40 percent
of the workforce who work at small and midsize businesses, does not cover less severe communicable diseases, and does not mitigate the
fear of lost income among many workers.

These deficiencies in the law indicate that a
federal paid sick day law is necessary. Proposed legislation that seeks to address this
need includes the Healthy Families Act. This
legislation would require employers with 15 or
more employees to offer seven paid sick days
each year, to be used to deal with individual
medical needs or to care for sick family members. Although the bill garnered over 100
House cosponsors and 24 Senate Cosponsors
in the 110th Congress, the Healthy Families
Act was not taken up in either Chamber. The
legislation is expected to be reintroduced early
in 2009. While some argue that this legislation
is good for public health in general, because
sick individuals should not attend work and
risk infecting coworkers and the public, others
point out that seven days of paid sick leave may
not be enough to minimize the spread of disease during a public health emergency such as
a pandemic flu outbreak. Nor is the legislation expansive enough to conform with the
CDC recommendation for possible self-quarantine for up to 10 days. However, given the
political realities surrounding the legislation,
such as opposition to any paid sick day requirements by some employer groups, the existing language is a positive step toward
addressing shortcomings in existing law.
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C. FEDERAL LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES

The following analyses were carried out by the research team at HealthPolicy R&D in affiliation
with Powell Goldstein LLP. The analysis in these sections does not constitute legal advice.

1. Federal Liability Protections For Volunteer Health Professionals
Liability protection for those health care volunteers who serve in a public health emergency has proved to be a serious issue as state
and local governments seek to build community-based volunteer medical and public
health teams to respond to public health
emergencies. Although 42 states and D.C.
have enacted legislation that offers liability
protection to health care volunteers who
serve during a public health emergency,
there are concerns that not all states have adequate legal authority to extend liability protection to volunteer health professionals.
(Please see Section 1, Indicator 8 for a detailed discussion of state liability laws.)
This patchwork of state laws raises concerns
about gaps in liability protection for health
professionals seeking to volunteer in a public
health emergency and for emergency planners seeking to organize volunteer health
professionals in advance of an emergency.
Existing federal statutes and regulations related to volunteer health professionals’ liability during public health emergencies
include:
The Federal Tort Claims Act: In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, the federal government
recruited volunteer health professionals for
potential deployment to the impacted region.150 These volunteer health professionals
were recognized as non-paid, temporary federal employees (travel and per diem were
paid) and made eligible for Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) liability protection.151,152
The FTCA, with some exceptions, makes the
U.S. government legally liable “for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or
68

employment.”153 For purposes of FTCA protection, a federal employee can include anyone acting in an official capacity on behalf of
a federal agency, whether that person is a temporary or permanent employee and whether
or not he or she is compensated.154
The Public Health Services Act: The Public
Health Services Act authorizes FTCA protection for certain volunteer health professionals, such as members of the federal NDMS.
The NDMS recruits citizens with medical, behavioral, and public health expertise to serve
on federal response teams that provide medical and ancillary services to those affected by
a public health emergency. NDMS personnel
are considered intermittent federal disasterresponse employees and, when deployed, are
paid by the federal government on a parttime basis.155,156 For the purposes of liability
protection, when they are acting within the
scope of their NDMS appointments, these individuals are considered to be employees of
the federal government’s Public Health Service and are given equivalent FTCA protection.157 To help coordinate state and local
emergency response, in 2006, the PAHPA Act
authorized the HHS secretary to extend similar protections to select members of the
MRC during a public health emergency.158
The Volunteer Protection Act: The federal Volunteer Protection Act (VPA) was enacted in
1997 in response to concerns that liability issues were affecting people’s willingness to volunteer for a broad range of community
activities, not limited to medical volunteerism
or emergency situations. Under the VPA, volunteers acting on behalf of a nonprofit organization or government entity are not liable for
causing harm if they were performing services
without compensation and certain conditions
were met. The conditions require that the vol-

unteer was: acting within the scope of his or
her responsibilities; properly licensed or certified if required in the state in which harm occurred; not engaged in willful or criminal
misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a conscious flagrant indifference to
the rights or safety of the individual harmed;
and not operating a motor or other vehicle.159
The VPA does not apply to the nonprofit organization itself, and volunteers remain potentially liable for certain non-economic losses.160
The VPA preempts weaker state laws; however,
states can provide additional liability protection
beyond the VPA.161 States also retain the option of opting out of the VPA.162
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act: The Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, also

known as the PREP Act, offers liability protection to manufacturers willing to sell countermeasures during a national emergency. The
law protects manufacturers when selling pandemic products, security countermeasures,
drugs, devices, and biological products. It also
extends immunity to distributors and program
planners, as well as to health care professionals
who dispense medical countermeasures.163
The only medical countermeasures that currently have protection under PREP are those
for which the HHS Secretary has issued declarations. While the PREP Act would seem to
offer liability protection for volunteer health
professionals and private sector entities that
dispense medical countermeasures during a
public health emergency, it does not offer protection for other services rendered.

Limitations of Current Federal Laws and Regulations
Volunteer health professionals who are “federalized” during public health emergencies
have the benefit of liability protection that is
equivalent to federal employees’ protection.
Through the EMAC states can provide liability protection to state employees who deploy
from one state to another in an emergency.164
Other volunteer health professionals have
protection, to varying degrees, through state
laws and the federal VPA. However, confusion and gaps remain, particularly for health
professionals seeking to volunteer across state
lines during a public health emergency.
For example, a significant number of volunteer health professionals are private sector and
local government employees. The state-tostate agreements under EMAC apply to state
employees and do not expressly cover other
volunteers.165 The federal VPA requires licensure in the state in which harm occurs, yet
many health professionals are only licensed in
the state in which they regularly practice.
Some states attempted to provide a “workaround” for volunteer health professionals
during Hurricane Katrina by temporarily declaring them to be state employees.166 At the
same time, the federal government rushed to

register volunteer health professionals as temporary federal employees and provide them
FTCA protection.
These federal and state stopgap liability efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
demonstrate the limitations of the current
patchwork of volunteer health professional
liability protections.
Removing barriers to well-organized and
timely response to critical public health
emergencies is an issue of national interest.
Rather than rely on an incomplete, complex
array of federal and state liability provisions
and the use of stopgap measures after an
event, Congress should establish clear statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act167 for FTCA protection to be provided
to qualified ESAR-VHP participants activated
by the federal government in response to a
public health emergency.168 A federal liability standard need not preempt states’ management of their individual registries as part
of the ESAR-VHP network. Instead, it can
help limit confusion on the ground during a
public health emergency and expedite
health expertise to areas in critical need.
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2. Public Health Emergencies and Entity Liability
The federal government’s National Response
Framework for disasters and emergencies clearly
articulates the important role of public-private
partnerships in emergency preparedness. The
Framework outlines a comprehensive, national
approach to emergency response and affirms
that the government cannot work alone in responding to events such as public health emergencies.169 Private-sector partners include
hospitals and other critical health care facilities,
as well as businesses and non-profit organizations that can help supply and deliver vital services and maintain community functions before,
during, and after an event.

varying degrees of liability protection through
a number of different existing federal and state
mechanisms, many organizational entities that
are key partners in emergency response do not
typically qualify for immunity protections.170
This lack of liability protection and the exposure it creates can limit or delay organizations’
willingness to join in an emergency response
and can hinder the timely action required to
address a public health emergency.
This section reviews public health emergency-related liability issues for two different
groups of entities: 1) hospitals; and 2) businesses and non-profit organizations.

Although individual volunteer responders
working with private-sector entities can secure
Hospitals
Hospitals are not often included in public
health emergency-related immunity coverage.171 Instead, hospitals can potentially be
held liable for their own actions or as a result
of the actions of health care professionals
and staff that are imputed to the hospital.172
In certain public health emergency situations, hospitals’ liability exposure may increase when circumstances make it difficult
for hospitals and their personnel to follow
standard protocols and when the scope of
the emergency response compels hospitals to
take on new and unfamiliar medical staff.
During a public health emergency, hospitals
may urgently need additional professional
staff to meet their obligations to provide
health care services.173 One tool for addressing capacity needs in large-scale events is volunteer health professionals, although the use
of volunteer health professionals has the potential to increase a hospital’s liability risk.174
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Some have suggested that risk management
policies can help mitigate these concerns.175
Good policies could include, for example,
well-defined processes and practices for selecting and managing volunteer health professionals during a public health emergency.176
However, these processes and practices can be
thwarted by events. For example, some hospital administrators in New York City reported
that they were unable to use health profes-

sionals who volunteered in response to the
9/11 tragedy because the hospitals could not
confirm basic information about the volunteers’ licensing and credentials due to communications system breakdowns.177
To address the need for rapid verification of
volunteers’ credentials during an emergency,
in 2006 PAHPA required the HHS secretary
to establish a national interoperable network
that links state systems for verifying volunteer
health care professionals’ credentials and licenses (ESAR-VHP).178 The network does not
specifically address hospitals’ potential liability
exposure, but it is an attempt to create a readily available resource to expedite hospitals’
credential verification processes, which may
have the potential to improve hospitals’ risk
management. Nonetheless, systems failures
and other events are real threats to this and
other mechanisms designed to pre-certify the
credentials of volunteers, leaving hospitals
with continued concerns about meeting
emergency-related surge demand while managing their facilities’ liability exposure.
To address hospital liability issues, Congress
may wish to consider providing hospitals and
health care organizations with liability protection for the actions of qualified ESAR-VHP
participants accepted into hospital facilities
during a federal public health emergency.

Congress established ESAR-VHP under federal law to help states develop registry systems
for identifying and verifying the credentials
of volunteer health professionals who could
respond during a public health emergency.179
Additional federal actions have encouraged
ESAR-VHP’s growth and development.180
However, under existing law, hospitals and
health care organizations may assume liability
risk when accepting volunteers.181
If federal and state governments are engaged
in actively building a network of health care

volunteers that can be deployed in response
to emergencies, the government also has a
stake in removing barriers to health care facilities accepting qualified volunteers. One
mechanism to advance this goal would be to
alleviate the actual and perceived liability
concerns attached to accepting volunteers by
protecting hospitals when the volunteers are
vetted through this established federal-state
partnership program for recruiting and certifying volunteer health professionals.

Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations
In a public health emergency, a network of
community entities may be needed to expedite
goods and services to individuals and critical
infrastructure sites, to provide shelter and basic
necessities, and to help maintain and restore
other vital community functions. Although
Good Samaritan laws at the state level are likely
to protect individual volunteers, these laws,
with some exceptions, generally leave significant gaps in liability protection for businesses
and non-profit organizations that voluntarily assist during a public health emergency.182
In a large-scale event, sizable numbers of volunteers, facilities and other private-sector resources are necessary to augment government
resources. Advocates have pointed to the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina and the various
needs it created for volunteers to: 1) support
law enforcement, emergency medical and fire
response; 2) assist with preserving and repairing infrastructure, including schools; and 3)
provide social support services such as counseling and sheltering.183 Businesses and nonprofit organizations not only have the capacity
to organize large numbers of people, they also
can provide other resources, such as hotels,
stadiums, and other facilities that can be vital
tools in emergency response.184
Although many groups face liability issues in a
public health emergency, there are certain entities that may already have liability protection
under federal law for specific response-related
actions. Under the federal PREP Act enacted in
2005, if the HHS secretary declares that a countermeasure is necessary to confront a disease or
other threat, immunity from tort claims is established for, among other things, the develop-

ment, distribution, dispensing, prescribing and
administration of the countermeasure. The
limited immunity applies only to covered countermeasures for which declarations have been
issued, and may be subject to other limitations
that the Secretary specifies in the declaration.
There is an exception to this liability protection
for willful misconduct.185 The PREP Act created
a federally supported emergency fund to compensate individuals for injuries caused directly
by a countermeasure initiated under the Secretary’s declaration, but funds have not yet been
appropriated for this compensation fund.186
The first declaration under this provision of the
PREP Act was for the H5N1 vaccine to protect
against the avian influenza virus.187
A variety of leading public health and disaster preparedness organizations, including
the American Red Cross, the American College of Emergency Physicians, APHA, and
TFAH support the expansion of Good
Samaritan laws to protect a wide range of volunteers and their sponsoring entities during
a public health emergency.188
To address liability issues for businesses and
non-profit organizations, Congress may wish
to create a federal floor for the minimum
protection that should be available to these
emergency response partners when working
in concert with government agencies. For
example, a federal liability “gap-filling” bill
could recognize states that have acted on this
issue already and create protections in those
states without coverage. This approach
would be consistent with the approach taken
by Congress in the VPA. The VPA preempts
weaker state laws, but allows states to exceed
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the VPA’s protections. A distinction would
be that a federal provision providing businesses and non-profit organizations with
Good Samaritan protections would be lim-

ited to actions occurring during a public
health emergency, whereas the VPA provides
protections that are broader in scope.

D. SHELF-LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
DOD and SNS both maintain large stockpiles
of medications and vaccines in order to ensure that both military and civilian populations have access to needed antidotes and
treatments in the event of a medical emergency. In order to save federal dollars, FDA
and DOD developed a system of extending
the shelf-life of these drugs and vaccines beyond the manufacturer’s expiration date.
The Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) is
administered jointly by the FDA and DOD.
The SNS also participates in the program.189
The program has resulted in substantial savings. According to CDC’s analysis, the return
on investment for SNS participation in the
SLEP is that for each dollar ($1.00) spent on
SLEP costs, which includes testing, shipping,
and re-labeling, SNS saved $13.00.190
Despite the substantial savings at the federal
level, states’ stockpiles of antivirals -- purchased
through an HHS-subsidized program as part of
states pandemic preparedness -- are not eligible.
HHS designated $170 million to subsidize
states’ purchases of up to 31 million treatment courses of Tamiflu® (oseltamivir) and

Relenza® (zanamivir). HHS will subsidize 25
percent of the cost, and states will pay the
other 75 percent. As of September 30, 2008
state and local jurisdictions have stockpiled
nearly 22 million treatment courses of antivirals, of which almost 21 million were purchased using the federal government subsidy.
In 2006, ASTHO surveyed its members regarding the stockpiling of antivirals. At the
time, states indicated that inventory management, including the storage, rotation,
and shelf-life extension strategies, were of
critical concern.191 State public health budgets are stretched thin already. Without a federal compromise on the SLEP, many states
will be unwilling to commit scarce dollars to
buy antivirals that will expire in only seven
years. Although the May 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
asked HHS, DOD, and the VA to explore the
possibility of extending SLEP to state and privately-held stockpiles, according to a 2008
IOM report, “nothing has been released
about the feasibility, cost, and other barriers
of extending the program to properly maintained non-federal stockpiles.”192

E. FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY REFORMS
Prompted by recent nationwide Salmonella
and E.Coli outbreaks, Congress held nearly 30
hearings on food safety in the 110th Congress
and introduced over 100 pieces of legislation
designed to improve the nation’s food safety
net. However, no new food safety laws were
enacted in 2007 or 2008. In November 2007,
FDA released its Food Protection Plan, a
modernization strategy designed to enhance
FDA’s ability to prevent and detect foodborne
disease and contamination. In June 2008,
Congress increased FDA’s FY 2008 funding by
$150 million, $66 million of which was designated for food safety. However, as of September 2008, FDA had not yet told Congress
how much money was required to fully implement the Food Protection Plan.
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As FDA and Congress seek to strengthen the
nation’s food supply, they face a number of
obstacles, including:
I Inadequate federal leadership, coordination, and resources;
I Outdated laws and policies; and
I Limited federal, state, and local coordination.
(For a detailed discussion of food safety,
please see our April 2008 report Fixing Food
Safety: Protecting America’s Food Supply from
Farm-to-Fork and the October 2008 report
Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing
the Federal Public Health System to Focus on Prevention and Preparedness, both available online at: www.healthyamericans.org.)

Hospital Emergency
Preparedness

“

3

SECTION

SURGE CAPACITY IS A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM’S ABILITY TO EXPAND QUICKLY BEYOND

NORMAL SERVICES TO MEET AN INCREASED DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE EVENT OF

”

BIOTERRORISM OR OTHER LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES.

— AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (AHRQ)

In a public health emergency, such as a
bioterror attack or catastrophic natural disaster, U.S. hospitals and health care facilities
will be on the front lines providing triage and
medical treatment to individuals. In the best
of times, however, most emergency departments must confront bed shortages and
staffing issues; in a mass casualty event, the
situation could quickly spiral out of control.
For the past five years, the U.S. government
has worked to improve hospitals’ overall
surge capacity, which the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) defines
as the ability to of a health care system to expand quickly beyond normal services to meet
an increased demand for medical care in the
event of bioterrorism or other large-scale
public health emergencies.194

193

The challenge of how to equip hospitals and
train health care staff to handle the large influx of critically injured or ill patients who
show up for treatment after or during a public health emergency remains the single,
most challenging issue for public health and
medical preparedness.
The following section outlines the steps that
have been taken and highlights some crucial
gaps in medical preparedness, including information on:
1. The Hospital Preparedness Program;
2. Mass casualty care;
3. Financing hospital preparedness; and
4. Preparedness and health reform.
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1. Hospital Preparedness Program
The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) focuses on improving the clinical response to a
large-scale health emergency. Initially run by
HRSA, HPP is now run by ASPR as mandated by
PAHPA. ASPR awards one-year funding grants
to hospitals and other health care facilities to improve surge capacity and enhance community
and hospital preparedness for all-hazards, including bioterrorism and pandemic influenza.

I Medical Evacuation / Shelter in Place; and

HPP activities are to focus on the following
five core goals:195

I Personal Protective Equipment; and

1. Integration: Integration of public and private medical capabilities with public
health and other first responder systems;
2. Medical Preparedness: Increasing the preparedness, response capabilities, and
surge capacities of hospitals, other health
care facilities (including mental health facilities), and trauma care and emergency
medical service systems with respect to
public health emergencies;
3. At-risk Populations: Taking into account
the public health and medical needs of atrisk individuals in the event of a public
health emergency;
4. Coordination: Minimizing duplication of,
and ensuring coordination among all levels
of planning, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities; and
5. Continuity of Operations: Maintaining
vital public health and medical services in
the event of a public health emergency.
Grantees are expected to be compliant with
NIMS, provide education and preparedness
training to staff and hospital personnel, exercise and drill according to HSEEP guidance, and clearly articulate which at-risk
populations with medical needs are being
served by the health care facility.
In addition, grantees are required to address
the following capabilities:
I Interoperable Communication Systems;
I Tracking of Bed Availability via the National Hospital Available Beds for Emergency and Disasters (HAvBED);
I ESAR-VHP;
I Fatality Management;
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I Partnership/Coalition Development.
If these capabilities are being adequately addressed, HPP grantees can work on these additional activities:
I Alternate Care Sites;
I Mobile Medical Assets;
I Pharmaceutical Caches;
I Decontamination.
In FY 2008, HPP awarded $398 million to 50
states and Washington, D.C., for an average of
$82,500 a year per hospital. An article in the
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics notes that
“this barely permits the hiring of a preparedness coordinator, leaving nothing for the infrastructure development and maintenance
that would be required.”196 In fact, a 2006
study by the Center for Biosecurity estimated
that true hospital preparedness for a severe
pandemic influenza would require a one-time
investment of at least $1 million per hospital
plus an additional $200,000 per year in maintenance costs, for a total of $5 billion for the
5,000 general hospitals in the United States.
Beginning in FY 2008, HPP grantees, for the
first time, were subject to maintenance of
funding requirements and had to meet specific
evidence-based benchmarks. Grantees are expected to maintain their health care preparedness expenditures at a level not less than the
average of expenditures during the previous
two-year period. The maintenance of funds
refers to state or local contributions to health
care preparedness and not federal dollars.
As mandated by the 2006 PAHPA legislation,
HPP grantees that fail to meet the evidencebased benchmarks will have funds withheld
from their FY 2009 awards.197 There is no
penalty for states who fail to meet maintenance of funding requirements.
Some public health experts have questioned
whether reducing HPP funding to certain hospitals or states that fail to meet the evidencebased benchmarks is the correct approach.
They argue that these are the places that might
need the money most to reach benchmarks.

2. Mass Casualty Care
According to GAO, as of 2005, there were approximately 950,000 staffed hospital beds in
the United States, meaning that health care
staff was available to attend to the patient occupying the bed. However, in a mass casualty
event, such as a severe pandemic influenza,
HHS expects that demand would far exceed
capacity.198

The question for hospitals, health care facilities, clinicians, and hospital administrators is
how to handle the surge of patients. Not only
in terms of space for the critically injured and
sick, but in allocating scarce resources such
as ventilators and pharmaceuticals, and finding enough trained, licensed health care
workers to care for the patients.

Altered Standards of Care
There is growing recognition in the United
States that a mass casualty event, particularly
a pandemic influenza, will result in the need
to alter and adapt the traditional standards
of care appropriate to the situation. Unfortunately, as an article in the New England Journal of Medicine notes, under current federal
and state law, governors can declare a state
of emergency during disasters, “suspending
some of the normal standards without giving
any idea of what the alternative standards
ought to be.”199
According to the federal government, “states
in conjunction with professional societies will

determine the appropriate standards of care
for the situation -- not HHS or the federal government.”200 Although AHRQ has published
two documents on mass casualty care -- Altered
Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events (2005)
and Mass Medical Care with Scarce Resources
(2007) -- these are intended merely to serve as
planning guidance for states and professional
associations as they develop “definitive guidance.”201 Several states, including New York202
and California,203 and professional associations,
such as the American Nurse Association204 and
the American Health Lawyers Association,205
have taken the lead in this arena.

Hospital Planning Considerations
Despite the release of guidance documents,
many disaster plans fail to account for the reality a mass casualty event will present. To
help develop comprehensive guidance for
managing mass casualty events, leading public
health and medical preparedness officials
convened a Task Force of Mass Casualty Critical Care. The Task Force is composed of 37
experts from various fields, such as bioethics,
critical care, emergency medicine, infectious
diseases, law, nursing, and government planning and response, including HHS, DHS,
DOD, and the VA. According to a write-up
from the Task Force’s January 2007 meeting
in Chicago, “disaster plans have assumed that
critical care resources will be available when
needed, and generally this assumption has
been correct. However, with the anticipation
of large volumes of critically ill patients in fu-

ture disasters, some believe that hospital capacity, and in particular critical care capability,
will be a major limiting factor for survival.”206
Not only will emergency departments be
overwhelmed in an emergency, but so would
critical care units and rehabilitation beds.
For instance, following the 2003 Rhode Island nightclub fire, the emergency department response lasted several hours while the
intensive care unit (ICU) admitted 47 critically injured patients with an average length
of stay of 21 days.207
Any sort of mass casualty event with prolonged
hospitalizations will put a strain on hospitals
and health care workers. To help hospitals prepare for such an event, much of the current
guidance focuses on the three S’s -- supplies,
staff, and space.
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Supplies/Equipment
Today’s hospitals and health care facilities
function with a “just-in-time supply chain,”
meaning very limited supplies, including
pharmaceuticals, are stored on-site and instead, are replenished on an as-needed basis.
While the use of a just-in-time supply chain
keeps hospital storage costs down, it also
“creates a significant threat to successful disaster response.”208 Hospital administrators
argue that it is not feasible for hospitals to
stockpile large quantities of supplies as they
lack both the space to do so and the resources to pay for these extra supplies.
In addition to the supplies, hospitals are likely
to run short of needed technologies, such as
ventilators and decontamination units.
Ventilators are especially crucial in the event
of a pandemic influenza. The write-up from
the 2007 meeting on mass critical care in
Chicago noted that ventilators in particular
are “unique to the critical care environment,
and they are essential equipment for the
management of respiratory failure.” The task
force went on to note that in a pandemic in-

fluenza there will be a shortage and “scarce
mechanical ventilators will need to be allocated to those patients who are prioritized.”209
The president’s FY 2009 budget request included $25 million to support the advanced
development of next generation ventilators.
The new ventilators are to be portable, inexpensive, and equipped with universal parts.
HHS has specified that the ventilators should
be easy enough to use so that “inexperienced
health care providers with no respiratory
support training could safely use the device.”210 Congress, however, failed to pass the
FY 2009 budget and instead, adopted a sixmonth continuing resolution. Although
there is no funding for the project in the current budget, ASPR continues to insist that
the development of these next generation
ventilators is a priority. HHS envisions their
FDA approval over a two to three year span.
However, even if hospitals were to stockpile
additional easy-to-use ventilators, they would
likely still not be able to treat all the patients
seeking care in a pandemic influenza.

Staff
Workforce shortages plague hospitals and
health care facilities even in the best of times.
It is no wonder then that workforce shortages
are a serious concern for mass casualty event
planning. According to a June 2008 report
from the Center for Studying Health System
Change, “the day-to-day shortages of key
health personnel -- such as nurses, physi-

cians, pharmacists, laboratory technicians,
and respiratory therapists -- exacerbate the
challenge of having sufficient numbers of
health workers in an emergency.”211 The report goes on to note that until elected officials and policy makers address these
challenges, “the ability to have adequate personnel for an emergency will be limited.”212

Space
During a mass casualty event, hospitals will be
pressed to treat a sudden influx of injured and
sick patients. In order to make room for the
surge of patients, the California Department of
Public Health surge capacity guidelines recommend that hospitals take the following actions:213
I Rapid discharge of emergency department
and other patients who can continue their
care safely at home;
I Cancel elective surgeries and procedures
and reassign surgical staff and space;
I Reduce use of imaging, laboratory testing,
and other ancillary services;
76

I Group like-patient types together to maximize efficient delivery of patient care;
I Convert single rooms to double rooms and
double rooms to triple rooms if possible;
I Use cots and beds in flat space areas such as
classrooms and lobbies within the hospital;
and
I Identify wings, areas, and spaces that can be
opened or converted for use as patient treatment areas, including outpatient clinics,
waiting rooms, conference rooms, physical
therapy gyms, and medical office buildings.

Other mechanisms to expand surge capacity
include:
I Encouraging home care for less severely ill
patients;
I Telemedicine, which allows health care
providers in hospitals to care for and moni-

tor patients at home with the use of electronic information and telecommunications
technologies; and
I Call centers, which will allow patients at home
to contact health care providers in hospitals
to obtain medical advice for home care.

3. Financing Hospital Preparedness
A 2001 study by the American Hospital Association found that a typical metropolitan hospital needed an estimated $3 million in
upgrades just to achieve baseline disaster preparedness. This figure does not include the
money for additional staff, support personnel,
or medical supplies and equipment. A 2006
study by the Center for Biosecurity suggested
that a 164-bed hospital would need $1 million
just to be minimally prepared for pandemic
influenza. However, a 2006 IOM report found
that average federal grant to hospitals is far
below that. “Of significance, current policy
dictates that the source of funding for hospital preparedness originates from general tax
revenues. Medical payers (e.g., Medicare,

Medicaid, and private insurance) directly
fund little, if any, of the preparedness bill.”214
Hospitals and health care associations have argued that the easiest way to address this problem is to boost hospital preparedness program
grants from general revenue taxes. The
American Hospital Association has said that
$11 billion is needed to achieve basic hospital
preparedness. A top White House official has
suggested that funding for the Hospital Preparedness Program be more than doubled to
a steady, sustained $1 billion a year. However,
the worsening economic situation in the
United States and around the world may prevent the Obama administration from seriously
increasing hospital preparedness funding.

4. Preparedness And Health Reform
President-elect Obama, his administration,
and the 111th Congress are likely to re-visit
the notion of health reform. Any discussion
of expanding access to quality health care
should include a commitment to a strong
public health system and public policies focused on prevention of disease and injury
and public health emergency preparedness.
In order to strengthen public health and preparedness, the nation must ensure that any
health care financing system that is developed includes stable and reliable funding for
core public health functions and clinical and
preventive services. The nation must adequately fund federal, state, and local public
health departments and programs to be able
to fulfill their responsibility of protecting the
public’s health, and, at the same time, public
health needs a sustainable funding stream.
Building healthy, prepared communities requires a financial commitment.

The health reform debate is likely to include a
conversation about the role of information
technology in health care delivery and public
health. The federal, state, and local public
health agencies need to have the near realtime capacity to monitor the delivery of health
care to the population in order to identify unusual illnesses or health events, whether natural or man-made. Health care providers are
interested in electronic health records (EHRs)
to improve patient care and efficiency. The
needs of both clinicians and public health officials should be considered when discussing
the role of health information technology.
For a thorough discussion of what a reformed
health system would like and what it will take
to build one, please see TFAH’s October 2008
report Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the Federal Public Health System to Focus on
Prevention and Preparedness. The full report is
available online at www.healthyamericans.org.
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Additional Issues
and Concerns
1. TRANSITION TERROR: ARE WE PREPARED?
Evidence shows that acts of terror often take
place in the weeks and months before or after
elections and political transitions.215 Terrorists seek opportunities to exploit weaknesses
in national security, whether real or made-up,
and a presidential election and transition is
seen as a period of increased vulnerability.216
During a transition period, the outgoing administration has the ability to implement policy affecting national or international
security, and the next day, the new administration and leadership may have a completely
different strategy. The changing of policies
coupled with the perceived lack of experience of a new administration may create a
target of opportunity to those wanting to injure the security of the nation in transition.

I November 1989: President Rene Moawad
of Lebanon was killed by a bomb -- he had
been in office for only 17 days.
I October-December 1982: An outbreak of
violence, causing more than 30 deaths, occurred in Northern Ireland in opposition
to elections to form a Provincial Assembly.
History shows the increased vulnerability of
new administrations, and although it may be
impossible to prevent an attack or crisis during the transition, steps can be taken to
lessen the risks to national security. Some
recommendations include:
I Select and confirm quickly senior executive branch leaders who have significant
national security responsibilities;218

Some documented events that have occurred
during national as well as international transitions include:217

I Put in place an accelerated screening and
confirmation for the main members of the
new president’s national security team;219

I March 2004: Terrorists bombed commuter
trains in Madrid, Spain just three days before
the country’s general election.

I President-elect Obama should provide the
names of those whom he intends to nominate as soon as possible so that investigations can begin;220

I December 2003: A suicide bomber detonated explosives aboard a commuter train
near Yessentuki, Russia two days before the
national elections.
I September 2001: Nine months after President George W. Bush’s transition, terrorists attacked New York City and the
Pentagon, killing nearly 3,000 people.
I February 1993: Terrorists detonated a car
bomb underneath the World Trade Center
in New York City, killing at least five people
and injuring scores more, just a month after
President Bill Clinton was sworn into office.
I March 1992: Irish Republican Army conducted a bombing campaign in Britain
aimed at influencing the upcoming election.
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I The outgoing president should be cautious of any activity taken in the last few
days of the administration that could interfere with the incoming administration’s
transition efforts, such as:221
L Establishing or revising national security organizations, policies, or programs
that are clearly counter to the positions
of the incoming president;
L Interacting with foreign leaders that
may have the perception of attempting
to portray future U.S. foreign policy desires; and
L Undertaking any steps that would have
a negative effect or produce unintended national security consequences.
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I The new president may want to have prior
administration officials maintain their security clearances and receive briefings regarding previous, current and emerging
threats and to learn of the prior administration’s national security policy and program successes and failures.222

I Congress should work with the new administration to understand its national security
priorities and where applicable, have the
changes in policies and programs reflected
in the 2009 budget and pass FY 2009 appropriations without unnecessary delay.223

2. AT-RISK POPULATIONS AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
Before, during, and after an incident, members of at-risk populations may have additional needs in one or more of the following
functional areas:
I Maintaining independence;
I Communication;
I Transportation;
I Supervision; and
I Medical care.

I Have chronic medical disorders; and

Overall the meeting attendees agreed that the
concept of community resilience is beneficial
because it shifts the conversation away from
fear and toward the collective attitudes and actions necessary to build strong communities
and ensure a swift recovery from major tragedy.
The report finds that it is important for federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments
to include community-based groups and faithbased organizations in the response and preparedness activities, specifically for “at-risk”
groups. The group agreed that community resilience is a positive turn for national policy and
in order to build community resilience, the following issues should be considered:

I Have pharmacological dependency.

I Cross-sector partnership;

The 2006 PAHPA legislation directed the nation’s public health agencies to take the needs
of “at-risk individuals” into consideration when
managing preparedness programs, such as the
SNS and federal grants to states and hospitals.

I The critical role of community- and faithbased organizations, especially as intermediaries with vulnerable populations;

The Center for Biosecurity convened a
roundtable discussion in April 2008 on community resiliency and the implementation of
HSPD-21. According to a draft meeting report, the roundtable meeting discussed the
meaning of “community resilience” and
came up with an illustrative definition:224

I Active engagement of the public in preparedness policy decisions;

In addition to those individuals specifically
recognized as at-risk in PAHPA ( i.e., children, senior citizens, and pregnant women)
individuals who may need additional response assistance should include people who:
I Have disabilities;
I Live in institutionalized settings;
I Are from diverse cultures;
I Have limited English proficiency or are
non-English speaking;
I Are transportation disadvantaged;
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“Community resilience is the ability of a community to rebound from a disaster with a new focus
on recovery and mitigation and a renewed sense
of trust in government and other community leadership. Community resilience is achieved when a
community has forged meaningful social networks
with the goal of emergency preparedness among
community members, leaders, government, and
private industry.”

I Strong social networks and robust communication linkages;

I Vital, interconnected public health, safety,
and medical institutions; and
I Strong diversified economic base with
broadly distributed opportunity.

3. CHILDREN AND PREPAREDNESS
Children under the age of 18 represent one
quarter of the U.S. population. Planning to
care for the nation’s 73.6 million children
and adolescents during a public health emergency presents complex considerations and
challenges. Children are not “small adults”
and special consideration needs to be given
to complicated issues ranging from child-appropriate doses of medications and vaccines,
to caring for children if schools and childcare
facilities are closed for extended periods.
Parents and other caregivers may also become sick or injured during a disaster, complicating their ability to care for children.
Columbia University’s National Center for
Disaster Preparedness has identified the following issues of concern for biological,
chemical and nuclear attacks:225
I Children are more vulnerable to chemical
agents that are absorbed through the skin
or inhaled;
I Children have special susceptibilities to dehydration and shock from biological agents;

I Children require different dosages or different antibiotics and antidotes to many agents;
I Children are more susceptible to the effects of radiation exposure and require different responses than adults;
I Children have unique psychological vulnerabilities, and special management
plans are needed in the event of mass casualties and evacuation;
I Emergency responders, medical professionals, and children’s health care institutions require special expertise and training
to ensure optimal care of those exposed to
chemical, biological, or nuclear agents;
I Children’s developmental ability and cognitive levels may impede their ability to escape
danger; and
I EMS, medical, and hospital staff may not
have pediatric training, equipment, or facilities available.
Other concerns related to children and preparedness include the following:

I Children can not be decontaminated in
adult decontamination units;

Limited pediatric care facilities
Children, particularly children under the age
of five, exhibit significantly higher mortality
rates in disasters when compared with
adults.226 Because children have unique vulnerabilities -- physiological, developmental
and psychological -- it is crucial that their
needs be incorporated into all stages of disas-

ter planning to improve the response system
for children in emergencies.227 Currently, the
United States has fewer than 300 pediatric
hospitals, a fraction of all hospitals (five percent), and only 40 percent of emergency department hospitals have specific procedures
regarding pediatric transfers.228

Unprepared emergency shelters
According to a recent Newsweek article,
shortly after Hurricane Ike hit Texas, San Antonio officials compiled a list of statistics
about evacuees in their city. City officials
counted a total of 5,303 persons who had
been forced to leave their homes, including
561 individuals with special medical needs,

but there was no separate tally for children.229
According to disaster-relief experts, this is
not uncommon as kids are rarely counted in
evacuations. Like hospitals, emergency shelters are often unprepared to handle children
in emergencies, with essentials such as baby
wipes and diapers nowhere to be found.230
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Schools and daycare emergency plans
In the United States, there are approximately
13 million children (63 percent) under the
age of five in some type of child care arrangement during the day.231 As of 2004, approximately 59 million students were enrolled in
prekindergarten through grade 12.232 At
school, children rely on adults to protect
them, therefore teachers and staff must be
prepared to help students through a crisis and
get them home safely.233 There are thousands
of fires in schools each year, yet there is minimal harm to students because staff and students are prepared and have regular drills.

More plans need to be in place for the event
of other emergencies such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, infectious disease outbreaks, and acts of terrorism.234 The time for
childcare facilities and schools to plan and
practice is now, before an emergency occurs.
The good news is that many states do have
specific emergency plans for child care facilities and schools.235 For example, the Office
of Child Care and Head Start in Maine put
together an emergency response plan that
serves as a planning tool for child care programs across the state.236

OBESITY, CHRONIC DISEASES AND PREPAREDNESS
According to CDC, the states and federal agencies are having serious problems evacuating and
sheltering obese and chronically ill people. At a 2008 CDC conference on emergency preparedness, the agency reported that 40 percent of evacuees during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike
were obese, and many of those individuals were unable to stay in local shelters because of
their condition.237 Also, earlier this year, during the flooding in Iowa, a similar problem occurred and many people who were obese or on oxygen were unable to stay at local shelters
and instead, these individuals had to stay in hospitals -- taking up a bed that might be needed
for an actual emergency case.238
Evidence from Hurricane Katrina also suggests that a large proportion of the evacuee population displaced to shelters had a significant burden of disease.239 Among those who arrived at
shelters (in the sample study), 55.6 percent had a chronic disease, with hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes, and pulmonary disease as the most common chronic conditions.240
Caring for evacuees who are obese or afflicted with one or more chronic disease increases the
resources needed at each shelter to prevent further morbidity and mortality.
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4. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
A catastrophic disaster, whether man-made or
naturally occurring, can lead to a variety of psychological consequences, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
increased substance use, as well as a rise in
pain intensity.241 At the same time, the disaster
can severely limit a community’s ability to provide mental health and substance abuse services, also referred to as behavioral health. It is
important for communities to have a behavioral health emergency preparedness plan in
place, not only for the benefit of the individual, but also in order to have a productive
workforce. In distressed populations, mental
health issues may be manifested by a rise in
work-related injuries, excessive absenteeism,
and lower productivity.242
Addressing mental health issues following a
disaster requires planning and coordination
among federal, state, and local governments
and private sector groups to effectively deliver
mental health and substance abuse services.
It is also important to have a plan regarding
how to handle those already mentally ill or
dealing with substance abuse prior to a disaster, such as the importance of ongoing access
to medications and support services. Research on past disasters and public health
emergencies shows that psychological casualties (e.g. multiple unexplained physical symptoms, acute anxiety, etc.) can vastly
outnumber medical casualties and place a
large and rapid expanding burden on emergency medical care organizations and
providers. Therefore, effective behavioral
health preparedness and response is also an
important consideration for medical surge
capacity planning.
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) works to
integrate mental health and substance abuse
services into the federal public health emergency response. To provide short-term crisis
counseling after a disaster, the federal government offers grants to states and localities
through the FEMA Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP), which is

administered by SAMHSA. To qualify for a
CCP grant, a state must demonstrate that the
need for crisis counseling in the affected area
is beyond the capacity of state and local resources. In a 2008 report on federal efforts to
help states prepare for the mental health consequences of disasters, however, GAO argued
that it is difficult to determine whether program funds are used efficiently and effectively
to help alleviate psychological distress.243
In FY 2003 and FY 2004 SAMHSA awarded
$6.8 million in preparedness grants to mental health and substance abuse agencies in 35
states for disaster planning.244 The total
amount awarded to each state ranged from
$105,000 to $200,000. Since then, SAMHSA
has not allocated any additional funds to the
states for mental health preparedness. Instead, according to the 2008 GAO report,
funding in more recent years has come from
CDC and HRSA/ASPR. These preparedness
funds may be used for mental health and
substance abuse preparedness, “but the agencies’ data-reporting requirements do not produce information on the extent to which
states used funds for this purpose.”245
At the federal level, HHS directed the U.S.
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps
to organize into five Rapid Deployment Force
teams, which each include four mental health
providers, and five Mental Health teams made
up of about 20 mental health providers.246
HHS has also increased the number of antidepressants and antipsychotics in the Federal
Medical Stations’ cache of drugs, and added
five new classes of drugs, including those to
treat sleeping disorders.247
In June 2008, HHS’s National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) convened a group of experts to study the mental health consequences
of disasters and study how to protect, preserve, and restore individual and community
mental health in catastrophic events.248 Recommendations from the Disaster Mental
Health Subcommittee were presented before
the NBSB on November 18, 2008.
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5. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
According to a 2007 survey by ASTHO, over
100,000 workers are employed in state public
health, in addition to the 160,000 workers NACCHO estimates are employed in local health departments.249 However, by 2020, the Association
of Schools of Public Health estimates that state
and local health departments will need an additional 250,000 public health workers.250
Public health workers are the backbone of the
U.S. public health system and carry out a range
of duties including epidemiologic surveillance,
laboratory testing and analysis, prevention and

treatment of infectious and chronic diseases,
and emergency preparedness.
The public health workforce, however, is seriously strained, according to the 2007 ASTHO
survey. Twenty-four states have 25 percent or
more of their state public health workforce eligible to retire within in the next five years,
while 10 states have 35 percent or more of
their state public health workforce eligible.
Only seven states have less than 25 percent of
their state public health workforce eligible to
retire within the next five years.

Public Health Workforce Eligible to Retire within the Next Five Years
States with < 25% of workforce
eligible for retirement.

States with ≥ 25% of workforce
eligible for retirement.

Connecticut (19%)
North Carolina (23%)
Ohio (14%)
South Carolina (15%)
Tennessee (16%)
Texas (23%)
Utah (22%)

Alabama (32%)
Alaska (27%)
Colorado (37%)
Delaware (25%)
Georgia (25%)
Illinois (39%)
Indiana (25%)
Iowa (30%)
Maryland (31%)
Michigan (39%)
Minnesota (27%)
Missouri (37%)

Montana (34%)
Nebraska (56%)
New Hampshire (50%)
New Jersey (49%)
North Dakota (27%)
Oklahoma (29%)
Oregon (32%)
Pennsylvania (29%)
Virginia (60%)
West Virginia (30%)
Wisconsin (54%)
Wyoming (32%)

Source: ASTHO’s 2007 State Public Health Workforce Survey Results. Note: Twenty states did not respond to this question on ASTHO’s survey (AR, AZ, CA, DC, FL, HI, ID, KS, KY, LA, MA, ME, MI, NV, NM, NY, RI, SD, VT, and WA).

The state public health workforce has continued to age since ASTHO’s last survey in
2003 and the average age of a state public
health employee is now 47. According to
ASTHO, “Despite ongoing efforts, the state
public health agency workforce is graying at
a higher rate than the rest of the American
workforce and state health agencies continue
to be affected by workforce shortages.”251
A 2006 survey by CSTE reported a current total of
2,502 epidemiologists working in state and territorial health departments. The survey, however,
also reported an estimated need for 3,361 epidemiologists to reach ideal capacity, a 34 percent
increase.252 In the field of bioterrorism/emergency preparedness the gap between current and
needed capacity was even larger at 37 percent.
As state health departments struggle with the
inevitable “exodus of highly skilled older workers,” they face numerous challenges to recruit84

ing and retaining qualified, trained personnel,
including the following:253
I Budget constraints;
I Lack of competitive wages for public health
careers;
I Lack of interest by recent graduates in
public health careers;
I Lack of visibility of public health careers; and
I Red-tape that hampers the recruitment
and hiring of qualified candidates.
For a more detailed discussion on the challenges in recruiting and retaining a welltrained public health workforce, including
recommendations for the Obama administration and the 111th Congress, please see
TFAH’s report Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the Federal Public Health System
to Focus on Prevention and Preparedness, available online at www.healthyamericans.org.

Recommendations

O

verall, this report finds that significant progress has been made in the
nation’s preparedness to respond to public health emergencies based
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on state-by-state measures and available data. Yet much work remains on critical issues of preparedness, including: surge capacity, legal protections for health
care volunteers, and eliminating geographic disparities in preparedness planning. Above all, preparedness requires a sustained effort and ongoing investment of funds. The progress we have seen is threatened by diminishing federal
support to states and localities for their preparedness activities, and it is unlikely that these states and localities can make up the funding shortfalls, given
the current nationwide financial crisis. Our country is only as secure as the
least prepared state; there is a federal interest and responsibility to assure a minimum level of preparedness throughout the country.

Important progress has been made since
September 11, 2001 and the ensuing anthrax
tragedies. Passage of PAHPA and updated
federal directives have been important milestones in the effort to protect the American
people from major health disasters. The passage of the legislation, however, does not
mean the changes called for have been
achieved. In fact, without increased and sustained funding and political prioritization,
many of the gains that have been made will
be jeopardized and new objectives and outcomes for public health preparedness will
unlikely be realized. Americans deserve
basic protections in the event of health emergencies, and right now, many of these protections are lacking, leaving Americans
vulnerable to unacceptable levels of risk.

preparedness plans. However, significant
work remains in areas such as medical countermeasures distribution and dispensing,
surge capacity, and legal protections for volunteers working during emergencies.

At the state level, there has been significant
progress in some areas of preparedness, including enhancing critical laboratory capacity and the development of pandemic

9. Health and sick leave benefits;

To further strengthen emergency preparedness, TFAH recommends action across the
following key areas:
1. Funding;
2. Restructuring of federal health agencies;
3. Transparency, accountability, and oversight;
4. Surge capacity;
5. Preparedness and health reform;
6. Public health workforce;
7. Research and development;
8. Legal preparedness;

10. Food safety reforms; and
11. Community resiliency.
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1. FUNDING
Public health preparedness requires a welltrained public health workforce, a sustained
effort at research and development, the building and maintenance of stockpiles of countermeasures, and hospital surge capacity.
When funding declines -- whether at the federal, state, or local level -- the immediate impact on public health preparedness may not
be evident. Funding cuts frequently result in
workforce reductions or hiring freezes. Without a trained public health workforce, preparedness suffers. Preparedness requires that
we have enough qualified laboratory scientists
who analyze lab specimens and transmit those
results to federal, state, and local health officials; epidemiologists and health information
specialists who develop and run biosurveillance systems to monitor disease rates and
warn of bioterror or foodborne disease out-

breaks; stockpile managers who receive, store,
and dispense medical countermeasures; and
public health nurses and doctors who vaccinate populations against infectious diseases
such as pandemic flu. The federal government should provide increased and sustained
funding for preparedness activities to state
and local health departments. It is a shared
responsibility between the federal government and the states. State-generated revenues
invested in public health should, therefore, increase as well. As demonstrated in this report,
federal funding has fluctuated -- limiting the
ability of states to build the kind of response
capacity that is needed to prepare for everything from a pandemic to a natural disaster to
a terrorist attack. The variation in critical state
investment in public health also reflects a significant variation in geographic capacity.

Recommendations for Funding
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Fully fund and stabilize funding for
state public health emergency
preparedness activities

FY 2008 funding for programs dedicated to
bioterrorism and public health emergency
preparedness capabilities, specifically programs
intended to support upgrading state and local
capabilities and hospital readiness, was $704 million.
The PHEP Cooperative Agreement should be
funded at $1.03 billion, which is the FY 2005
level adjusted for inflation. These funds are used
to develop core boots-on-the-ground support for
disaster response and any reduction in funding
leaves the country at unnecessary levels of risk.
Inconsistencies in funding from year to year means
that states cannot predict how much money they will
receive and this affects their ability to hire and train
staff, expand capacity, and implement new programs.

End the practice of “reprogramming”
and redirecting money from the state
preparedness grants for special projects

In recent years, the PHEP Cooperative Agreement
not only has seen its base funding decline, but
further reductions as portions are carved out for
special projects. For example, in FY 2007 HHS took
$35 million from the PHEP to fund a Poison Control
Partnership Program (PCPP) to enhance real-time
disease detection program. HHS did not renew this
funding in FY 2008. It is not clear how HHS expects
to maintain any gains in enhanced collaboration
among state health departments and poison control
centers without additional funding. HHS should refrain from one-year-carve outs that waste taxpayers’
money. Instead, PHEP base funding should be increased and maintained so these relationships and
workforces can be built and sustained.

Recommendations for Funding
Fully fund hospital preparedness

Increase pandemic influenza funding

Increase funding for BARDA

Funding should be appropriated for the
replenishment and maintenance of
national stockpiles as many parts of the
stockpile are set to expire in the
coming years
Funding should be appropriated for the
development of new evidence-based
benchmarks and objective standards

Provide a transparent accounting of
pandemic influenza funding

The HPP focuses on improving the clinical response to a large-scale health emergency,
which includes both developing surge capacity and continuity of operations planning.
On average, hospitals receive about $100,000 per year, with some as low as $10,000
per year. In FY 2008, the HPP was funded at $398 million. In the short-term, this
crucial program should be funded at $596 million, which is the FY 2004 level
adjusted for inflation. In the long-term, the administration and Congress should
examine ways to build hospital preparedness into the federal health care financing
system, by providing, for example, enhanced reimbursement rates under Medicare to
those facilities that are willing to enhance and maintain their emergency response
capacity. This would remove the funding of hospital preparedness from the unpredictability of the annual appropriations cycle.
The Obama administration should provide a detailed assessment of long-term
funding needs for pandemic preparedness. In the short-term, Congress should
appropriate $870 million in no-year FY 2009 pandemic preparedness
funding, $363 million above the recommended level of $507 million, providing
additional resources for the development and purchase of vaccine, antivirals,
necessary medical supplies, diagnostics and other surveillance tools. Additionally,
an appropriation of $662 million is recommended for ongoing annual pandemic preparedness activities at HHS, $350 million above the recommended
level of $312 million, providing additional resources for state and local
preparedness.
In FY 2008, BARDA received $101 million, which is nowhere near the amount
needed for advanced research and development of medical countermeasures.
Congress should appropriate $1.29 billion over multiple years for BARDA’s
Pandemic and Emerging Disease Program for the advanced development of
pandemic influenza vaccine and pre-pandemic vaccine and antiviral stockpiles.
Another $850 million for biological countermeasures and diagnostics should be
appropriated, and made available over multiple years in the Public Health and
Social Services Emergency Fund (PHSSEF) for BARDA’s Advanced Research and
Development Fund.
The next secretary of HHS should give the president and Congress a professional
judgment budget that includes the cost of replenishing and maintaining stockpiles.
Funding to buy new medical countermeasures may require a new Act of Congress
as the 2004 Project BioShield does not allow for replenishment and
maintenance costs.
PAHPA required HHS to work in coordination with the research community and
evaluation specialists and develop new objectives to measure how well states
respond to major public health emergencies. PAHPA specifically required CDC’s
CPHP to focus on systems research, but overall CPHP funding was not increased to
account for the program. CDC should provide Congress with a professional
judgment budget that includes the cost of fully funding the CPHPs and the PERRCs
to carry out their important work on public health workforce preparedness and
public health emergency preparedness research and evaluation.
Nearly $5 billion of FY 2006 pandemic influenza funding was designated as ‘no-year
funding,’ meaning HHS was able to spend that money as needed over the next
several years. This approach enables HHS to contract with pharmaceutical manufacturers to advance the development of new-line vaccines and medications and bolster
production capacity over several years. HHS should provide a clear plan for how the
remaining funds will be spent.
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2. RESTRUCTURING OF FEDERAL HEALTH AGENCIES
Prevention, preparedness, and public health
are vital to the well-being of families, communities, workplace productivity, U.S. competitiveness, and national security. The incoming
Obama administration and the 111th Congress
should make protecting the health of all Americans a priority. However, the nation’s public
health structure is broken and needs to be
fixed. The current federal structure for public
health emergency preparedness has several
specific problems. Major limitations include:
I Lack of clear, strong leadership;

I Limited coordination within health agencies and poor coordination across agencies
in the federal government.
The following recommendations represent a
set of options that could be addressed together
as a whole or individually by the Obama administration and Congress. They are drawn
from TFAH’s October 2008 transition paper
Blueprint for a Healthier America: Modernizing the
Federal Public Health System to Focus on Prevention
and Preparedness. The full report is available
online at www.healthyamericans.org.

I Understaffing; and

Recommendations for Restructuring of Federal Health Agencies
Ensure a broad understanding of health
security issues within the Executive
Office of the President

Clarify roles and responsibilities
among federal agencies

Clarify the role of the Office of Health
Affairs in DHS
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The Obama administration should appoint a
Deputy Assistant to the President for Health
Security Affairs who can coordinate domestic and
global health security issues across the National
Security Council, Homeland Security Council,
Domestic Policy Council, and National
Economic Council.
HHS is the lead cabinet agency for determining
policy and planning for public health emergencies.
There is broad consensus among experts that HHS
should remain as the lead agency. However, other
cabinet agencies have different types of expertise
that are needed during emergencies. For example,
the VA can manage large health systems, and the VA
and DOD can effectively and rapidly move people,
equipment, and supplies. The White House Homeland Security Council should review Emergency
Support Function-8 to determine whether any
changes in protocol are needed, and if any new authorities are needed to permit larger contributions
by VA and DOD during emergencies.
While HHS is considered the lead agency for public
health response, some critical health functions
operate out of the DHS Office of Health Affairs
(OHA), including bio-monitoring activities such as
BioWatch, a bio-aerosol environmental monitoring
system for early detection of biological events.
OHA is also responsible for integrating emergency
management and medical response at all levels of
government. The White House Homeland Security
Council should review the health-related functions
of DHS and establish a structure to make sure these
systems are well-coordinated and housed in the
most appropriate agencies.

Recommendations for Restructuring of Federal Health Agencies
Elevate the current Assistant Secretary
for Health position to be an
Undersecretary for Health (USH)

Ensure appropriate division of labor
within HHS

Leadership and accountability

Appoint a strong, independent
Surgeon General

This office should oversee a strategic approach to
prevention, preparedness, and public health to
increase coordination and accountability among
agencies, including all Public Health Service
agencies, ASPR, and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services reporting to this official. The
USH is not meant to disempower agencies or add
another bureaucratic layer, but to help coordinate
and provide leadership.
Under the current structure, ASPR functions as
both a policy arm and operating division. As a
policy office, it recommends and oversees policy
and coordination for all HHS agencies and interacts
with other cabinet agencies and the White House
on preparedness issues. As an operating division,
it manages some programs including hospital preparedness grants and medical response (ESF-8).
Some officials have suggested that all preparedness
grants should be managed by ASPR rather than
CDC, even though CDC has traditionally functioned as an operating division and has expertise
in managing grants. Roles must be clarified. With
support from a new Undersecretary of Health
(USH), ASPR should focus on consistency in policy
and coordination among programs, to ensure that
all HHS agencies follow the policy guidance of
ASPR. CDC should continue to be responsible
for the public health emergency response, which
includes serving as the main operating division for
preparedness grants, to avoid adding more
bureaucracy and confusion for state and local
government grantees.
Designate a single official within HHS to be
responsible, accountable, and fully empowered
to plan and coordinate implementation of the
National Health Security Strategy called for in
PAHPA. This official should either perform or
oversee all the preparedness-related activities of
the ASPR, the Assistant Secretary for Health,
and all other components of HHS. Further, he or
she must ensure the needed coordination and
integration across all the agencies that have a role
to play.
The Surgeon General must be given the
independence to speak directly to the public on
matters of public health emergency preparedness
and personal preparedness, and be given the
resources needed to ensure those messages
are heard.
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3. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT
PAHPA not only demonstrated the resolve of
Congress and the Bush administration to
continue to address public health emergency
preparedness, but gave the federal agencies,
namely HHS, a series of deliverables and
deadlines to produce and meet. While much
progress has been made on the implementation of PAHPA, which is notable in light of

personnel and funding constraints, much remains to be done. To ensure HHS fully complies with PAHPA and does so in an open and
transparent manner, pursuant to the provisions of the statute, Congress should use its
oversight powers to ensure full implementation and execution of PAHPA.

Recommendations for Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Oversight
Publish regular progress reports on the
implementation of PAHPA
Develop new evidence-based
benchmarks and objective standards

Develop and implement the use of
standardized preparedness exercises

Incorporate lessons learned into
future planning

Collect performance data; assess the
results; and, annually release the
findings publicly on a state-by-state basis

Transparency

Continuous revision and strengthening
of preparedness plans
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HHS should regularly provide publicly available updates on the progress made on
benchmarks and deliverables under the PAHPA statute. The first progress report
was released in November 2007. An update is planned for late 2009.
CDC’s Division of State and Local Readiness’ Outcome Monitoring and Evaluation
Branch is working closely with PHEP program and evaluation specialists to develop a
new set of performance based metrics to measure organizational readiness and response to public health emergencies. The objectives should focus on outcome results
from real-life drills and exercises. Benchmarks currently in use are more processoriented and not clear predictors of how well a state will respond to an emergency.
CDC, in coordination with other government agencies, state and local health
departments, research organizations, and universities, should develop and
implement the use of standardized public health preparedness exercises. The
exercises should include a thorough evaluation and after-action report that is made
publicly available. Any weaknesses or gaps identified in the evaluation should be
addressed within a specific amount of time.
The use of real-life exercises and drills, in addition to table-top exercises, gives states
the ability to accurately gauge how well they would perform in a public health
emergency. The lessons learned from these evaluations, however, are only useful if
they are demonstrably incorporated into revised and updated preparedness plans.
As required by PAHPA, HHS is in the process of developing a standardized reporting
form for all states and hospital grantees. The use of this form will allow HHS to
rate the performance of the grantees and to assure the proper expenditure of funds.
Data from this form and other evaluations of states’ emergency preparedness should
be reported yearly on a state-by-state basis. This allows Americans to appropriately
assess their states’ progress and document how states have used taxpayer-supported
preparedness funds.
The federal government, in collaboration with the states, should share states’ pandemic
preparedness plans and performance grades with the public to increase transparency
and build community resiliency. CDC, which published its first report on the PHEP
Cooperative Agreement in February 2008, should continue to share evaluation results
on a state-by-state basis, in addition to releasing the specific criteria it uses for evaluating
states, and providing the public a basis for interpreting these scores. The more people
know about state and local preparedness, the better equipped they are to make their
own family and household plans. CDC’s next report will be released in early 2009 and
will provide an evaluation of the agency’s preparedness programs and activities.
Federal and state agencies need to keep preparedness plans updated to account
for changes in the environment and advancements in scientific knowledge.

4. SURGE CAPACITY
Surge capacity remains the largest threat to
the nation’s ability to respond to a major catastrophe such as a pandemic influenza.
Much remains to be done to ensure that the

U.S. health care system is able to function in
a mass-casualty event. In addition to the
funding recommendations discussed above,
TFAH suggests the following:

Recommendations for Surge Capacity
Altered standards of care

Regional coordination of health care
facilities, including alternative care sites,
with public health and emergency
management

Alternate care sites

Enhance communication systems

Designation of a disaster coordinator
for each hospital

Surge workforce

Legal issues are a major barrier for many states (and hospitals) in their planning for
scenarios that would involve altered standards of care and the allocation of scarce resources. The federal government should take steps to address the legal issues associated
with shifting to a different paradigm of providing health care when the need for care
overwhelms available resources (i.e., staff, supplies, space) during catastrophic public
health emergencies.
Hospitals, local health departments, and emergency management agencies should build
regional consortiums to organize and plan for public health emergencies. Such regional
collaboration can lead to more efficient use of resources among hospitals and health
departments, including personnel, and facilitate the sharing of promising practices. This
coordination should include all federal resources active in the region, including VA and
DOD facilities. (Regional efforts could be within a locality or across county and/or state
lines depending on the size of the communities involved.)
Despite the clear need for alternative care sites following a mass casualty event, there
are several barriers to their successful roll-outs. To address these barriers, TFAH
recommends the following measures: 1) Increase local, state, and regional planning with
clear delineation of responsibilities and authority; 2) Foster public-private partnerships
among health care practitioners; 3) Employ operational drills to test the deployment of
mobile units and the creation of alternative care sites; and, 4) Address licensing and
liability concerns for health care workers, behavioral health professionals, and
volunteers and liability concerns for non-health care volunteers and third-party entities
that play host to alternative care sites. In addition, emergency planners will need to
obtain, stockpile, and store supplies, equipment and medicines for use in the alternative
care sites.
Hospitals must develop communication systems that allow health care facilities and
public health departments to talk to each other and collectively manage an
emergency response.
Strong leadership is essential to mounting and sustaining a successful public health
emergency response at the national, state, and local levels. This applies to hospitals
as well, which should designate a strong leader, respected and trusted by staff, to
serve as a disaster coordinator. The person who fills this role will be required to
assure that many difficult decisions are made, including the use of altered standards
of care, alternate care sites, limited resources, and the call-up of volunteer
medical personnel.
Public and private health care organizations should develop means to boost staff
during a public health emergency, either through the use of incentives for current
staff or through the use of volunteers or non-traditional staff, such as emergency
medical technicians and medical and nursing students. The surge workforce should
be recruited in advance in order to ensure licensing and accreditation issues are
resolved before an emergency strikes.
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5. PREPAREDNESS AND HEALTH REFORM
America must provide quality, affordable health
care to all. A strong public health system and
public policies focused on prevention of disease
and injury, and preparedness for public health
emergencies, should be a cornerstone of a
health reform plan. A strong public health system is necessary to help promote better health,

monitor the health of the country, and protect
people from health threats that are beyond individual control, including bioterrorism, foodborne illness, and natural disasters. The nation
must ensure that a reformed health care system
will be prepared to react to and mitigate the
consequences of a public health emergency.

Recommendations for Preparedness and Health Reform
Build preparedness and prevention into
health reform

Past health reform discussions have focused on how best to care for people after
they become sick or harmed. As the next president, administration, and Congress debate 21st century health reform, an emphasis should be placed on prevention of disease and preparedness against public health emergencies. A reformed health care
system should assure stable funding for a strong public health infrastructure and finance the preparedness role of the health care system.

6. PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE
The growing workforce shortage in the health
care and public health fields threatens U.S.
emergency preparedness. America’s response
will be severely limited, unless the workforce
challenges the public health system faces are

addressed. PAPHA contained two key provisions related to workforce development,
whose implementation TFAH supports. But
much more remains to be done to address the
public health workforce crisis.

Recommendations for Public Health Workforce
Fund and implement PAHPA
workforce provisions

Enact and fund comprehensive public
health workforce scholarship initiatives

Federal match for state and local workforce
Allow federal funding to support more
public health education programs

Strengthen the U.S. Public Health
Service Commissioned Corps

Streamline the registration and
accreditation of emergency health
care volunteers
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Congress should appropriate and allocate the necessary funds to implement the HHS
workforce demonstration project. This student loan repayment project is intended for
individuals who: 1) are eligible for the National Health Service Corps loan repayment
program and 2) also agree to serve in a state health department that provides service to
a significant number of health professional shortage areas or has areas that are at risk of a
public health emergency. Congress should also appropriate and allocate monies necessary
to execute the second PAHPA workforce provision, which allocates grants to states to
assist in operating state loan repayment programs.
Institute a grant and/or loan repayment program to college juniors and seniors and
graduate students (in their final years of training) who commit to entering
governmental public health. Students would have to meet certain academic
requirements, such as achieving a B average, to qualify for the program.
The federal government should provide federal matching funds to state and local governments to invest in recruitment, retention, training, and retraining for public health workers.
Currently, only the nation’s 40 schools of public health can compete for certain CDC
and other funding to support governmental public health professionals. Universities
that offer master’s programs in public health (outside the schools of public health)
and other related master’s programs should be allowed to compete for funding.
Congress should strengthen the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps
by increasing the number of active duty personnel, creating a “Ready Reserve,” and
establishing a dedicated funding stream for all Corps activities under the management
and fiscal control of the Surgeon General.
The expansion of ESAR-VHP and the mandatory participation in the program in
order to receive preparedness funds is a major step in the right direction. HHS
should integrate other health care volunteer systems such as the MRC and the
NDMS into ESAR-VHP in order to eliminate confusion among participants and avoid
double-counting potential health care volunteers. Health care volunteers enrolled in
these systems should participate in federal, state, and local emergency drills.

7. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The basic technology and tools of public
health need to be modernized. Too often
front-line health care professionals are relying on outdated diagnostic tests and med-

ications. As new tests and therapies are developed and as older ones become obsolete,
the SNS should be replenished.

Recommendations for Research and Development
Enhance research and development of
vaccines and public health technologies

Clarify requirements and deliverables
under Project BioShield contracts
Replenish and augment the SNS

Complete purchases of antiviral
medications

Expand the Shelf Life Extension Program

Modernize disease surveillance systems

Public health should be a central part of
the design and implementation of health
information technology systems

Basic technology and tools of public health must be modernized to adequately
protect the American people. This includes research and development of vaccines
and new technologies; and improved chemical laboratory testing capabilities.
Collaboration with the private sector, as envisioned under BARDA and Project
BioShield, will be essential.
ASPR should coordinate with NIH, FDA and CDC to ensure future BioShield requests
for proposals and procurement contracts for new countermeasures have clearly
articulated requirements, expectations, and deliverables.
Ensure the SNS contains enough supplies and dosage recommendations for adults and
children. In addition, future federal appropriations cycles must take into account the
need to replenish currently stockpiled countermeasures that pass their expiration dates.
Currently, the bulk of SNS medications were purchased under the 2004 BioShield Act.
Many of these vaccines and drugs are beginning to expire -- even within the Shelf Life
Extension Program -- which leaves a huge gap in our nation’s preparedness.
The federal government has met its goal of stockpiling 50 million treatment courses
of antivirals. States have collectively stockpiled 22.5 million treatment courses towards
the 31 million goal. The 26 states that have not yet purchased 100 percent of their
subsidized antivirals should do so. Meanwhile, the federal government should
re-examine this shared responsibility in light of major gaps in antiviral stockpiling in certain
states. Additionally, if federal guidance on the use of antivirals shifts from treatment to
prophylaxis, stockpiling goals will change and more purchases will be needed.
Congress should extend the Shelf Life Extension Program (or establish a new, parallel,
SLEP-like program within FDA) to include state and local antiviral and antibiotic
stockpiles. Currently, state and local stockpiles could have shorter shelf lives even
though the nation is depending on state and local stockpiles to meet national goals.
Every health department and health agency should be part of a 21st century surveillance
system that meets national standards and is interoperable between jurisdictions and
agencies to ensure rapid information sharing. Surveillance systems should be able to
detect infectious disease outbreaks or a bioterrorist attack. Plans should ensure
adequate laboratory surveillance of influenza and other infectious diseases, as well as
testing for pathogens such as E. Coli, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),
and extensively drug-resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB).
Current health information technology is concentrated on electronic health records
(EHRs), which are used to improve patient care and efficiency. As the use of EHRs
grows, public health officials’ need for near real-time data on disease surveillance
should be factored into their design and implementation. Public health can use data
from EHRs to monitor the health of the population and the demand for care,
invaluable tools to help detect and mitigate public health emergencies.
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8. LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
This report has underscored the critical need
for states to develop full legal preparedness
for all-hazards public health emergencies.
All four core elements of public health legal
preparedness should be addressed: laws and

legal authorities; competency in using law;
coordination across sectors and jurisdictions
in implementing law-based interventions;
and legal best practices.

Recommendations for Legal Preparedness
State legal preparedness for all-hazards
public health emergencies

State liability protections for volunteer
health professionals

Federal volunteer health professional
liability protection

State entity liability protection

Federal entity liability protection
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States should review and apply tools that have been developed for their use in
assessing and making needed improvements in their legal preparedness for public health
emergencies. These tools include, for example, model legislation (e.g., the Draft Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act) and draft memoranda of understanding (e.g.,
between public health and law enforcement agencies), such training curricula as
“Forensic Epidemiology 3.0” and “Public Health Emergency Law 3.0”, the Menu of
Suggested Provisions for Mutual Aid Agreements, The Social Distancing Law Assessment
Template, and the National Action Agenda for Public Health Legal Preparedness. (These
and additional tools are accessible at http://www.cdc.govv/phlp)
Liability concerns are a growing challenge to emergency preparedness officials.
Volunteers and private entities have expressed reluctance to participate in response and
recovery efforts for fear that their actions may make them liable. State legislatures
should adopt the UEVHPA which has been approved by both the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, or enact
similar legislation that extends liability protection to volunteer health professionals in a
public health emergency.
Congress should amend the Public Health Service Act to provide Federal Tort Claims
Act protection to qualified ESAR-VHP participants when they are activated by the
federal government to respond to a public health emergency. The federal Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorized the ESARVHP to help states develop registry systems for the timely identification, verification and
use of volunteer health professionals during public health emergencies.254 In 2006,
PAHPA required the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services to link the state
systems into a single national network of systems.255 The state systems continue to be
maintained by the individual states, with guidance from the federal government. Despite
ongoing efforts to build this national network, the liability issues that can arise from
activating the ESAR-VHP remain an area of concern.256
State legislatures should consider extending Good Samaritan liability protections to
those non-health care volunteers and business and non-profit entities that provide
emergency assistance.
To address liability issues for businesses and non-profit organizations, Congress may wish
to create a federal floor for the minimum protection that should be available to these
emergency response partners when working in concert with government agencies.

9. HEALTH AND SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
A public health emergency will create financial
hardships for individuals and the health care system. Because compliance with recommendations to seek immediate care and/or self-isolate
or quarantine may be critical to containing the

spread of influenza or a terrorist-introduced organism, TFAH believes the federal government
should take steps to assure that lack of health insurance or sick leave do not prevent compliance
with public health recommendations.

Recommendations for Health and Sick Leave Benefits
Establish an emergency health benefit

Set up emergency sick leave policies
and procedures

Congress should establish a short-term emergency health benefit, which would allow
hospitals and health care centers to keep functioning during a prolonged public health
emergency, while ensuring care to uninsured and underinsured individuals affected by
the crisis. Legislation currently under consideration in Congress, the Public Health
Emergency Response Act (PHERA), would help ensure that victims of catastrophic
public health emergencies have meaningful and immediate access to medically
necessary health care services.
The federal government should clarify whether the Department of Labor’s Disaster
Unemployment Assistance Program, as currently established, would cover workers
without sick leave who self-quarantine in the event of a pandemic flu. Congress should
pass legislation that would require employers with 15 or more employees to offer a
minimum of seven paid sick days each year, to be used to deal with individual medical
needs or to care for sick family members. Having paid leave may be critical
to assuring compliance with public health recognitions for voluntary quarantine by
individuals in a pandemic influenza.

10. FOOD SAFETY REFORMS
Reforms are needed to make the U.S. food safety system preventive, instead of reactive.

Recommendations for Food Safety Reforms
Unified and prevention-oriented statutory
mandate and organizational structures

Increased resources for research,
standard-setting, inspection,
enforcement, and education

Risk-based resource allocation

In the short-term, HHS should split the FDA into two separate entities: one
that handles drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices and one that handles food.
By splitting the agency, HHS will ensure that food safety gets the attention, resources, and
priority it deserves and does not take a back seat to the more profitable drug and medical
regulation. In the long-term, Congress should enact legislation that paves the
way for a single, unified food safety agency to carry out a prevention-focused,
integrated food safety strategy, including mandatory implementation of
preventive controls by producers and processors. The single food safety agency
should include: FSIS; the food regulatory functions of FDA, including CFSAN, the Center
for Veterinary Medicine, and the food portion of FDA’s field resource; and the food safety
aspects of EPA’s pesticide program.
A modernized food safety system will require additional resources for (1) research
and data collection on the incidence and causes of foodborne disease, new food
safety technologies and prevention strategies, and consumer behavior, (2) setting food
safety performance standards and establishing a mandatory standard of care for
preventing food safety problems, (3) inspection and enforcement to ensure standards
are consistently met by both domestic and foreign producers and processors, and (4)
food safety education of commercial food handlers and consumers.
The federal government should direct its resources for food safety research, regulation,
and education in the manner most likely to maximize reduction in foodborne disease.
This would require repealing the current FSIS inspection mandate and substituting a
modernized mandate for the entire farm-to-table food safety system that would ensure
an adequate resource base for inspection, but require the inspection and other resources
be applied in the manner most likely to contribute to disease reduction.
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11. COMMUNITY RESILIENCY
HSPD-21 identifies community resilience as
one of “the four most critical components of
public health and medical preparedness,”
along with mass casualty care, mass distribution, and biosurveillance. The U.S. government defines “community resiliency” as the
ability of a community to cope and recover
from a disaster or public health emergency.
A CDC-funded study states that in order “for
a community to be resilient, its members
must put into practice early and effective ac-

tions, so that they can respond to adversity in
a healthy manner.”257
Taking this into account, preparedness plans
need to consider the diverse needs of the
U.S. population, in particular, “at-risk,” “special needs,” and “vulnerable” populations.
Only by effectively reaching out to all segments of the U.S. population can the country
appropriately be prepared to survive and
overcome crises.

Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Guard against complacency

Engage communities in planning

Focus on disease prevention and
health promotion
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One of the biggest challenges facing public health
emergency preparedness is complacency. Federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments
must maintain a sense of urgency regarding
preparedness. Officials should communicate the
importance of preparedness to the public while
not resorting to scare tactics. Engagement with
media is the key to building a heightened sense of
awareness around the issues of emergency
preparedness, especially at the community level.
Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments must engage communities in local
emergency and pandemic planning. Too often
emergency planners just look to their grantees and
ignore other key stakeholders, such as volunteer
organizations, religious institutions, and schools and
universities. Planners must proactively approach
these diverse groups and bring them to the table.
The president and Congress should invest
strategically in community-based disease
prevention programs. Americans cannot be
prepared if they are unhealthy, yet chronic disease
rates are spiraling out of control in this nation.
More than two-thirds of American adults are
overweight or obese. One in four has heart disease;
and one in three has high blood pressure. Twentyfour million Americans have type 2 diabetes and
another 54 million are pre-diabetic. These
underlying health conditions pose a challenge when
residents are asked to evacuate due to a public
health emergency. Persons dependent on
prescription drugs also face challenges when asked
to shelter-in-place as they may run out of their
medicines.

Recommendations for Strengthening Community Resiliency
Communicating effectively with at-risk
individuals

Children are not small adults

The president and Congress should
carefully consider the recommendations
from the National Commission on
Children and Disasters, which are due
out in 2010.

Behavioral health considerations

Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials
must design culturally competent risk
communication campaigns that use respected,
trusted, and culturally competent messengers.
Current research and best-practices regarding
emergency preparedness communication strategies
for at-risk populations should direct the creation
and dissemination of these messages.
Children are inherently vulnerable as they depend
upon adults for food, shelter, supervision and
guidance. As such, their needs should be taken
into account in all public health emergency and
pandemic preparedness efforts. Because disease
susceptibility, outcome, and transmission will likely
differ for children when compared to adults,
recommendations for child social distancing during
a pandemic, will likely differ from social distancing
recommendations for adults. Evacuation and
reunification planning should reflect the fact that
children are often separated from their parents for
much of the day. Child advocates, such as teachers
and pediatricians, should be consulted as plans are
made. Preparedness plans should be clearly
communicated to parents, schools, and daycare
facilities.
The National Commission on Children and
Disasters, a bi-partisan panel appointed by the
president and Congressional leaders, held its
first meeting in October 2008. Over a period
of two years, the Commission will examine and
assess the needs of children independently, and in
relation to the preparation, response and recovery
from all emergencies, hazards and disasters.
Following its investigation, the Commission will
issue a final report, complete with findings and
recommendations, to the next president and
Congress. These recommendations should be
acted upon with utmost urgency.
Disasters have far reaching behavioral health
consequences.258 Federal and state emergency
planners should, therefore, coordinate with
mental health and substance abuse agencies to
ensure effective and ongoing response to
all-hazard emergencies.
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APPENDIX A: CDC AND ASPR PREPAREDNESS GRANTS BY STATE
BIOTERRORISM FUNDING BY SOURCE AND YEAR
FY 2007
State
CDC
ASPR
Total
Alabama
$10,228,439 $6,330,289 $16,558,728
Alaska
$5,015,000
$1,349,441 $6,364,441
Arizona
$14,284,449 $8,317,173 $22,601,622
Arkansas
$7,533,981
$4,063,403 $11,597,384
California
$52,023,574 $34,106,620 $86,130,194
Colorado
$11,234,142 $6,525,958 $17,760,100
Connecticut
$9,112,072
$4,943,121 $14,055,193
Delaware
$5,000,000
$1,581,970 $6,581,970
D.C.
$9,129,492
$1,737,218 $10,866,710
Florida
$33,289,391 $23,432,938 $56,722,329
Georgia
$18,230,415 $12,370,869 $30,601,284
Hawaii
$5,296,353
$2,129,653 $7,426,006
Idaho
$5,439,853
$2,359,069 $7,798,922
Illinois
$19,245,542 $13,163,842 $32,409,384
Indiana
$13,406,349 $8,503,785 $21,910,134
Iowa
$7,832,164
$4,280,453 $12,112,617
Kansas
$7,709,812
$4,004,077 $11,713,889
Kentucky
$9,905,373
$5,832,130 $15,737,503
Louisiana
$10,536,471 $5,935,695 $16,472,166
Maine
$5,381,949
$2,175,388 $7,557,337
Maryland
$12,815,412 $7,619,177 $20,434,589
Massachusetts
$14,418,081 $8,660,567 $23,078,648
Michigan
$21,555,319 $13,298,463 $34,853,782
Minnesota
$12,587,653 $7,050,445 $19,638,098
Mississippi
$7,797,260
$4,189,754 $11,987,014
Missouri
$13,236,793 $7,906,932 $21,143,725
Montana
$5,026,488
$1,697,530 $6,724,018
Nebraska
$5,966,406
$2,741,751 $8,708,157
Nevada
$7,662,442
$3,663,636 $11,326,078
New Hampshire $5,308,479
$2,166,921 $7,475,400
New Jersey
$17,584,884 $11,560,312 $29,145,196
New Mexico
$7,249,926
$2,977,887 $10,227,813
New York
$22,935,076 $14,561,258 $37,496,334
North Carolina $16,570,173 $11,727,581 $28,297,754
North Dakota
$5,028,972
$1,306,102 $6,335,074
Ohio
$22,745,252 $15,050,914 $37,796,166
Oklahoma
$8,871,195
$5,037,444 $13,908,639
Oregon
$9,192,614
$5,191,530 $14,384,144
Pennsylvania
$24,743,362 $16,271,242 $41,014,604
Rhode Island
$5,048,931
$1,853,432 $6,902,363
South Carolina $9,972,754
$5,978,140 $15,950,894
South Dakota
$5,000,000
$1,491,255 $6,491,255
Tennessee
$13,009,292 $8,155,520 $21,164,812
Texas
$44,570,881 $30,301,320 $74,872,201
Utah
$7,174,066
$3,732,769 $10,906,835
Vermont
$5,039,717
$1,290,942 $6,330,659
Virginia
$17,109,122 $10,189,048 $27,298,170
Washington
$14,168,202 $8,608,090 $22,776,292
West Virginia
$6,026,051
$2,805,313 $8,831,364
Wisconsin
$12,667,934 $7,544,102 $20,212,036
Wyoming
$5,000,000
$1,152,882 $6,152,882
CDC Total
FY 07*
$645,917,558

ASPR Total
FY 07*
$378,925,351

Grand Total
FY 07*
$1,024,842,909

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

FY 2008
CDC
ASPR
$10,241,093 $6,073,401
$5,015,000
$1,312,013
$14,227,671 $7,972,742
$7,435,489
$3,906,396
$50,161,370 $32,625,884
$11,141,885 $6,260,449
$8,927,705
$4,747,354
$5,000,000
$1,534,297
$6,698,743
$1,707,585
$32,940,501 $22,422,494
$18,689,009 $11,847,828
$5,228,184
$2,057,849
$5,405,739
$2,277,157
$19,912,211 $12,605,863
$13,335,867 $8,151,131
$7,702,063
$4,113,883
$7,598,339
$3,849,684
$9,750,535
$5,597,192
$9,998,186
$5,696,194
$5,271,144
$2,102,569
$13,038,391 $7,305,500
$14,805,770 $8,301,006
$20,453,241 $12,734,552
$12,616,406 $6,761,826
$7,629,747
$4,027,180
$13,029,088 $7,580,577
$5,022,876
$1,644,766
$5,877,064
$2,642,978
$7,652,253
$3,524,243
$5,317,054
$2,093,475
$18,788,803 $11,072,985
$7,054,780
$2,868,709
$22,518,790 $13,941,707
$16,696,497 $11,232,884
$5,023,132
$1,270,585
$21,838,104 $14,409,789
$8,740,269
$4,837,520
$9,100,217
$4,984,817
$23,758,643 $15,576,347
$5,012,619
$1,793,799
$9,968,869
$5,736,768
$5,000,000
$1,447,580
$12,844,807 $7,818,211
$43,355,376 $28,988,249
$7,162,839
$3,590,331
$5,041,316
$1,256,092
$17,222,047 $9,762,140
$14,012,182 $8,250,841
$5,933,288
$2,703,739
$12,188,297 $7,233,733
$5,000,000
$1,124,115

Total
$16,314,494
$6,327,013
$22,200,413
$11,341,885
$82,787,254
$17,402,334
$13,675,059
$6,534,297
$8,406,328
$55,362,995
$30,536,837
$7,286,033
$7,682,896
$32,518,074
$21,486,998
$11,815,946
$11,448,023
$15,347,727
$15,694,380
$7,373,713
$20,343,891
$23,106,776
$33,187,793
$19,378,232
$11,656,927
$20,609,665
$6,667,642
$8,520,042
$11,176,496
$7,410,529
$29,861,788
$9,923,489
$36,460,497
$27,929,381
$6,293,717
$36,247,893
$13,577,789
$14,085,034
$39,334,990
$6,806,418
$15,705,637
$6,447,580
$20,663,018
$72,343,625
$10,753,170
$6,297,408
$26,984,187
$22,263,023
$8,637,027
$19,422,030
$6,124,115

CDC Total
FY 08*
$636,383,499

Grand Total
FY 08*
$999,762,508

ASPR* Total
FY 08*
$363,379,009

% Change
FY 07-FY 08
-1.5%
-0.6%
-1.8%
-2.2%
-3.9%
-2.0%
-2.7%
-0.7%
-22.6%
-2.4%
-0.2%
-1.9%
-1.5%
0.3%
-1.9%
-2.4%
-2.3%
-2.5%
-4.7%
-2.4%
-0.4%
0.1%
-4.8%
-1.3%
-2.8%
-2.5%
-0.8%
-2.2%
-1.3%
-0.9%
2.5%
-3.0%
-2.8%
-1.3%
-0.7%
-4.1%
-2.4%
-2.1%
-4.1%
-1.4%
-1.5%
-0.7%
-2.4%
-3.4%
-1.4%
-0.5%
-1.2%
-2.3%
-2.2%
-3.9%
-0.5%
Grand Total
Percent Change
FY 07 - FY 08
-2.4%

*Note that CDC total funding for FY 2007 includes CRI, Level 1 chemical lab capacity, real-time disease detection, and EWIDS funding. It does NOT include pandemic
influenza funding. FY 2008 CDC total funding includes CRI, Level 1 chemical lab capacity, and EWIDS funding. **Note that totals do not include funds for 3 major U.S.
metropolitan areas, Chicago, L.A. County, and New York City, U.S. Territories, such as Puerto Rico and Guam, and Freely Associated States of the Pacific, such as the
Marshall Islands. Source: 1) HHS. HHS Provides More Than $1 Billion to Improve All Hazards Pubilc Health. News Release, June, 3, 2008. <http://www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2008pres/06/20080603a.html> (accessed June 6, 2008). 2) CDC. Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program Announcement
AA154 - FY 2008 (Budget Period 9). Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008, p. 22-24. http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/08/pdf/
fy08announcement.pdf (accessed September 16, 2008). 3) HHS. HHS Provides $430 Million to States to Enhance Hospital and Other Health Care Facilities Preparedness for
Public Health Emergencies. News Release, June 28, 2007 <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/06/pr20070628a.html> (4 CDC. Guidance Document for Continuation of
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements (Budget Period 8). Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007, p. 22-24.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/fy07announcement.pdf (accessed September 16, 2008).
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APPENDIX B: INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUG PURCHASES BY
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND SELECT CITIES
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS STOCKPILE PURCHASES -- STATES, LOCALITIES, AND TERRITORIES
State

Population
4,503,726
648,280
5,579,222
2,727,774
25,591,206
4,547,633
3,486,960
818,166
557,620
16,999,181
8,676,460
1,248,755
1,367,034
9,779,966
6,199,571
2,941,976
2,724,786
4,118,189
4,493,665
1,309,205
5,512,310
6,420,357
10,082,364
5,064,172
2,882,594
5,719,204
918,157
1,737,475
2,242,207
1,288,705
8,642,412
1,878,562
19,212,425
8,421,190
633,400
11,437,680
3,506,469
3,564,330
12,370,761
1,076,084
4,148,744
764,905
5,845,208
22,103,374
2,352,119
619,343
7,365,284
6,131,298
1,811,440
5,474,290
502,111
278,048,349

Initial Allocation*
(06/30/06)
472,860
68,065
585,780
286,397
2,686,899
477,470
366,107
85,902
58,546
1,784,796
910,968
131,111
143,529
1,026,829
650,912
308,887
286,084
432,381
471,804
137,457
578,754
674,093
1,058,578
531,703
302,652
600,477
96,400
182,423
235,416
135,305
907,393
197,236
2,017,172
884,167
66,503
1,200,877
368,155
374,230
1,298,844
112,981
435,589
80,310
613,706
2,320,701
246,956
65,027
773,304
643,744
190,189
574,763
52,718
29,193,150

All Antivirals Purchased
by State (09/30/08)
533,553
77,030
67,717
382,398
2,752,151
215
22,829
121,164
45,000
66,000
474,022
172,487
8,567
516,018
650,912
312,631
286,084
216,224
471,804
0
210,727
50,662
1,076,950
340,640
338,648
600,477
8,174
71,952
135,514
68,000
880,293
77,409
2,444,836
677,882
57,000
1,388,858
54,015
26,523
1,298,792
11,900
459,960
80,310
613,706
1,023,141
52,033
71,036
827,661
417,902
227,561
363,729
52,718
21,185,815

Percent of Allocation
Purchased
112.84%
113.17%
11.56%
133.52%
102.43%
0.05%
6.24%
141.05%
76.86%
3.70%
52.03%
131.56%
5.97%
50.25%
100.00%
101.21%
100.00%
50.01%
100.00%
0.00%
36.41%
7.52%
101.74%
64.07%
111.89%
100.00%
8.48%
39.44%
57.56%
50.26%
97.01%
39.25%
121.20%
76.67%
85.71%
115.65%
14.67%
7.09%
100.00%
10.53%
105.59%
100.00%
100.00%
44.09%
21.07%
109.24%
107.03%
64.92%
119.65%
63.28%
100.00%
72.57%

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California**
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois**
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York (includes NYC)
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
State Subtotal:
Other Entity
American Samoa
Chicago
Fed States of Micronesia
Guam
LA County
Marshall Islands
Northern Marianas Islands
Palau
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Entity Subtotal
TOTAL

57,884
2,869,121
108,143
163,593
9,871,506
56,429
76,129
19,717
3,877,881
108,814
17,209,217
295,257,566

6,077
301,238
11,354
17,176
1,036,440
5,925
7,993
2,070
407,151
11,425
1,806,849
30,999,999

0
200,545
0
0
1,036,440
0
0
0
407,151
0
1,644,136
22,829,951

0.00%
66.57%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
90.99%
73.65%

Source: ASPR, information as of September 30, 2008. * Initial allocation is for subsidized treatment courses only; 25% federal subsidy per treatment course. Many
states have purchased additional antivirals at unsubsidized prices. ** The population count for California and Illinois does not include residents of Los Angeles County or
Chicago, respectively. These two localities, along with the District of Columbia, received their own allocation of federally-subsidized antivirals based on their populations.
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APPENDIX C: DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR STATE
INDICATORS
The data for the state indicators come from
a variety of publicly available sources.
Methodology for Mass Distribution -- Strategic
National Stockpile
Source: CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness
and Response, Division of the Strategic National Stockpile.

TFAH used the states’ 2007 -- 2008 scores on
the CDC technical assistance review (TAR)
of state SNS plans. According to CDC, states
must score 69 or higher out of 100 to satisfactorily document their SNS planning efforts. States were given an opportunity to
verify the SNS TAR scores CDC provided to
TFAH in coordination with ASTHO.
Methodology for Mass Distribution -- Antiviral
Stockpiling
Source: ASPR.

ASPR provided TFAH with the pandemic influenza antiviral drugs stockpile purchases
for states, localities, and territories as of September 30, 2008.
Methodology for Flu Vaccination Rates
Data for this analysis was obtained from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) dataset (publicly available on the
web at cdc.gov/brfss).259 BRFSS is an annual
cross-sectional survey that measures behavioral risk factors in the adult population (18
years of age or older) living in households.
Data are collected from a random sample of
adults (one per household) through a telephone survey. The BRFSS currently includes
data from 50 states, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands. The 2007 statistics are
the most recent data available.
To conduct the analyses, TFAH contracted
with Daniel Eisenberg, Ph.D., assistant professor, and Edward N. Okeke, MBBS, Health
Service Organization and Policy Doctoral
Student, at the Department of Health Management and Policy of the University of
Michigan School of Public Health. Re-
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searchers weighted the data using sample
weights provided by CDC in the dataset and
then merged data on the FLUSHOT variable
from 2004-2007.260 Researchers dropped
observations where either the survey participant answered “don’t know” or refused to answer. These accounted for less than 0.4
percent of the data. Researchers then calculated three-year rolling averages for each
state restricting the sample to only individuals aged 65 and older, and then carried out
hypothesis testing to determine if there were
statistically significant changes in the percentage of adults 65 and over who reported
receiving vaccination for the flu.
Researchers reported three-year averages for
2004-2006 and 2005-2007 as well as standard
errors and 95 percent Confidence Intervals.
They also reported which states experienced
a statistically significant change from 20042006 to 2005-2007. Sample sizes were 246,773
and 300,530 respectively.
Methodology for Public Health Laboratories -Lab Pickup and Delivery Services
Source: APHL

APHL surveyed state public health lab directors between September and October 2008.
All 50 states and D.C. responded to the survey.
Respondents were asked:
Does your State Public Health Lab currently
have an intra-state courier system (non-mail)
that operates 24 hours per day for specimen
pickup and delivery? For the purposes of this
assessment, intra-state courier service refers
to a system that is state owned and operated
or contracted to a designated carrier.
Yes
No. Please explain what system is in place:
______________________
Decline to respond

Methodology for Public Health Laboratories -Pandemic Influenza Planning
Source: APHL

APHL surveyed state public health lab directors between September and October 2008.
All 50 states and D.C. responded to the survey.
Respondents were asked:
1) Are you familiar with the expectations for
your laboratory’s capabilities described in
your state’s pandemic influenza plan?
Yes
No
Decline to respond
2) Can your laboratory meet the expectations
of your state’s pandemic influenza plan?
Yes
No
Decline to respond
Methodology for Biosurveillance - NEDSS
Source: CDC, National Center for Public Health Informatics, Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services.

In order to determine FY 2009 grant allocations, CDC’s Division of Integrated Surveillance Systems and Services queried state
health departments on their NEDSS status.
According to CDC, for a state to be considered NEDSS-compatible, the state health department must have systems that meet three
basic requirements:
1) An internet browser-based system;
2) Electronic laboratory results (ELR) reporting; and

Methodology for Health Care Volunteer
Emergency Liability Protection
TFAH contracted with the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services. A research team consisting of an experienced lawyer and team members with experience in reading and interpreting statutory
text assembled all relevant statutes and then
assessed the statutes using methods of plain
text analysis. Because of growth in the adoption of UEVHPA and the comprehensiveness
of the statute, researchers adopted the following three-tier approach to the review:
1) States adopting the UEVHPA or enacting
its full equivalent, as measured by the terms
of state statutory law;
2) States whose laws offer some, but not all,
of the emergency volunteer protections available under UEVHPA; and
3) States offering only minimal protections
in the form of Good Samaritan Statutes.
The “minimal protections” or “low” category
represents those states with only Good Samaritan or similar laws under which volunteers
may be provided with an affirmative defense,
but not necessarily immunity from liability.
The “some protections” or “medium” group
of states extend protections to volunteers during times of emergency, but may not explicitly
identify health practitioners, may require affiliation with a regional or local emergency
compact, or may not provide coverage to volunteers in the event of injury during rendering of services. Finally, the “UEVHPA” or
“high” protection states have adopted the
model statute or all of its elements.

3) An integrated data repository.
States were given an opportunity to verify
CDC’s NEDSS-compatibility assessment in
coordination with ASTHO.
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Methodology for Entity Emergency Liability
Protection
TFAH contracted with the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health
Services. A research team consisting of an experienced lawyer and team members with experience in reading and interpreting statutory
text assembled all relevant statutes and then
assessed the statutes using methods of plain
text analysis. Researchers examined state law
to identify states that have enacted “volunteer
entity” protections to incentivize emergency
response by public and private actors.
In assessing state law relevant to entity protections, researchers drew from model language
developed by the Public/Private Legal Preparedness Initiative, a special undertaking of the
North Carolina Institute for Public Health.261
Key elements of this model law are as follows:
1) The establishment of a specific coverage
trigger (e.g., a Gubernatorial declaration of
a state of emergency);
2) Retroactive coverage that reaches preplanning and training activities; and
3) An approach to protection that follows the
immunity model used for volunteers rather
than the more limited, “affirmative defense”
approach.
State statutes that extended to entities what
might be thought of as “property” immunity -that is, immunity with respect to injuries involving real or other property owned or controlled
by an entity -- were not included. Rather, in
order to qualify for designation, a state statute
must have focused on protecting conduct undertaken by entities during an emergency.
Methodology for Community Resiliency -Medical Reserve Corps
Source: OCVMRC

The OCVMRC provided TFAH with the raw
data on 791 MRC units nationwide as of October 28, 2008. Variables included: state; region; date established; volunteer count total;
sponsoring organization type; jurisdiction
type; unit focus; Is your MRC unit compliant
with NIMS requirements? (Y/N); If no, is
your MRC unit working towards NIMS com102

pliance? (Y/N); Are your MRC members included in the State volunteer registry (ESARVHP)? (Y/N); If no, do you plan to include
your members in the State volunteer registry
(ESAR-VHP)? (Y/N); Is there a State MRC
Coordinator? (Y/N).
In consultation with OCVMRC, TFAH limited the analysis of MRC units to those 716
units that were more than six months old.
Methodology for Food Safety -- Detection
and Diagnosis
Source: CDC. Summary Statistics for Foodborne Outbreaks, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2005, 2006, and
2007. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/outbreak_data.htm

Data for this indicator were obtained from
CDC’s Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System (publicly available at
h t t p : / / w w w. c d c . g o v / f o o d b o r n e o u tbreaks/outbreak_data.htm.) State health
department are responsible for reporting
foodborne disease outbreaks to CDC
through the Electronic Foodborne Disease
Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS).
TFAH analyzed data from 2004 through 2006
(the most recent year for which data were
available at the time of publication). For
each year, TFAH calculated the total number
of reported outbreaks per state and the total
number of reported outbreaks with confirmed etiology (bacterial, chemical, parasitic, viral, or multiple) per state. TFAH also
calculated the national total number of reported outbreaks and national proportion of
confirmed outbreaks. TFAH combined the
2004 to 2006 data and calculated the three
year average for each state and the nation.
States that met or exceeded the national average of confirmed outbreaks (44 percent)
achieved a point on this indicator; states that
fell below the national average of confirmed
outbreaks earned zero points.
All data for 2004 - 2006 were collected electronically through eFORS without confirmation of etiology by CDC staff; all etiologies
are as reported by the state.

Methodology for Funding Commitment -- State
Public Health Budgets
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spending on public health for the last budget cycle,
fiscal year 2007-2008. For those states that
only report their budgets in biennium cycles,
the 2007-2009 period (or the 2008-2010 and
2009-2010 for Virginia and Wyoming respectively) was used, and the percent change was
calculated from the last biennium, 2005-2007
(or 2006-2008 and 2007-2008 for Virginia
and Wyoming respectively).
This analysis was conducted from August to
October of 2008 using publicly available
budget documents through state government web sites. Based on what was made
publicly available, budget documents used
included either executive budget document
that listed actual expenditures, estimated expenditures, or final appropriations; appropriations bills enacted by the state’s
legislature; or documents from legislative
analysis offices.
“Public health” is defined to broadly include
all health spending with the exception of
Medicaid, CHIP, or comparable health coverage programs for low-income residents.
Federal funds, mental health funds, addiction
or substance abuse-related funds, WIC funds,
services related to developmental disabilities
or severely disabled persons, and state-sponsored pharmaceutical programs also were not

included in order to make the state-by-state
comparison more accurate since many states
receive federal money for these particular
programs. In a few cases, state budget documents did not allow these programs, or other
similar human services, to be disaggregated;
these exceptions are noted. For most states,
all state funding, regardless of general revenue or other state funds (e.g. dedicated revenue, fee revenue, etc.), was used. In some
cases, only general revenue funds were used
in order to separate out federal funds; these
exceptions are also noted.
Because each state allocates and reports its
budget in a unique way, comparisons across
states are difficult. This methodology may include programs that, in some cases, the state
may consider a public health function, but
the methodology used was selected to maximize the ability to be consistent across states.
As a result, there may be programs or items
states may wish to be considered “public
health” that may not be included in order to
maintain the comparative value of the data.
Finally, to improve the comparability of the
budget data between FY 2006-2007 and FY
2007-2008 (or between biennium), TFAH adjusted the FY 2007-2008 numbers for inflation (using a 0.95 conversion factor based on
the U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics; Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).
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APPENDIX D: FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS ADVISORY
GROUPS, PANELS AND COMMITTEES
TITLE

MISSION

The Department of Homeland
Security Homeland Security
Advisory Council

The Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Advisory Council
provides advice and recommendations to the secretary of DHS on a variety of
homeland security issues, including public health and health care.262 The Committee
is the secretary’s primary advisory body and its 21 members are experts from state
and local governments, terrorism prevention and response communities, academia
and the private sector, including health care.
The Department of Homeland Security National Advisory Council (NAC)
was born post-Katrina and has 30 members across the country. The NAC’s work
has focused on the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident
Management System (NIMS), and special needs populations. The NAC reports to
the administrator of FEMA, which has started to place a heavy emphasis on regional
coordination. NAC members are appointed by the FEMA administrator and are
drawn from a wide cross-section of society, both in terms of geographic location and
professional experience. The initial NAC charter expires in February 2009 and must
be renewed in accordance with the law.263
The Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC) was self-established
by the health care sector, as a part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program as part of HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection. Per HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, HHS serves
as the Sector Specific Agency for the health care and public health sector. HSPD-7 also
encouraged the creation of an independent self-governed sector coordinating council
for 17 critical sectors of the U.S. economy, including health care. The HSCC is to
coordinate with a wide variety of health care components including direct health care
delivery systems (hospitals, clinicians/personnel, etc), insurers/payors, health
information technology, laboratories and blood services, mass fatality/mortuary
services, medical materials management (manufacturers/distributors/suppliers),
occupational health, and the pharmaceutical/biotech industry and share this sector’s
concerns with HHS. The HSCC includes over 100 representatives of the companies,
organizations, trade associations, and professional societies that either own and
operate or play a critical role in ensuring the continuity of the nation’s healthcare
system. HSCC has responsibility for activities such as communicating potential risks,
threats, and vulnerabilities to private health care organizations.264 The HSCC and the
HPH GCC work closely together to better protect the nation’s critical infrastructure
and key resources.
As a partner to the HSCC, the HPH GCC is led by HHS and consists of
representatives from a wide-variety of federal agencies, national associations
representing state, local, tribal, and territorial public health entities, and members
from various state and local jurisdictions. The HPH GCC was also established in
response to HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The HPH
GCC is tasked with the same mission as the HSCC but to represent the federal,
state, local, tribal, and territorial public health and health care entities. The HSCC
and the HPH GCC work closely together to better protect the nation’s critical
infrastructure and key resources.
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) serves as a source of independent, scientific and technical planning
advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. The Committee’s
primary focus is the use of science and technology to prevent or mitigate the effects
of catastrophic emergencies -- both terrorist attacks and natural disasters.265

The Department of Homeland
Security National Advisory
Council (NAC)

The Healthcare Sector
Coordinating Council (HSCC)

The Healthcare and Public Health
Sector Government Coordinating
Council (HPH GCC)

The Homeland Security Science
and Technology Advisory
Committee (HSSTAC)
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TITLE

MISSION

The Interagency Coordinating
Council on Emergency Preparedness
and Individuals with Disabilities

The Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and
Individuals with Disabilities was established in 2004 to ensure that the federal
government appropriately supports safety and security for individuals with disabilities in
disaster situations.266 Housed within DHS, the Council has three priorities. First, the
Council is to consider the unique needs of federal agency employees with disabilities and
individuals with disabilities whom the agency serves. Second, the Council is to
encourage state, local, and tribal governments to consider the unique needs of
employees and individuals with disabilities in emergency preparedness planning. Finally,
the Council is to facilitate cooperation among federal, state, local, and tribal governments
and private organizations and individuals in the implementation of emergency
preparedness plans as they relate to individuals with disabilities. Council members
include the heads of executive departments, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Administrator of General Services, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, and the Commissioner of Social Security.
The IOM Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic
Events serves to bring together leaders from government, academic, and private
sectors to openly discuss issues of concern. The Forum members identify topics of
interest for meetings and workshops. Initially, the Forum has focused on: medical surge
capacity, disaster preparedness training, communication and distribution, psychological
and community resilience, and research and evaluation. The Forum is sponsored by
federal agencies, state and local associations, health professional associations, and
private sector business associations. There are 32 members and a staff of four.
The National Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals and Public
Health Emergencies, formerly the National Advisory Committee on Children
and Terrorism, was created under the 2006 PAHPA legislation to focus on public
health emergencies as they relate to at-risk individuals. According to the Office for
At Risk Individuals, Behavioral Health, and Human Services Coordination at ASPR,
the charge for the Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals and Public Health
Emergencies has significantly evolved since its previous iteration and steps must be
taken to determine how best to reconstitute the group and reestablish it. In the
meantime, HHS is currently working on related at-risk issues through existing
relevant advisory committees, such as the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB)
and the Commission on Children and Disasters.267
The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB) was created under PAHPA
and has a five-year mandate (2007 -- 2012).268 The NBSB was established to provide
expert advice and guidance to the secretary of the HHS on scientific, technical,
and other matters of special interest to HHS regarding activities to prevent, prepare
for, and respond to adverse health effects of public health emergencies resulting from
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological events, whether naturally occurring,
accidental, or deliberate. On March 4, 2008, the charter of the NBSB was amended to
allow the NBSB to provide advice and guidance to the secretary on other matters
related to public health emergency preparedness and response.269 There are 13 voting
members of the NBSB in addition to non-voting, ex officio members. There are five
working groups under NBSB that focus on: pandemic influenza, disaster medicine,
medical countermeasures R&D, medical countermeasures sustainability and market
development, and personal preparedness; and one subcommittee on disaster mental
health. NBSB planned to issue a series of recommendations from each working group
in the summer and fall of 2008

The IOM Forum on Medical and
Public Health Preparedness for
Catastrophic Events

The National Advisory Committee
on At-Risk Individuals and Public
Health Emergencies

The National Biodefense Science
Board (NBSB)
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TITLE

MISSION

The National Biosurveillance
Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS)

The National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) was created
as part of HSPD-21, which mandated that the secretary of HHS, in collaboration with
other federal agencies, create an “Epidemiologic Surveillance Federal Advisory
Committee” that includes representatives from state and local government public
health authorities and appropriate private sector health care entities. The
Committee’s role is “to ensure that the federal government is meeting the goal of
enabling state and local government public health surveillance capabilities.”270 The
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee is a subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee to the Director of CDC.271

The National Commission on
Children and Disasters

The National Commission on Children and Disasters was established in
December 2007. The commission chair and nine members are appointed by the
president and bipartisan members of Congress. The panel of experts will
recommend changes that federal, state, and local governments need to make to
meet the needs of children in emergencies, including planning, response and recovery
efforts. The Commission held its first meeting October 14, 2008, more than 10
months after its creation, and well into the 2008 hurricane season, which saw
devastating storms Gustav and Ike tear across the Gulf states.272

The National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was developed by HHS
to help confront the so-called “dual-use dilemma” -- that the research in biology,
chemistry, and radiology can be used inappropriately for the purposes of bioterrorism
or biowarfare. NASBB offers advice and recommendations on how to further
biotechnological research while minimizing the risk of harm. NASBB is housed in the
Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) within the Office of the Director, NIH.273
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APPENDIX E: KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES
UNDER PAHPA
KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Deliverable
Section 201 (g) (1) -- Achievement
of measurable evidence-based
benchmarks and objective standards.
Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the
HHS secretary shall develop or where
appropriate adopt, and require the
application of, measurable evidencebased benchmarks and objective
standards that measure levels of
preparedness. In developing such
benchmarks and standards, the secretary
shall consult with and seek comments
from state, local and tribal officials and
private entities, as appropriate. Where
appropriate, the HHS secretary shall
incorporate existing objective
standards.
Section 201 (g) (2) -- Criteria for
pandemic influenza plans. Not later
than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS
secretary shall develop and
disseminate to the chief executive
officer of each state criteria for an
effective state plan for responding
to pandemic influenza.

Section 202 (d) (2) -- Public Health
Situational Awareness. Not later than
180 days after the date of enactment
the Pandemic and All- Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate
committees of the Congress a
strategic plan demonstrating the
steps the HHS secretary will
undertake to develop, implement,
and evaluate the interoperable
network of systems for real-time
disease detection and surveillance.

Why the Deliverable
is Important
This demonstrates the federal
government’s ability to develop
clear, evidence-based
performance metrics to
evaluate federal and state
emergency preparedness.

Due Date
June 2007

Met?
Yes. HHS is using new
capability-based performance
measures for the PHEP
grantees.274 As CDC and the
research community build a
stronger research base on
preparedness, CDC expects to
roll out new objectives.

This demonstrates the federal
government’s ability to provide
clear direction and guidance to
state emergency planners and
keep variation among states
pandemic plans to a minimum.

June 2007

Yes. HHS sent a letter with
criteria and guidance to states
on January 26, 2007.275

This reflects federal commitment
to a near real-time electronic
surveillance system, which is
necessary to quickly identify and
track disease outbreaks and
biological and chemical incidents
(accidental or intentional).

June 2007

Revised guidance was sent out in
March 2008 and revised plans
were submitted in June 2008.
ASPR expects to release the
results of the review in
December 2008, although delays
in the review and the presidential
transition may postpone the
release.276
Yes. On October 31, 2008
CDC’s Biosurveillance
Coordination Unit (BCU)
released the latest draft version
of the National Biosurveillance
Strategy for Human Health.
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Deliverable
Section 301(a) (C) (2) -- Joint review
and medical surge capacity strategic
plan. Not later than 180 days after date
of enactment of the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the HHS
secretary, in coordination with the
secretary of Homeland Security,
secretary of Defense, and secretary of
Veterans Affairs, shall conduct a joint
review of the National Disaster
Medical System. Such review shall
include an evaluation of medical surge
capacity.
Section 201(j) (1) -- Annual reporting
requirements. Each entity shall prepare
and submit to the HHS secretary annual
reports on its activities under this
section and section 319C-2 of the
Public Health Service Act. Each such
report shall be prepared by, or in
consultation with, the health
department. In order to properly
evaluate and compare the performance
of different entities assisted under this
section and section 319C-2 and to
assure the proper expenditure of funds
under this section and section 319C-2,
such reports shall be in such
standardized form and contain such
information as the HHS secretary
determines and describes within
180 days of the date of enactment
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act.
Section 303(a) -- Not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary, in collaboration
with state, local, and tribal officials, shall
build on state, local, and tribal
programs in existence on the date
of enactment of such Act to
establish and maintain a Medical
Reserve Corps to provide for an
adequate supply of volunteers in the
case of a Federal, State, local, or tribal
public health emergency. The corps shall
be headed by a director who shall be
appointed by the HHS secretary and
shall oversee the activities of the corps
chapters that exist at the state, local,
and tribal levels.
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Why the Deliverable
is Important
This demonstrates the ability of
HHS to lead and coordinate with
other key federal agencies on
issues of concern for public health
preparedness, such as medical
surge capacity.

Due Date
June 2007

Met?
Yes. The Department has
completed a joint review with
the Departments of homeland
security, defense, and veterans
affairs of the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS), although
the final report has not yet
been released.

This demonstrates the federal
government’s commitment to
tracking the use of federal
preparedness dollars.

June 2007

Yes. ASPR receives annual
health-department prepared,
standardized progress reports
on HPP grantee program activities.
ASPR uses these reports to
properly evaluate HPP
grant-related performance and
assure the expenditure of funds
requirements are met for HPP.277

This reflects the federal
government’s ability to set forth a
nationally recognized certification
process for health care volunteers
who serve in emergency public
health events and recruit said
volunteers.

June 2007

Yes. The department expanded
the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC)
to provide for an adequate supply
of volunteers in the case of a
federal, state, tribal, territorial,
or local public health emergency.

KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Deliverable
Section 401 -- Not later than six months
after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary shall develop
and make public a strategic plan to
integrate biodefense and emerging
infectious disease requirements
with the advanced research and
development, strategic initiatives for
innovation, and the procurement of
qualified countermeasures and qualified
pandemic or epidemic products.
Section 303(b) -- Not later than 12
months after the date of enactment of
the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary
shall link existing state verification
systems to maintain a single national
interoperable network of systems,
each system being maintained by a state
or group of states, for the purpose of
verifying the credentials and licenses of
health care professionals who volunteer
to provide health services during a public
health emergency.
Section 402 -- The HHS secretary shall
establish the National Biodefense
Science Board to provide expert advice
and guidance to the HHS secretary on
scientific, technical and other matters of
special interest to the Department of
Health and Human Services regarding
current and future chemical, biological,
nuclear, and radiological agents, whether
naturally occurring, accidental, or
deliberate.

Why the Deliverable
is Important
This illustrates the federal
government’s ability to set a
national strategy for research and
development, innovation support,
and procurement of
countermeasures to chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) agents and emerging
infectious diseases.

This reflects the federal
government’s ability to set forth a
nationally recognized certification
process for health care volunteers
who serve in emergency public
health events.

This illustrates the federal
government’s ability to convene
leading experts from government,
private sector and research
institutions to come together to
guide the national strategy for
research and development,
innovation support, and
procurement of countermeasures
to chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) agents and
emerging infectious diseases.
Section 402(A) -- Not later than one
This illustrates the federal
year after the date of enactment of the government’s ability to convene
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness leading experts in government,
Act, the HHS secretary shall hold
private sector and research
the first meeting of the National
institutions to come together to
Biodefense Science Board.
guide the national strategy for
research and development,
innovation support, and
procurement of countermeasures
to chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) agents and
emerging infectious diseases.

Due Date
June 2007

Met?
Yes. On July 7, 2007, Secretary
Michael Leavitt published a
Draft BARDA Strategic Plan for
Countermeasure Research,
Development and Procurement, to
guide and facilitate the research,
development, innovation, and
procurement of medical
countermeasures and build upon
established national strategies
and directives.

December
2007

Yes. The department has written
compliance requirements for
state participation in the
ESAR-VHP program. As of
October 1, 2008 (FY 2009)
participation in ESAR-VHP will be
a mandatory requirement to
receive future grant dollars
from the PHEP.

December
2007

Yes. On May 24, 2007, Secretary
Leavitt established and issued a
call for nominations to the
National Biodefense Science
Board (NBSB).
On December 17, 2007 Secretary
Leavitt announced the 13
members of the NBSB.278

December
2007

Yes. Secretary Leavitt held the
inaugural meeting of the NBSB
December 17 -18, 2007.279
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Deliverable
Section 102(d) -- Amends the Public
Health Service Act by inserting Section
2814(1). The HHS secretary shall
oversee the implementation of the
national preparedness goal of taking
into account the public health and
medical needs of at-risk individuals
in the event of a public health
emergency. Not later than one year
after the date of enactment of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, the HHS secretary shall prepare
and submit to the U.S. Congress a
report describing the progress made
on implementing the duties
described in this section.
Section 201(g) (5) -- Withholding of
amounts from entities that fail to
achieve benchmarks or submit
influenza plans.

Why the Deliverable
is Important
This benchmark reflects how well
the federal government is
implementing plans to reach at-risk
populations, including the elderly
and other special needs individuals.

This component of the bill links
funding with accountability, which
motivates states to meet
preparedness benchmarks.

Due Date
December
2007

Met?
Yes. The Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act
Progress Report released in
November 2007 describes the
progress made toward
implementing duties related
to at-risk individuals.

October 2008 Yes. CDC established 10
(FY 2009)
benchmarks that state and local
grantees are required to meet in
order to receive their full PHEP
base funding. States that fail to
meet these benchmarks can lose
up to 10 percent of their FY 2009
base PHEP funding.280 This funding
will be distributed in August 2009.
ASPR established five state-level
and seven hospital-level
performance measures that HPP
grantees much achieve. Those
that fail to substantially meet the
benchmarks will have funds
withheld from FY 2009
awards.281,282 This funding will be
distributed in August 2009.
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KEY DELIVERABLES AND DUE DATES UNDER P.L. 109-417
Deliverable
Section 202 (d) (1) -- Public Health
Situational Awareness. Not later than
two years after the date of enactment
of the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act, the HHS secretary, in
collaboration with state, local, and tribal
public health officials, shall establish a
near real-time electronic nationwide
public situational awareness
capability through an interoperable
network to share data and
information to enhance early
detection of rapid response to, and
management of, potentially
catastrophic infectious disease
outbreaks and other public health
emergencies that originate
domestically or abroad. Such network
shall be built on existing state situational
awareness systems or enhanced systems
that enable such connectivity.
Section 103 -- Amends the Public Health
Service Act and adds Section 2802(a) (1).
Preparedness and response regarding
public health emergencies. Beginning in
2009 and every four years thereafter,
the HHS secretary shall prepare and
submit to the relevant committees
of the congress a coordinated
strategy (to be known as the
National Health Security Strategy)
and any revisions thereof, and an
accompanying implementation plan
for public health emergency
preparedness and response.

Why the Deliverable
is Important
This reflects federal commitment
to a near real-time electronic
surveillance system, which is
necessary to quickly identify and
track disease outbreaks and
biological and chemical incidents
(accidental or intentional).

This quadrennial review of public
health emergency preparedness
illustrates the importance of the
issues and the need to keep
continually updating and revising
preparedness plans.

Due Date
January 2009

Met?
In progress. In early 2008, CDC
established the Biosurveillance
Coordination Unit (BCU) to lead
the development of a strategy
and implementation plan for
integrated human biosurveillance.
However, a DHS entity, the NBIC,
will integrate all biosurveillance,
including data from CDC, USDA,
FDA, DOD, EPA, VA, and ODNI.

2009

In progress. HHS has completed
the preliminary work of defining
key terms and creating a
framework to guide development
of the National Health Security
Strategy. HHS is now being
supported by the RAND
Corporation to carry out a broad
community engagement plan
and finalize the strategy and
accompanying implementation
plan and evaluation framework.
HHS anticipates meeting the
2009 legislative deadline in
delivering the strategy
to Congress.283

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act Progress
Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November 2007. http://www.hhs.gov/aspr
/conference/pahpa/2007/pahpa-progress-report-102907.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007), except where noted.
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